Summary
denying motion to strike when plaintiff pleaded subject matter of defamatory statements, who made statements, and to whom statements were made
Summary of this case from Stevens v. KhalilyOpinion
CV166068094S
08-04-2017
Christina Bartucca v. Career Team, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#142)
A. Susan Peck, Judge Trial Referee.
On November 30, 2016, the plaintiff, Christina Bartucca, filed the second amended complaint in this action against the defendants, Career Team, LLC (Career Team), Christopher Kuselias, KRA Corporation (KRA), Kimberly Staley, Human Resources Agency of New Britain, Inc. (HRA), Kathleen Quinn, Workforce Alliance (WA), William Villano, and Capital Workforce Partners (CWP). In the second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff began employment as the manager of program operations for HRA on June 4, 2014. HRA is a community action agency that engages in workforce development and is funded by WA to provide workforce development services for the South Central Region of Connecticut. On June 22, 2015, the plaintiff accepted an offer to work at Career Team and filed her notice of resignation with HRA, to be effective on July 3, 2015. On June 24, 2015, Kuselias rescinded the offer of employment on the basis that he did not have approval to offer the position to the plaintiff. That day, the plaintiff attempted to rescind her resignation letter with HRA, in which HRA extended her end date from July 3, 2015, to July 24, 2015, to consider her resignation. On July 15, 2015, the plaintiff was informed that her position with HRA would end on July 24, 2015. In counts twelve and thirteen, the plaintiff alleges that Villano intentionally, and without cause, interfered with the plaintiff's position with HRA because he made disparaging comments about the plaintiff during meetings, which caused HRA to refuse to accept the plaintiff's rescission of her resignation. Further, Villano instructed at least one employee of WA to " find dirt" on the plaintiff so he could discredit her at Workforce Alliance, HRA, and the field of workforce development. In count seventeen, the plaintiff alleges that Villano published a defamatory statement when he told staff during a meeting that the plaintiff stole company property because she stole a company cell phone. Villano, acting with knowledge of the falsity of the statement, made it to damage the plaintiff's reputation and credibility.
Career Team contracts with and is funded by Capital Workforce Partners to provide workforce development services.
Kuselias is the chief executive officer of Career Team. The plaintiff filed suit against Kuselias in his individual and official capacity.
KRA contracts with and is funded by Capital Workforce Partners to provide workforce development services in the greater Hartford area.
Staley is the vice president and director of client services at KRA. The plaintiff filed suit against Staley in her individual and official capacity.
Quinn is the regional director of South Central One Stop Career Centers at HRA. The plaintiff filed suit against Quinn in her individual and official capacity.
Workforce Alliance provides contracts to local workforce development organizations to provide workforce development services.
Villano is sued in his individual and official capacity presumably related to his relationship with Workforce Alliance.
Capital Workforce Partner is a workforce development organization that provides contracts to local workforce development organizations to provide workforce development services.
On January 9, 2017, the defendants filed their answer and special defenses. On January 13, 2017, the defendants, WA and Villano, filed a motion to strike counts twelve and thirteen of the plaintiff's second amended complaint on the ground that the counts fail to allege the necessary elements of tortious interference and count seventeen on the ground that it fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of defamation. The motion to strike and objection thereto have been fully briefed by the parties. The court heard oral argument at short calendar on May 30, 2017.
WA and Villano will be referred to collectively as the defendants.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Practice Book § 10-39(a) provides, in relevant part: " A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of . . . any one or more counts . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . ." " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016).
The defendants argue that their motion to strike should be granted on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff failed to allege facts to support the element of knowledge of, and interference with, a business relationship for tortious interference under counts twelve and thirteen; and (2) the plaintiff failed to allege the specific defamatory statement at issue to support a claim of defamation under count seventeen. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the defendants' motion to strike should be denied because (1) the plaintiff sufficiently alleged Villano's knowledge of the business relationship, which he was interfering with, and an intention of disrupting that relationship to support a claim of tortious interference; (2) the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Villano acted out of malice when he intentionally and without justification interfered with the plaintiff's business relationship with HRA when he instructed at least one person to " find dirt" on the plaintiff to support a claim of tortious interference; and (3) the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a defamation claim because the defamatory statement, that the plaintiff had committed theft of a company issued cell phone, adequately described the subject matter of the defamatory statements.
I
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
" A claim for tortious interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2) the defendants' knowledge of that relationship, (3) the defendants' intent to interfere with the relationship, (4) the interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendants' tortious conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Development Co., 318 Conn. 847, 864, 124 A.3d 847 (2015).
In the present case, the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the elements for tortious interference with contractual relations. The plaintiff alleges (1) a beneficial relationship between herself and HRA's agents; (2) that Villano, as an agent for HRA, had knowledge of those relationships and interfered with them when he made disparaging comments about the plaintiff and requested that an employee of WA " find dirt" on the plaintiff in order to discredit her at Workforce Alliance, HRA, and within the field of workforce development; and (3) actual loss. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike counts twelve and thirteen must be denied.
II
DEFAMATION
" To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 84, 856 A.2d 372 (2004). " [A] complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom, and to whom." Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-98-0486346-S, (July 12, 2002, Berger, J.), aff'd, 76 Conn.App. 907, 822 A.2d 372 (2003).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges in count seventeen that " Villano made defamatory statements" about the plaintiff when he " published a defamatory statement by stating in a staff meeting that [the plaintiff] stole company property in that she stole a cell phone, when Villano had expressly given [the plaintiff] permission to keep the phone" and " acted with knowledge of the falsity of the statements made to HRA and [Workforce Alliance], or with reckless disregard for the truth of his statements." The plaintiff, therefore, has sufficiently pleaded a defamatory statement and by whom and to whom it was made. Although the plaintiff has not specifically identified the individual recipients of the statements, the complaint alleges that Villano made the defamatory statement at a staff meeting. Thus, the recipients of the defamatory statement are an ascertainable group. " [T]he identification of a particular group has been determined to be sufficient in the context of a motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dean v. Liberation Programs, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-13-6018607-S, (November 13, 2013, Tobin, J.T.R.); see also Tax Data Solutions, LLC v. O'Brien, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6016263-S, (February 6, 2013, Zemetis, J.); Mendez v. Utopia Home Care, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-6006222-S, (November 5, 2010, Peck, J.). Thus, construing the second amended complaint in the mariner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the defendants' motion to strike count seventeen must also be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike counts twelve, thirteen, and seventeen of the plaintiff's second amended complaint is hereby denied.