Opinion
No. 05-15-00899-CR
04-28-2016
CATHY LEA BATES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 065077
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence, Cathy Lea Bates pleaded guilty to possession of less than one gram of a controlled substance. The trial court deferred an adjudication of guilt, and placed Bates on community supervision for a period of five years. Bates contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to effect a traffic stop. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At the hearing on Bates's motion to suppress, Pottsboro Police Officer Zack Sweetin testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m. on August 8, 2014, he saw a silver Ford F-150 pickup truck leave the Fink Motel, a location known for criminal activity, including "drug use, distribution, disturbances, things of that nature." Sweetin began following the truck and observed Bates, who was driving the truck, commit several traffic violations, including crossing over the double, solid yellow line while turning left at an intersection and driving on the fog line at the side of the road on two occasions.
Sweetin was concerned about "those traffic violations on that stretch of roadway," because, in the summer at that time of night, the road was "known for intoxicated drivers." Although Sweetin had previously made traffic stops on the stretch of road where he observed the traffic violations, he did not believe it was safe to stop the truck at that time of night on that stretch of road. Once he reached a safer location, Sweetin initiated a traffic stop.
The patrol car had a camera that Sweetin activated shortly after he began following Bates's truck. The recording shows Bates's truck traveling on a two-lane road. On the inside of each lane was a solid, double yellow line. As Bates approached an intersection, she activated her left turn signal and moved into a left-turn-only lane. Although in the middle of the intersection there was a break in the two solid, double yellow lines through which a vehicle could turn, Bates failed to use the opening. All four tires of Bates's truck crossed both double, solid yellow lines that separated the turn lane from the lane for on-coming traffic. As Bates turned, the truck entered the lane for oncoming traffic in the intersecting road and then moved into the correct lane. As Bates continued to drive, her tires touched the white fog line on the outside of her lane on two occasions. After she was stopped, Bates gave Sweetin permission to search the vehicle, and Sweetin found less than one gram of a substance he believed to be methamphetamine.
The trial court denied Bates's motion to suppress and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant to this appeal, the trial court found: (1) Bates failed to make a proper turn and disregarded a traffic control device; (2) Sweetin observed Bates's "failure to make a proper turn by turning left of center"; and (3) Sweetin observed Bates's "car touch and subsequently cross over the solid white fog line two times." The trial court concluded Bates's conduct violated sections 545.101(b) and (c), 544.004, and 545.058 of the transportation code; Sweetin had probable cause to stop and detain Bates after observing the violations of traffic law; and the stop was lawful.
Analysis
Bates contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because Sweetin's observations did not contain enough specific articulable facts to justify the stop and the totality of the circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion for Sweetin to stop her.
Although Bates asserts the traffic stop violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Texas Constitution, she did not separately brief her state and federal constitutional issues or argue that the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we will address Bates's issue based on the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Flores v State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (resolving case "under the Fourth Amendment only" when appellant "never argued that Article 1, § 9 [of the Texas Constitution] provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment").
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Brodnex v. State, No. PD-1087-14, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2016). We review the trial court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, "especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor." Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3 (quoting Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). We give the same deference to the trial court's conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor as well as purely legal questions de novo. Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3. Although the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), we review de novo "whether the totality of the circumstances is sufficient to support an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3 (quoting Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48-49).
When the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports the fact findings. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. We afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Applicable Law
A routine traffic stop is similar to an investigative detention. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-39 (1984). An investigative detention is a seizure that implicates Fourth Amendment protections. Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless detention of a person that amounts to less than a full-blown custodial arrest must be justified by reasonable suspicion. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3. A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3; Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "This is an objective standard that disregards the subjective intent of the officer and requires only some minimal level of justification for the stop." Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3. However, the police officer must have more than an inarticulable hunch or mere good-faith suspicion that a crime was in progress. Brodnex, 2016 WL 1128274, at *3; Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 52. A reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492-93.
The State stipulated that Sweetin did not have a warrant at the time he initiated the traffic stop.
A police officer may initiate a traffic stop if he has a reasonable basis for suspecting a motorist has committed a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Gammill, 442 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. ref'd). The State does not have to establish with absolute certainty the traffic violation occurred. Leming v. State, PD-0072-15, 2016 WL 1458242, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2016). Rather, the State just has to carry its burden of proving that, under the totality of the circumstances, the detention was reasonable. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Gammill, 442 at 543.
See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Discussion
The trial court first concluded Bates violated sections 545.101(b), 545.101(c), and 544.004 of the transportation code by failing to make a proper left turn and by disregarding a traffic control device. Section 545.101 of the transportation code provides:
(b) To make a left turn at an intersection, an operator shall:TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.101(b)(1), (2), (c) (West 2011). Section 544.004 of the transportation code requires the operator of a vehicle to "comply with an applicable official traffic control device placed as provided by this subtitle unless the person is: (1) otherwise directed by a traffic or police officer; or (2) operating an authorized emergency vehicle and is subject to exceptions under this subtitle." Id. § 544.004.
(1) approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to a vehicle moving in the direction of the vehicle; and
(2) after entering the intersection, turn left, leaving the intersection so as to arrive in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of the vehicle on the roadway being entered.
(c) On a street or roadway designated for two way traffic, the operator turning left shall, to the extent practicable, turn in the portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.
Sweetin testified he believed Bates committed a traffic violation by crossing over the solid, double yellow lines that separated the left-turn lane from the lane for oncoming traffic. The video from Sweetin's patrol car shows there was a break in the solid, double yellow lines in the intersection through which a vehicle was permitted to turn left. Bates did not turn through that opening. Rather, she completed her turn before reaching the opening and, in doing so, passed over the solid, double yellow lines that separated the left-turn lane from the lane for oncoming traffic and briefly entered the lane for oncoming traffic in the intersecting road. We conclude the trial court did not err by determining, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Sweetin had reasonable suspicion to believe Bates committed a traffic violation by making an illegal left turn. See Earl v. State, 362 S.W.3d 801, 802, 803 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref'd) (police officer's testimony that defendant failed to make the left turn properly, crossed over the stop line, drove on the wrong side of the road and "cut corner, left turn" constituted reasonable suspicion that defendant violated section 545.101(b)(2) of transportation code).
See Willis v. State, No. 01-03-00478-CR, 2004 WL 966339, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2004, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We resolve Bates's sole issue against her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The trial court also concluded Sweetin had reasonable suspicion that Bates committed a traffic violation by failing to maintain a single lane and driving on the improved shoulder. Because we conclude the trial court did not err by determining Sweetin had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on Bates making an illegal left turn, we need not address whether he also had reasonable suspicion based on Bates's failure to maintain a single lane and driving on the shoulder of the road. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. --------
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 150899F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 065077.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Stoddart and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 28th day of April, 2016.