Opinion
Civil Action RE-18-56
05-26-2020
JOHN BARTH, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WATERBORO et al., Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Wayne R. Douglas, Justice
John Barth filed a three-count complaint against the Town of Watefboro ("Town"), Gary Lamb, and ten unnamed individuals, alleging that the Town's Zoning Board of Appeals ("ZBA") unlawfully denied his application for a building permit to continue construction of a residence in Waterboro (Count I); that this denial was an unconstitutional taking of his property without just compensation (Count II); and that Lamb, acting in his official capacity as Town Manager, violated Barth's constitutional and other rights (Count III),
Although the complaint was inadvertently docketed as a real estate action, the court subsequently clarified that Count I set out an appeal of governmental action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, and Counts II and III constituted independent claims joined with the appeal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). See Order Addressing Pending Motions and Other Matters entered March 8, 2019. The March 8th order bifurcated the claims, directed that Count I be addressed first, and stayed consideration of Counts II and III pending resolution of Count 1. The March 8th order as well as the court's January 21, 2020 order provide additional detail as to the procedural background of the instant action.
In its January 21, 2020 order, the court denied Barth's appeal of the ZBA's decision (Count I). Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(c) with respect to the remaining two counts on January 30, 2020. Several weeks later, on February 21, 2020, Barth filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II. A non-testimonial hearing on the motions scheduled for April 7, 2020 was postponed due to suspension of all civil proceedings. See Pandemic Management Order, PMO-SJC-1, dated March 30, 2020. After further review, the court has determined that oral argument is unnecessary and the pending motions can be addressed and resolved on the basis of the pleadings and written submissions.
I. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Counts II and III)
A. Standard of Review
A defendant's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint in the same manner as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Wawenock, LLC v. DOT, 2018 ME 83, ¶ 4, 187 A. 3d 609; see Harvey, Maine Civil Practice, § 12.14 (3d ed. 2011). The court considers facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and determines whether the facts alleged entitle him to relief on some legal theory. Id. The court is not bound to accept any legal conclusions set forth in the complaint. Bowen v. Eastman, 645 A.2d 5, 6 (Me. 1994). The motion will be granted when it "appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." See Bonney v. Stephens Mem'l Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 16, 17 A.3d 123 (articulating the motion to dismiss standard).
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiffs initial pleading "shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." M.R. Civ. P. 8(a). The initial pleading in this case exceeds one hundred pages, and consists of a thirty-page document styled as the complaint accompanied by three memoranda of law totaling fifty pages with an additional thirty pages of exhibits. Numerous pages in the complaint are single-spaced, not double-spaced as required by M.R. Civ. P, 5(i). Only half of the complaint's pages are organized into numbered paragraphs, and many of those paragraphs contain multiple factual allegations-not "simple, concise, and direct" averments as required by M.R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). In addition, the three legal memoranda contain numerous factual references. Therefore, to be clear about the factual record used in addressing the instant motion, the court limits its inquiry to the averments set forth in the document styled as the complaint and not the accompanying memoranda of law. In addition, consistent with Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, the court has also considered two official public documents-its January 21, 2020 order denying Barth's 80B appeal and the ZBA's May 24, 2018 decision. 2004 ME 20, ¶¶ 8-10, 843 A.2d 43 (holding that court may rely on extra-pleading materials that are "official public documents" in deciding a motion to dismiss).
B. Facts
For purposes of the Rule 12(c) motion, the court accepts as true the following facts.
Barth is a resident of Springvale, Maine. For a number of years, he had been engaged in efforts to renovate and establish a private school on the upper campus of the former Nasson College in Springvale, a property he purchased in 1992. (Pl's Compl. 13.) The complaint alleges that these efforts were resisted and ultimately frustrated by local residents; that his Springvale property has been the target of vandalism by teenagers and "ATV gangs" over the years; and that Lamb's son was involved in "attacks" on Barth's Springvale property. (Pl's Compl. 13, 16-18 .)
Because portions of Barth's complaint do not use numbered paragraphs, citations thereto reference page numbers.
In 2000, Barth purchased a seven-acre island in Lake Arrowhead, located in Waterboro, with the intention of constructing a residence. Between 2004 and 2005, he obtained a building permit from the Town as well as a conservation permit from the Saco River Corridor Commission ("SRCC"), both of which were required in order to commence construction. (Pl's Compl. 13, 18, 19.)
During 2005 and 2006, Barth built docks on the island and the shore landing; constructed a modular shed that he transported to the island; and began excavating for, designing, and constructing concrete piers on the island. (Pl's Compl. 15, 19.)
In January 2007, Patti Berry, the Waterboro Code Enforcement Officer ("CEO") at the time, notified Barth that "a new permit was needed" and "she would renew the permit herself." (Pl's Compl. 14, 19.) Barth asserts that "he was unaware of any permit expiration under the informal renewal process, [but] the renewed permit would have expired under the present rules on 9/16/2009." Barth's construction efforts ceased in or around 2009 due to his medical condition and his loss of employment on account of the recession. (Pl's Compl. 23.)
As noted below, the ZBA concluded that the 2005 permit expired in 2007 and there was no evidence that CEO Berry had extended it for an additional two years. See infra, p. 6. This discrepancy is ultimately immaterial to the disposition of the instant motion because Barth agrees that the original building permit expired in 2009 and the court assumes that fact to be true in deciding this motion.
Three years later, in early 2012, Barth wrote to CEO Berry and sent her drawings and photos in preparation to resume work. He received a letter from Berry's replacement, Mark Mitchell, advising Barth that his building permit had expired. Barth says he met in person with Mitchell in April 2012; gave him updated drawings; and understood Mitchell had no objection to the changes but was "still getting settled in his new position so work should proceed temporarily." (Pl's Compl. 26-27.)
In early August 2012, Barth wrote to CEO Mitchell "reporting the minor welding ('steel installation') at the site, the only work done since 2009." On August 22, 2012, Mitchell wrote to Barth informing him that his permit had expired and he would need a new permit to resume construction. No work was done after this notice. (Pl's Compl. 28.) No permit was sought during 2013 or 2014 "due to recession losses." (Pl's Compl. 15.)
One page earlier, however, the complaint states: "In 2014, Plaintiff sought to renew the building permit and was met with numerous demands and denials by defendant town officials." (Pl's Compl, 14.) When read in context of the complaint as a whole, this reference to the year as "2014" appears to be a typographical error. Even if the 2014 date were accepted as accurate, it would not alter the court's conclusions and disposition of the instant motion.
Lamb, who is also a resident of Springvale, was hired as Waterboro Town Manager in February 2014. Barth alleges that Lamb "has admitted collusion" with others in Springvale who opposed Barth's earlier efforts to develop his property there. (Pl.'s Compl. 29.)
In December 2014, the Town hired a new CEO, Glenn Charette. Barth alleges that Charette requested new plans and drawings; "acted slowly"; and "later revealed that his plan was to obstruct the approved project by denying the permit and influencing the SRCC to deny renewal of its permit." (Pl's Compl. 31.)
In July and August of 2016, CEO Charette informed Barth that he needed to provide a new survey, a septic system design and building plans for the existing structure with an engineer's stamp of approval, Barth submitted an application for a new building permit with drawings as well as a new septic system design in August and a new survey in September. In late 2016, Barth "observed several small cracks in two of the four guesthouse piers, due to weathering during the period of delays." The complaint also asserts that the "cracks worsened during the following years and "[b]ecause no cracks had occurred during the eight prior years, these may be caused by vandalism." (Pl's Compl, 14, 15, 21 (emphasis added).)
In March 2017, CEO Charette wrote Barth "refusing all cooperation," meaning that the Town was insisting on compliance with the requirements of the applicable building codes as well as its requests for additional information and materials. (See Pl's Compl. 22.)
In the summer of 2017, Lamb visited Barth's property with CEO Charette. They photographed the cracks in the foundation, and Lamb took boundary markers from the site. (Pl's Compl. 22, 26.) Lamb's actions "were made in [his] official capacity" as the Town's manager and denied Barth the "improved property value of the subject property." (Pl's Compl. 7, 27.)
Barth wrote to the Town's Board of Selectmen In September 2017 to request that Lamb not be involved in the building permit approval process because of the animosity he had expressed about Barth. (Pl.'s Compl. 22.) Lamb responded by letter to the board, explaining his belief that Barth had frightened his young children while they were present on Barth's campus in Springvale, (Pl's Compl. 22.)
Barth appealed to the ZBA the CEO's decision not to issue the permit. A hearing was held in May 2018. The ZBA issued its decision on May 24, 2018, concluding that the permit issued to Barth in 2005 had expired in 2007; there was no evidence that it was extended in 2007; no new or replacement permit had been requested until 2016; the earlier 2009 IRC Building Codes had been replaced by the 2015 IRC Building Codes; a new building permit application was required to meet the new code; and CEO Charette had acted appropriately in requiring Barth to apply for a permit and provide an engineering approval for the existing peers. See ZBA Findings of Fact and Conclusions, dated May 24, 2018. The ZBA found specifically that CEO Charette had spoken with the engineer Barth had referred but did not hear back from the engineer and that Charette's decision to require an engineer's stamp on the proposed plans was due to the fact that no previous inspection of the work had been made. Id.
Barth filed this action in Superior Court in July 2018. The complaint alleges that the Town's actions were "motivated by envy and prejudice to destroy the property value of [p]laintiff and "denied realization of the developed property value" that would have resulted if Barth completed construction on his home. (Pl's Compl. 6, 14, 24.)
C. Discussion
Barth seeks redress for alleged violations of numerous statutes as well as his rights under the Maine Constitution. Barth also alleges that he had vested rights in a previously issued but expired building permit and that the Town is equitably estopped from denying him the right to continue construction on his residence. Further, the complaint seeks damages for various torts, including fraud, libel, and trespass.
Although the complaint references potential claims under the U.S. Constitution and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986, including a "takings" claim under the 5th and 14thAmendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it states expressly that these references are included only "[f]or purposes of notice and preservation of issues" and "not for adjudication." (Pl's Compl. 6, 7. (emphasis added). Accordingly, any claims under federal law, whether statutory or constitutional in nature, are not before the court in this case and are not addressed.
Defendants cite Van Dyke v. Town of Dexter, No. l:18-cv-00263-NT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202055, at *3 (D. Me. Nov. 29, 2018) (Torreson, J.) in arguing that Barth's independent claims in Counts II and III should be dismissed because they are subsumed into the Rule 80B appeal in Count I, which previously had been dismissed. In Van Dyke, the plaintiff failed to file a Rule 80B appeal from the Town of Dexter's determination of a dangerous building on her property. One year later, she filed suit alleging numerous constitutional violations and torts arising out of the Town's decision. The District Court held that because these claims arose out of a common nucleus of facts and could have been brought in conjunction with a Rule 80B appeal, they were now time-barred. Here, plaintiff joined the independent claims with his Rule 80B appeal.
1. Statutory Claims
Barth alleges that both the Town and Lamb are liable to him for violations of the following statutes: (i) the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), 5 M.R.S. § 4551 et seq; (ii) the Maine Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681-4685; (iii) 17-A M.R.S. § 903, which criminalizes the "misuse of entrusted property"' by a fiduciary; (iv) 30-A M.R.S. § 2632, which sets forth qualifications for a town manager; (v) 30-A M.R.S. § 3001, which sets parameters for state law preemption of municipal ordinances; and (vi) 30-A M.R.S. § 3007(6), which limits a municipality's power to restrict or nullify a final permit. In addition, he asserts that Lamb is liable for violating the following statutes in the Maine Criminal Code: (vi) 17-A M.R.S. § 151 (criminal conspiracy); (vii) 17-A M.R.S. § 152-A (criminal attempt); (viii) 17-A M.R.S. § 506-A (harassment), and (ix) 17-A M.R.S. § 805 (aggravated criminal mischief). These claims lack merit.
There is no private, civil remedy for alleged violations of the Maine Criminal Code, and Barth is not authorized to institute criminal proceedings or prosecute the Town or Lamb for any alleged criminal violations. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 701, 708. Barth has not identified any authority conferring a private right of action for the alleged violations of the sections of Title 30-A to which he cites. Barth does not have a cognizable claim under the MHRA because the allegations pleaded in the complaint do not qualify him as an "aggrieved person." 5 M.R.S. § 4621 (authorizing the filing of a civil action by an "aggrieved person"); 5 M.R.S. § 4553(1-D) (defining "aggrieved person" to include a person claiming unlawful discrimination on the basis of protected class status or injury by unlawful housing discrimination). His claims under the MCRA are addressed below in connection with the state constitutional claims.
2. State Constitutional Claims
Barth alleges in Counts II and III, respectively, that the Town and Lamb, acting in his official capacity as Town Manager, are liable for numerous violations of his state constitutional rights, namely Article 1, Sections 1, 11, 19 and 21 of the Maine Constitution.
Article I, Section 1 provides: "All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Me. Const, art. I, § 1.
The exclusive means for bringing a civil action to vindicate an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution of Maine is 5 M.R.S. §4682. Andrews v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 1998 ME 198, ¶¶ 21-23, 716 A.2d 212. Section 4682(1-A) provides as follows:
Whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law, intentionally interferes or attempts to intentionally interfere by physical force or violence against a person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property or by the threat of physical force or violence against a person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of rights secured by the Constitution of Maine[.] . . . the person whose exercise or enjoyment of these rights has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, may institute and prosecute in that person's own name and on that person's own behalf a civil action for legal or equitable relief.5 M.R.S. § 4682 (emphasis added). To bring a civil action based on an alleged violation of a state constitutional right, therefore, a claimant must allege (i) intentional interference or an attempt to intentionally interfere (ii) with the exercise of rights secured under the Constitution of Maine (iii) by force or violence against a person; or damage or destruction of property; or trespass on property (or the threat of any of the foregoing), Andrews dismissed an action for declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief to vindicate the right to free speech under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Maine because the plaintiff had "not alleged interference with his speech rights by physical force or violence, damage or destruction of property, trespass on property, or threats thereof" 1998 ME 198, ¶ 23, 716 A.2d 212 (emphasis added).
Essentially, the constitutional violations for which Barth seeks compensation involve the asserted denial of his rights to his property in Waterboro, particularly the right to continue construction of a residence pursuant to an expired building permit. In other words, this is essentially a "takings" case, and the "takings" alleged is the diminishment of his property value due to the inability to build the residence which he had planned.
Generally, a claim of unconstitutional taking without payment of just compensation takes one of three forms: (1) permanent, physical occupation of property, no matter how minute the intrusion, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982); (2) a, perse regulatory taking, which occurs when implementation of a regulation results in a total, permanent diminution of a property's value, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); and (3) an ad hoc regulatory taking, which depends on a fact-specific inquiry into the diminution in value caused by the government action, the reasonableness of the landowner's investment-backed expectations for the property, and the character of the interference, Penn. Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 177 (Me. 1989) (providing that rights under Art. I, section 21 of the Maine Constitution are coextensive with the Fifth Amendment).
The complaint alleges that the taking of his property was caused by imposition of standards that Barth claims amount to a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law; an intrusion upon his natural rights ("possessing and protecting property"); a denial of his right to redress; and/or an infringement of his "vested rights" in a previously approved building permit. He therefore contends his property was taken without just compensation and he suffered additional financial loss consisting of expenses already incurred.
The interference with the exercise of state constitutional rights asserted here and for which he seeks compensation was not predicated on the kinds of acts required by section 4682 or Andrews. Rather, it is based upon the Town's denial of a building permit, which frustrated Barth's ability to complete construction of his residence.
Although the complaint is replete with allegations of acts of violence and vandalism by unnamed individuals against Barth and his property, these acts are not relevant to or connected with the constitutional violations asserted. Many of the acts are alleged to have occurred in Springvale with respect to his property there, dating as far back as from 1998. (Pl's Compl. 16-17.) The alleged perpetrators of similar acts of vandalism with respect to the Waterboro property are identified as two unrelated individuals with no alleged connection to defendants as well as others described only genericalty as "an ATV mechanic in Waterboro," "ATV gangs," or "criminal ATV gangs." Even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, only two discrete acts alleged constitute the type of predicate acts that are connected to the constitutional violations asserted here. (Pl's Compl. 17.)
First, the complaint alleges that Lamb trespassed on his property to photograph cracks in the foundation piers of the structure and, while there, removed boundary markers. (Pl's Compl. 22, 26.) It is not alleged that this act of trespass, in and of itself, caused a diminution in property value. Nor is it specifically alleged that Lamb's (or Charette's) presence on Barth's property in 2017 (the year following Charette's requirement of new engineering approvals for the piers) was the basis for the Town's denial of a new permit, which, in fact, was based on the CEO's earlier requirement (affirmed by the ZBA) that Barth's prior permit had expired and he needed to provide an engineer's approval in order to obtain a new permit. With respect to removal of the boundary markers, the complaint merely alleges that this "caus[ed] serious delays and expenses"-not a depreciation in property value that might give rise to a takings claim. (Pl.'s Compl. 25.) White the alleged trespass and conversion may make out claims in tort, they do not take on a constitutional dimension.
See supra footnote 9.
Second, the complaint alleges "damage or destruction of property"-a potential predicate act required by Section 4682. The damage referenced are cracks in the foundation piers "due to weathering during delay periods," which iirst appeared in "late 2016." (Pl. Compl. 15.) The complaint alleges that this "may have been caused by vandalism" and "it is probable that defendant Lamb and his criminal ATV gang associates . . . committed numerous crimes there, deliberately caus[ing] the weathering by dousing the sides of the covered piers with water during the freezing weather." (Pl's Compl. 5, 25 (emphasis added).)
Even viewed in the most favorable light to plaintiff and taken as true, this allegation is legally insufficient to support the constitutional takings claim pleaded here. According to the complaint itself, CEO Charette's demand that Barth submit new engineering approvals was first made in August 2016-i.e., before the discovery of the cracks that were "due to weathering during delay periods," (Pl's Compl. 15.) It was the requirement of an engineering approval-which Barth declined to satisfy and which served as the basis for the ZBA's affirmance of Charette's authority to insist on compliance with the applicable building codes-that ultimately resulted in Barth's inability to move forward with construction under a new permit.
Moreover, even in the context of the instant motion, an allegation that "it is probable" that Lamb and "his ATV gangs" caused this damage is too speculative as a matter of law to state a causal connection between the observed damage in the piers and conjecture about action by Lamb and/or others. See Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242 ("The mere possibility of such causation is not enough, and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or even if the probabilities are evenly balanced, a defendant is entitled to a judgment.").
3. Other Claims
a. Vested Rights; Equitable Estoppel
Barth claims that his right to continue construction under a previously issued but expired building permit became vested and that the Town is equitably estopped from denying his right to go forward and complete construction under his previously approved plans. The court squarely decided these issues in connection with Count I of the complaint. To the extent he attempts to reassert the same arguments in Count II and Count III, he is barred by claim preclusion. See Town of Mount Vernon v. Landherr, 2018 ME 105, ¶ 15, 190 A.3d 249; Norton v. Town of Long Island, 2005 ME 109, ¶ 17-18, 883 A.2d889.
b. Tort Claims
Finally, any tort claims asserted (trespass, libel, fraud) are barred by the Maine Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). The MTCA applies to tort claims against the Town, a "governmental entity" within the meaning of 14 M.R.S. §§ 8102(2), (3), as well as any such claims against Lamb, whom the complaint names as a defendant in his official capacity as Town Manager. 14 M.R.S. § 8102(1).
The MTCA requires a claimant to first provide written notice of the claim within 180 days of the date the cause of action accrues as a prerequisite for bringing a civil action in tort against a governmental entity or its employees. 14 M.R, S. § 8107(1). Failure to comply with this requirement means the claimant may not proceed with suit. Porter v. Philbrick-Gates, 2000 ME 35, ¶ 4, 745 A.2d 996; Smith v. Voisine, 650 A.2d 1350, 1352 (Me. 1994). Here, the complaint does not allege that plaintiff filed any written pre-suit notice or otherwise complied with the mandatory pre-suit notice requirement; nor are there any allegations regarding a good cause basis as to why written notice could not have been filed within the period prescribed. 14 M.R.S. §8107(1)
Although the 180-day notice period was enlarged to 365 days in 2019, the tort claims here arose under the prior law. See P.L 2019, ch. 214, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 2019).
IV. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Count II)
In light of the ruling herein granting the Town's motion for judgment on the pleadings on Count II, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is rendered moot. Even if the summary judgment motion was not mooted, it would be denied for failure to comply with Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) and 56 (h).
A motion for summary judgment may be made "with or without supporting affidavits.'* M.R. Civ. P. 5b(b). Plaintiff's statement of material facts is not supported by a separate affidavit, but the statement itself is a sworn document and therefore must meet the requirements of a sworn affidavit. See M.R. Civ, P. 56(e) (requiring affidavits shall “be made on personal knowledge" and "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence" and "[g ] worn or certified copies of all papers ar parts therefor referred to in an affidavit shall be, attached thereto or served therewith"), The jurat's oath, averring that statements of fact are true "to the best of my knowledge and belief, does not constitute an oath or affirmation made on the basis of personal knowledge. Plaiz v. Finley, 2009 ME 55, ¶ 18, 973 A.2d 743 (clarifying that a statement made ''upon information and belief is not based on personal knowledge), Although not defective per se if it is apparent that the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts averred, Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank v. Pease, 2002 ME 82, ¶ 25, 797 A.2d 1270, it is unclear whether that is so with respect to all statements therein; and, if not, plaintiff cannot rely upon potential hearsay statements to establish the facts material to his motion. (See, e.g., Pl.'s. S.M.F. ¶¶ 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 23.) A majority of die twenty-live numbered paragraphs in the statement of material facts do not have a supporting record citation. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1) (requiring each fact asserted "shall be supported by a record citation as required by paragraph (4) of this rule"). In other Instances where there is a citation to an exhibit, the exhibit was not "attached thereto and served therewith," M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). Even if the exhibits referenced may have been previously submitted to the court in connection with other motions or tilings, they should have been attached to the statement of material facts and served with die new filing (or at least identified with more precision) because the court has no independent duty to search for them. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4); Chase Home Finance LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 8, 12, 985 A.2d 508; Levine, 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653 ("The court is neither required nor permitted to independently search a record to find support, for facts offered by a party.").
In the "unique setting' of summary judgment, "strict adherence to the Rule's requirements is necessary to ensure that the process is both predictable and just." Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co. v. Raggiam, 2009 ME 120, ¶ 7, 985 A.2d 1; see Cach, LLC v. Kulas, 2011 ME 70, ¶ 12, 21 A.3d 1015. Failure to abide by the requirements of Rule 56 is grounds for denying the motion. See First Tracks Investments, LLC v. Murray, Plumb & Murray, 2015 ME 104, ¶ 3, 121 A.3d 1279 ("[T]he court would have been well within its discretion ... to have denied summary judgment based on the manner in which both parties availed themselves of the summary judgment process."); Stanley v. Hancock County Comm'rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 29, 864 A.2d 169 (recognizing that a court may deny a motion for summary judgment "solely on th[e] basis" that a party did not comply with M, R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1)).
The deficiencies referenced above, standing alone or in combination, would be fatal to the instant motion. See Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 29, 864 A.2d 169; Levine, 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653. And, as plaintiff has been previously admonished, "[u]nrepresented parties receive no special consideration and are held to the same standards as represented parties." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Camire, 2017 ME 20, ¶ 8, 155 A.3d 416.
V. Order
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ordered and the entry shall be:
"Defendants Town of Waterboro and Gary Lamb's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. Counts II and III of the complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DISMISSED as moot.
The clerk may enter this Decision and Order on Pending Motions on the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
SO ORDERED.
Article I, Section 11 provides: "The Legislature shall pass no bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, and no attainder shall work corruption of blood nor forfeiture of estate." Me. Const, art. I, § 11. Article I, Section 19 provides: "Every person, for an injury inflicted on the person or the person's reputation, property or immunities, shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered freely and without sale, completely without denial, promptly, without delay." Me. Const, art. I, § 19. Article I, Section 21 provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation; nor unless the public exigencies require it." Me. Const, art. I, § 21.