Opinion
NO. 2023 CA 0446
12-14-2023
BAYOU MANCHAC HOLDINGS, LLC, 1015 Highway 30, LLC, Blue Sapphire Investment Company, LLC v. IBERVILLE PARISH COUNCIL and J. Mitchell Ourso, Jr.
Jill L. Craft, W. Brett Conrad, Jr., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Bayou Manchac Holdings, LLC, 1015 Highway 30, LLC, and Blue Sapphire Investment Company, LLC F. Barry Marionneaux, Plaquemine, Louisiana, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Iberville Parish Council and J. Mitchell Ourso, Jr., in his Individual Capacity and in his Official Capacity as Parish President
On Appeal from the 18th Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberville, State of Louisiana, Trial Court No. 81,663, The Honorable Alvin Batiste, Jr., Judge Presiding
Jill L. Craft, W. Brett Conrad, Jr., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Bayou Manchac Holdings, LLC, 1015 Highway 30, LLC, and Blue Sapphire Investment Company, LLC
F. Barry Marionneaux, Plaquemine, Louisiana, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees, Iberville Parish Council and J. Mitchell Ourso, Jr., in his Individual Capacity and in his Official Capacity as Parish President
BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
Judge Guy Holdridge, retired, is serving as pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court
WOLFE, J.
2Owners of immovable property in Iberville Parish, Louisiana, brought this lawsuit for a declaratory judgment against the parish and the president of the parish, in his individual and official capacity, seeking a declaration of rights relative to the development of a new residential subdivision in the City of St. Gabriel. The Parish President, in his individual capacity, filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, asserting that there are no allegations that he individually engaged in any activity that would warrant the entry of a declaratory judgment against him personally. The trial court sustained the exception and the property owners appealed. For the following reasons, we find that the trial court improperly certified the judgment as final, and we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Bayou Manchac Holdings, LLC, 1015 Highway 30, LLC, and Blue Sapphire Investment Company, LLC, are Louisiana limited liability companies that own immovable property located within the incorporated limits of the City of St. Gabriel, in Iberville Parish, Louisiana. In 2017, plaintiffs entered into an agreement to sell the property to America Homeland, LLC, for the purpose of developing the property into a residential subdivision to be known as the Riverstone Development. Plaintiffs began the process of obtaining approval for the development of the subdivision and obtained approval by the City of St. Gabriel on March 6, 2020. However, the Iberville Parish Council and the Parish President, J. Mitchell Ourso, Jr., (Ourso), did not approve the development of the new subdivision, primarily due to flooding and stormwater drainage concerns.
On June 24, 2022, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief, naming the Iberville Parish Council and Ourso, individually and in his official capacity as Parish President, as defendants. Plaintiffs requested that the trial court declare that they may immediately develop the new subdivision and that the Parish Council and Parish 3President may not obstruct, stop, or delay the development. In response, Ourso, in his individual capacity, filed a Peremptory Exception Raising the Objection of No Cause of Action, asserting that he is entitled to immunity, and that there are no allegations demonstrating that he, as an individual, wrongfully refused to allow the development of the new subdivision. Ourso essentially argued that all of plaintiffs’ allegations against him related solely to his position as Parish President in the performance of discretionary functions. Plaintiffs opposed Ourso’s exception, maintaining that Ourso exceeded his authority as Parish President and that he was not entitled to immunity for his conduct that was not within the course and scope of his position as Parish President.
After a hearing on September 29, 2022, the trial court sustained Ourso’s objection of no cause of action as to claims made against him individually, but allowed plaintiffs thirty days to amend their petition to state a cause of action against Ourso in his individual capacity. That judgment was signed on November 16, 2022. Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental, Amending, and Restated Petition for Declaratory Relief on October 31, 2022. In their amended petition, plaintiffs inserted the phrase, "individually and in his official capacity" after each reference to Ourso. Plaintiffs also added a new paragraph outlining instances where the Parish Council and Parish President, individually and in his official capacity, acted recklessly, outrageously, and willfully by intentionally forcing plaintiffs to conduct two expensive drainage impact studies, meet potable water requirements, and overcome an alleged moratorium on new subdivision developments.
Ourso, in his individual capacity, filed a second exception of no cause of action, which was heard by the trial court on February 2, 2023. In a judgment signed on February 15, 2023, the trial court again sustained Ourso’s exception and dismissed Ourso, in his individual capacity, with prejudice. The trial court expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay and that the judgment was final 4pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(A)(1). Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Ourso was entitled to immunity because Ourso had no power to preclude the development of the new subdivision.
DISCUSSION
The partial judgment before us was rendered in an action for declaratory judgment; it is partial in that it only dismisses one party in one capacity, but the party remains in the lawsuit in another capacity. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1871 provides that a declaratory judgment "shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1877 further provides that declaratory judgments "may be reviewed as other orders, judgments, and decrees." Asay v. Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon, 2020-0852 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/16/21), 323 So.3d 395, 398; Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 2002-0716 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/30/03), 867 So.2d 715, 717. A final judgment of the trial court can be appealed. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2083. Whether a partial final judgment is appealable is determined by examining the requirements of La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915. Motorola, 867 So.2d at 717.
[1] In this case, the trial court designated the judgment as final pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915, after expressly determining that there was no just reason for delay. However, the trial court did not provide reasons for the designation. Therefore, before we consider the merits of the appeal, we must determine whether the judgment is properly certified, because the designation is not determinative of 5this court’s jurisdiction. Asay, 323 So.3d at 398. See also Radcliffe 10, L.L.C. v. Burger, 2017-0967 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/29/18), 251 So.3d 435, 440.
In the judgment, the trial court states that "it is expressly determined that there is no just reason for delay and this is hereby a final judgment under La. [Code Civ. P.] art. 1915(A)(1)." We are compelled to note that a partial judgment dismissing the suit as to less than all of the parties pursuant to Article 1915(A)(1) does not require a designation as a final judgment, and is immediately appealable. However, when the trial court renders a partial judgment as to one or more but less than all of the claims against a party, as in the case sub judice, the judgment must be designated as final after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, pursuant to Article 1915(B)(1). In the absence of such a determination and designation, the judgment is not final for the purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all of the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B)(2).
[2–6] Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Co., Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044, 1046 (en banc); Radcliffe, 251 So.3d at 440. If no reasons for the certification are given, but some justification is apparent from the record, the appellate court should make a de novo determination of whether the certification is proper. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1119. Appellate courts have a policy against multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation. Our goal is to promote judicial efficiency and economy in the administration of justice. Thus, in considering whether a judgment has been properly designated as final and appealable, a trial court must consider judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Id. at 1122.
[7, 8] Some of the factors a trial court should take into account in making a certification that a partial judgment is final and there is no just reason for delay, are: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the trial court; (3) the likelihood that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and (4) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Messinger, 894 So.2d at 1122. However, the overriding inquiry for the trial court is whether there is no just reason for delay. Id. at 1122-1123.
In this case, all parties acknowledge that Ourso remains in the lawsuit in his official capacity as Parish President and the issue of Ourso’s immunity has not been completely adjudicated. Additionally, the Parish Council’s immunity, if any, must 6still be decided. Thus, the possibility of piece-meal appeals involving the same parties and the same issues is clearly evident. Given the nature of the claims and the procedural posture of this case, we find that addressing the issues at this time would promote piecemeal appeals and would not make review available at a time that best serves the parties. Accordingly, on our de novo review of the record, we cannot conclude that there is no just reason for delay. Thus, the trial court’s certification does not meet the requirements of Messinger. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
The plaintiffs may proffer at the trial on the merits any evidence that they have as to the liability of Ourso, individually. In that matter, a complete record will be before this court in the event of an appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, we dismiss this appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiffs-appellants, Bayou Manchac Holdings, LLC, 1015 Highway 30, LLC, and Blue Sapphire Investment Company, LLC.
APPEAL DISMISSED; REMANDED.
Welch, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
*Judge Guy Holdridge, retired, is serving as pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court*
WELCH, J., dissenting.
1I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The February 15, 2023 judgment is clearly wrong in two respects. First—the February 15, 2023 judgment is an impermissible partial grant of a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, which is prohibited by law. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1993); State, by and through Caldwell v. Astra Zeneca AB, 2016-1073 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/11/18), 249 So.3d 38, 50-51, writs denied, 2018-00766, 2018-0758 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So.3d 899, 904; Expert Riser Solutions, LLC v. Techcrane International, LLC, 2018-0612 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/18), 270 So.3d 655, 663. Here, the trial court’s partial grant of Mr. Ourso’s no cause of action exception resulted in a judgment that only dismissed certain claims, all of which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. If there are two or more items of damages or theories of recovery that arise from the operative facts of a single transaction or occurrence, a partial judgment on an exception of no cause of action should not be rendered to dismiss one item of damages or theory of recovery. In such a case, there is truly only one cause of action—a request for a declaratory judgment—and a judgment partially maintaining the exception is inappropriate. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, 616 So.2d at 1239; Astra Zeneca AB, 249 So.3d at 50-51; Expert Riser Solutions, 270 So.3d at 663.
2As to the merits of the exception of no cause of action—in my de novo review of this matter, I find that the trial court legally erred in sustaining the re-urged peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action filed by Mr. Ourso and dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims against him in his individual capacity. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment. This court reviews a trial court’s ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action de novo, since the exception raises a question of law. Christian Schools, Inc. v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Association, 2020-0762-R (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/18/22), 342 So.3d 1068, 1075, writ denied, 2022-01015 (La. 10/12/22), 348 So.3d 78.
We consider the petition and amended petition filed by plaintiffs in conducting a de novo review. There are no annexed documents to review. In their amended petition, plaintiffs alleged as follows:
Petitioners contend defendants Parish and Ourso, individually and in his official capacity, acted recklessly, outrageously, and willfully by intentionally forcing Petitioners, without the authority of law: (1) to spend over $200,000.00 on a drainage impact study demonstrating the "Riverstone Development" would have no adverse impact and actually improve drainage, (2) to obtain a second drainage impact study performed by defendant Ourso’s hand-picked engineer, (3) to ensure all potable water requirements were and/or are met, and (4) to be precluded from development due to an alleged "moratorium" which does not apply to Petitioners’ property. Petitioners contend the reckless, outrageous, and willful action by defendants Parish and Ourso, individually and in his official capacity, have taken Petitioners’ immovable property out of commerce without any legal light or power to do so. Petitioners further contend the actions of defendants Parish and Ourso, individually and in his official capacity, are ultra-vir[es] and outside the scope of their limited, statutory duties and authorities.
Defendants Parish and Ourso, individually and in his official capacity, have no discretionary or policy making ability to preclude Petitioners from developing the "Riverstone Development", Precluding Petitioners from development is not grounded in any social, economic, or political policy and, is instead, based on the unilateral, unjust, and improper whim of defendants Parish and Ourso, individually and in his official capacity.
In ruling on an exception of no cause of action, the trial court must determine 3whether the law affords any relief to the claimant if he were to prove the factual allegations in the petition and annexed documents at a trial. Shekinah Glory Ministries v. One Way Deliverance Ministry, 2022-1170 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/20/23), 366 So.3d 1256, 1259. An exception of no cause of action is triable solely on the face of the petition and any annexed documents thereto. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 931; Shekinah Glory Ministries, 366 So.3d at 1259. For purposes of the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any documents annexed to the petition must be accepted as true. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 853, 927, and 931; Shekinah Glory Ministries, 366 So.3d at 1259. The adjective "well-pleaded" refers to properly pleaded allegations conforming to the system of fact pleading embodied in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. It does not include allegations deficient in material detail, conclusory factual allegations, or allegations of law. Strategic Medical All. II v. State, 2022-0051 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 355 So.3d 55, 59. The burden of demonstrating that no cause of action has been stated is on the party raising the objection. Shekinah Glory Ministries, 366 So.3d at 1259. In reading a petition to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, it must be interpreted, if possible, to maintain the cause of action instead of dismissing the petition. Id. Any reasonable doubt concerning the sufficiency of the petition must be resolved in favor of finding that a cause of action has been stated. Id. The petition must set forth material facts upon which the cause of action is based. La. Code Civ. P. art. 891(A); Shekinah Glory Ministries, 366 So.3d at 1259. The correctness of conclusions of law is not conceded for the purposes of a ruling on an exception of no cause of action. Id.
Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Ourso, in his individual capacity, undertook the above-alleged actions. Plaintiffs alleged that such actions were ultra-vires and outside the scope of his statutory duties and authority as the Parish President. Accepting these well-pled facts as true, I find that plaintiffs’ petitions alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Mr. Ourso in his individual capacity and 4that the law affords a legal remedy to plaintiffs should they prove the factual allegations of their petitions at trial. See, e.g., Shekinah Glory Ministries, 366 So.3d at 1262 (Church sued a lessor and lessor’s agent after it paid a deposit and signed a lease, but was prevented from taking possession of the property. Lessor’s agent filed an exception of no cause of action, arguing that the church did not allege any cause of action against her individually. The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the exception, finding that the church’s petition pled facts as to lessor’s agent personally with sufficient particularity to state a cause of action.). Cf. Blackett v. City of Monroe, 33,339 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 9/7/00), 766 So.2d 768, 771 (affirmed ruling sustaining exception of no cause of action in favor of mayor, finding that plaintiffs failed to allege any facts that demonstrated that the mayor took any action beyond his authority so as to render him liable in his individual capacity).
Secondly—the majority errs in concluding that the trial court improperly certified the February 15, 2023 judgment as final. Specifically, the majority errs by concluding that the judgment even required a La. C.C.P. art 1915(B) certification. Iberville Parish and the Iberville Parish Council are "political subdivisions" of the State of Louisiana. See La. R.S. 13:5102(B)(1). Furthermore, a suit brought against a State official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official, but rather, is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. Lacerte v. State, 2019-1401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/4/21), 317 So.3d 763, 769 n.5, writ denied, 2021-00193 (La. 3/23/21), 313 So.3d 272, citing Smith v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 2017-0038 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/28/17), — So.3d —, —, 2017 WL 3426018, *3, writ denied, 2017-1273 (La. 11/6/17), 229 So.3d 472. Accordingly, the suit against Mr. Ourso in his official capacity as Parish President is no different than a suit against Iberville Parish, a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana. In contrast, the suit against Mr. Ourso in his individual capacity is a suit against a natural person, i.e., a human being. See La. Civ. Code art. 24.
5I find that the February 15, 2023 judgment did not require a La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B) certification, nor a discussion of the factors of R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122-23. The trial court’s February 15, 2023 judgment that sustained Mr. Ourso’s exception of no cause of action and dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims against him in his individual capacity is a judgment that dismissed a party from the suit without adjudicating all of the issues in the case. Such a judgment is a partial final judgment subject to an immediate appeal. A trial court’s designation or certification of such judgment as final for appeal is unnecessary. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(A)(1); Sheppard v. City of Baton Rouge, 2002-2421 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 25, 26, writ denied, 2004-2566 (La. 1/14/05), 889 So.2d 268. The majority’s decision effectively impairs this court’s jurisdiction to review the merits of the legally incorrect judgment. Furthermore, the majority’s decision precludes this court from exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to correct the clearly wrong judgment by converting the appeal into a supervisory writ application. See Succession of Jaga, 2016-1291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 227 So.3d 325, 328 n.2. See also Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 4-2 and 4-3. This court has discretion to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs if the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. In this matter, the judgment was signed on February 15, 2023, and the notice of judgment was issued and mailed on February 27, 2023. The motion for devolutive appeal was filed on March 6, 2023. Thus, because this appeal was filed within thirty days of the notice of judgment, the motion for appeal can be considered a timely filed application for supervisory writs under Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 4-2 and 4-3. Accordingly, this court could have considered whether to convert this appeal to an application for supervisory writs.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.