Opinion
2:22-cv-04294-MGL-MGB
06-20-2023
Maurice Baum, Petitioner, v. Warden Jansen, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Maurice Baum (“Petitioner”) has filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging an administrative disciplinary action he received while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Edgefield. (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 12.) Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the petition and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. The undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner challenges a disciplinary action taken against him at FCI Edgefield for Incident Report 3421614, charging him with possessing a hazardous tool in violation of Code 108. According to the Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”) Report, the charges came about after “staff” recovered a cell phone while conducting a cell search in cell 218 of unit B-2. (Dkt. No. 1 at 14.) A forensic report call log of the confiscated cell phone showed that a call was placed on December 8, 2019 to a telephone number found on Petitioner's “approved inmate telephone list.” (Id.) According to the DHO, “a review of the telephone number . . . indicated” Petitioner is “the only inmate” within the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) having this telephone number “on his approved inmate list and as being the only inmate placing [a] call to the telephone number.” (Id.) After considering the evidence, including the incident report, photos, and the Central Office Lab Report, the DHO found that Petitioner committed the prohibited act based on “the greater weight of the evidence.” (Id.) The DHO outlined the sanctions to be imposed, including the disallowance of 41 days of good conduct time. (Id.)
On November 29, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition, asserting that he is “innocent of the alleged conduct” and seeking “[t]o have [his] good time restored.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9.) On February 21, 2023, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 12.) By order of this Court filed on February 22, 2023, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Petitioner was advised of the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 13.) On March 3, 2023, Petitioner filed his response in opposition to Respondent's motion. (Dkt. No. 15.) Respondent did not file a reply brief, and the motion is ready for review.
STANDARDS
As matters outside the pleadings have been considered by this court, Respondent's motion will be treated as one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56....”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257.
In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1080, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that this petition should be dismissed as moot because the disciplinary action has been expunged by the BOP and Petitioner's good conduct time of 41 days has been restored. (Dkt. No. 12 at 2-3.) In support, Respondent has submitted an affidavit from BOP Legal Assistant, J. Carter, who avers that “Petitioner's disciplinary action for Incident Report Number 34216147has been expunged and his good conduct time has been restored.” (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 1.) He further states,
The addition of the number “7” here appears to be a scrivener's error. The SENTRY records contain no incident report with this number. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 3-5.) Further, the number listed here is eight numbers long, and the incident reports are given a code of seven numbers.
Petitioner's Chronological Disciplinary Record from SENTRY as of December 22, 2022, contains the disciplinary action for Incident Report Number 3421614, reflecting sanctions of 41 days disallowance of good conduct time, 30 days of disciplinary segregation, and 90 days loss of visiting and phone privileges. Petitioner's updated Chronological Disciplinary Record as of February 21, 2023, does not reflect Incident Report Number 3421614, as it has been expunged.(Id.) J. Carter has attached to his affidavit the SENTRY records he mentions, which substantiate his claims. (Id. at 3-5.)
Petitioner does not respond to the mootness argument. In his response brief, he appears to argue that his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated because another inmate was charged “with the exact [same] incident” and the other inmate's charges were dismissed. (Dkt. No. 15 at 1-3.)
A federal court's jurisdiction empowers it to decide questions that can affect the rights of litigants in the case before it, but it has “no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A case is moot where “the issues presented are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id.; see also Hood v. Johns, 432 Fed.Appx. 180, 180 (4th Cir. 2011) (an appeal is moot if a court cannot grant any effectual relief in favor of the appellant).
Here, the record indicates that Petitioner's lost good conduct time has been restored and Incident Report 3421614 has been expunged. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at 1-5). Because Petitioner has already received the relief he requests, his case should be dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Shellman v. Vereen, No. 4:19-cv-226-JFA-TER, 2019 WL 3521737, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2019) (“Based on the respondent's declaration, the 27 hours of GTC were restored and the disciplinary action . . . was expunged by the respondent. Thus, the petitioner's claims in his original § 2241 petition are now moot.”); Gordon v. Andrews, No. 1:20-cv-578, 2020 WL 8617590 (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 2020) (dismissing § 2241 petition because petitioner “has received the relief he requested in his petition”) (citing Johnson v. Finnan, 252 Fed.Appx. 98, 99 (7th Cir. 2007) (restoration of good time credits renders moot inmate's habeas challenge)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 12) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).