Opinion
03-CV-862 (MJD/JGL)
June 25, 2003
Memorandum Opinion Order
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The plaintiff, Michael Beach ("Plaintiff"), filed a Complaint in federal district court on January 15, 2003. The claims alleged in the Complaint are as follows: Count I, Equal Protection; Count II, Violation of Due Process; Count III, Violation of Privacy; Count IV, Unconstitutional Taking of Property; Count V, False Imprisonment, Imprisonment for Debt, and Threat of Imprisonment for Debt; Count VI, Constitutional Violation of the Liberty Interest in Family; Count VII, Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, a declaration that Minn. Stat. Chapt. 518 is unconstitutional, and an order enjoining the defendant, the State of Minnesota ("the State"), from enforcing Minn. Stat. Chapt. 518 against him.
The State brings this motion pursuant to Fed R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Oral arguments were heard on this matter on April 28, 2003.
BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is the biological father of two children. A Judgment and Decree of Dissolution of the Plaintiff's marriage was issued on June 4, 1999. An Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and Judgment and Decree was entered on August 17, 1999.
The Judgment and Decree awarded sole legal and physical custody of the Plaintiff's children to their natural mother.
Plaintiff states that prior to the marriage dissolution he was a "fully-involved and full-time father" to his children and that he desires to continue to be a full-time parent.
In November of 1996, Plaintiff's ex-wife initiated child custody proceedings. Prior to that, the Plaintiff and his ex-wife had a parenting agreement which they had entered into before their separation. Thereafter, however, the Plaintiff's parenting time was restricted and continued to be restricted through subsequent orders during dissolution and post-dissolution proceedings. In particular, the Plaintiff asserts that his parenting time was diminished by the following court orders:
(1.) A June 26, 1998 Order which reduced his parenting time from 40% to 30% while maintaining joint legal custody.
(2.) A June 6, 1999 Judgment and Decree awarding his ex-wife sole physical and legal custody of the children.
(3.) An October 30, 2002 Order amending the Judgment and Decree and vacating the Plaintiff's visitation rights.
Plaintiff further states that he was arrested from his home on August 9, 2002 on a bench warrant for constructive civil contempt.
Among the claims alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint are that the state court (1.) unlawfully restricted his parenting time; (2.) ordered his arrest for constructive civil contempt; (3.) denied his right to be heard in a cost of living adjustment to his child support; (4.) improperly denied his requests for relief from child support and child custody orders; (5.) conspired to violate his civil rights by making custody and child support orders and enforcing the orders against him, and (6.) that Minn. Stat. 518 is unconstitutional because the custody provisions, have a discriminatory impact upon men and that the child custody statutes violate his right to liberty and family privacy by interfering in his childrearing decisions without first finding that he is an unfit parent.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the child support ordered by the state court pursuant to Chapter 518 is unconstitutional in that the court violated due process by imposing a child support award that is not related to the actual costs of raising his children. He further contends that the statute's child support provisions violate equal protection because they apply to divorced families and not to marriages, and that the child support statutes impose an unconstitutional taking of his property and an unconstitutional threat of imprisonment for failure to pay a debt.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the State argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any of Plaintiff's claims against the State, the sole defendant, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Further, the State contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the Plaintiff seeks review of state court orders. Lastly, the State argues that Beach's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For the purposes of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes all facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint as true. Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Further, the Court must construe the allegations in the Complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the Complaint favorably to Plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). A motion to dismiss will be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Id.; see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Court applies those standards in the following discussion.
DISCUSSION 1. Plaintiff's Request For Default Judgment
The State filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer on February 5, 2003. In his Memorandum of Law, the Plaintiff argues that the State is in default for filing a motion to dismiss rather than an answer to the Complaint. This argument is without merit. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to file either a 12(b) motion or an answer. Further, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) states regarding the Rule 12(b) defenses, including 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), that "[a] motion making any one of these defenses shall be made before pleading if further pleading is permitted." Id. This district has held that, "when a motion to dismiss has been filed, no answer need be filed until ten days after the court disposes of the motion." Northland Insurance Companies v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp.2d 1108, 1115 (D.Minn. 2000).
2. Eleventh Amendment
The State argues that state sovereign immunity bars the Court from considering this matter. The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as barring individual citizens from suing states in federal court, including their own state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 10 S.CT. 504, 505, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); Murphy v. State of Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff argues that the federal district court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter. While in most instances federal district courts do have federal question jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by individuals against states in federal court, even where suit is based on a federal question. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. Due to federalist principles, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued." Employees v. Missouri Dept of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978).
Two exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity exist. First, a state may be sued in federal court where Congress, through an enactment of legislation pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, has made an unequivocal expression of intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995).
Second, an exception applies when a state consents to suit in federal court. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S.Ct. 878, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883); Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 84 So. Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233. In order for the state waiver exception to apply, "[a]s a general matter, only unmistakable and explicit waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity" is adequate. Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 50 F.3d 502, 506 (8th Cir. 1995).
The Plaintiff does not argue that Congress has abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in the particular federal claims asserted in the Complaint. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that § 1983 claims do not restrict a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); see also Williams v. State of Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 1992). Congress also has not abrogated state immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See Begun v. State Bd. Of Registration, 531 F. Supp. 955, 956 (E.D.Mo. 1982).; An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137, 1162 (W.D.Mich. 1980).
Likewise, the State has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to the federal claims alleged in the Complaint. See Minn. Stat. § 1.05 (Supp. 2001) (waiving Minnesota's immunity for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
3. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Even assuming Plaintiff's claims were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts, other than the U.S. Supreme Court, from reviewing state court judgments. Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). In addition, even claims that are "inextricably intertwined with state court judgments are outside the scope of federal district court jurisdiction." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16. "A general federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 41 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marhsall, J. concurring).
Plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum of Law indicate that his claims arise from his dissatisfaction with the results of recent state court orders relating to child custody and visitation rights. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff states:
Plaintiff has, is, and will suffer irreparable injury from the deprivation of rights resulting from order issued under authority of Minnesota Chapter 518 . . . Unless and until the unjust and unequal treatment of Plaintiff as a natural parent, which has arisen by reason of the enactment and enforcement of Chapter 518, is lifted, Plaintiff will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury.
(Compl. ¶ 28-29).
Although the Plaintiff does not directly request an appeal of the state court's judgment, his claims are nonetheless barred by Rooker-Feldman. The Eighth Circuit has stated that, "federal plaintiffs cannot by artful pleading obtain a hearing of disguised state court appeals that would be otherwise subject to a Rooker-Feldman bar." Lemonds, 22 F.3d at 494. Further, "cases interpreting the doctrine make it clear that a litigant cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman by recasting his or her lawsuit as a § 1983 action." Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990).
The Court finds that the relief the Plaintiff seeks would "only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong," hence becoming nothing, "other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment." Keene Corp., 908 F.2d at 296-297 (citation omitted); see Postma v. First Federal Savings Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996). As such, the Court is prohibited from considering the Plaintiff's claims to the extent that they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The only claim that is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the Plaintiff's overall claim that Minn. Stat. Chapt. 518 is unconstitutional. See Postma, 74 F.3d at 162, n. 3 (holding that a federal district court would have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to a state statute which would not require review of state court judgment). Nevertheless, this claim is barred for the reasons stated in the Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that,
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket #5) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket #3) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #4) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.