Summary
holding that possible loss of a state prison job due to a California state prisoner's classification as a sex offender did not violate the prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights
Summary of this case from Garcia v. DiazOpinion
No. 09-55646.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed October 12, 2010.
Rodney Bernard Barno, San Diego, CA, pro se.
Attorney General for the State of California, Esquire, Sylvie Snyder, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, William McCurine, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:07-CV-01373-WMC.
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Rodney Bernard Barno, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims for deliberate indifference to his safety and due process violations arising out of his alleged classification as a sex offender. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2001), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Barno's deliberate indifference claim because Barno failed to allege that he suffered any injury or threat of harm other than the allegedly erroneous classification itself, possible loss of a prison job, and temporary restrictions on visitations with minors. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003) (visitor restrictions on inmates charged with substance abuse did not violate Eighth Amendment); Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (there is no Fourteenth Amendment liberty or property interest in prison employment); Hoptoivit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1256 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[M]isclassification does not itself inflict pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.").
The district court also properly dismissed Barno's due process claim because the alleged classification error did not result in any deprivations or changes in the conditions of confinement that constituted an "atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" so as to give rise to a protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (inmate's sex offender classification implicated a liberty interest only because applicable regulations required that sex offenders participate in a mandatory treatment program before being eligible for parole).
Barno's request to vacate his expedited motion for an order requiring prison officials to return legal documents is granted. In response to his voluminous letters requesting a copy of the docket report confirming receipt of his reply brief, we note that Barno's reply brief was filed and considered.
Barno's remaining contentions are un-persuasive.
AFFIRMED.