Opinion
CIV-21-445-D
07-28-2021
QUINCY BARNES, Petitioner, v. LONNIE LAWSON, Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GARY M. PURCELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing pro se, has filed this action seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 10. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended the Motion to Dismiss be granted.
I. Background
On January 30, 2014, Petitioner was convicted in state court of Robbery in the First Degree in violation of Okla. Stat tit. 21, § 798. Doc. No. 10 at 1-2; Doc. No. 10-2; see also Oklahoma State Courts Network, Stephens County District Court, Case No. CF-2013-107B. The court sentenced Petitioner to, inter alia, twenty-five years imprisonment with all but the first 15 suspended. Id.
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db'stephensνmber=CF-2013-00107B&cmid=7917
By this action, Petitioner argues that he has been deprived of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendments based on Respondent's failure to apply good time credits to his sentence. Doc. No. 1 at 7. He seeks the application of said credits and immediate release. Id. at 8. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Petitioner failed to exhaust state court and administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, and that his claims are untimely and fail on the merits. Doc. No. 10 at 2-8.
II. Analysis
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees certain procedural safeguards before a State may deprive an individual of his or her “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). “We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State, the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient[.]” Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted). Therefore, with respect to Petitioner's claims of due process deprivations, Petitioner must first establish that he had a constitutionally protected interest.
Protected liberty interests may be derived from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Oklahoma has created a liberty interest in earned sentence credits. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A); Waldon v. Evans, 861 P.2d 311, 313 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). Thus, Oklahoma inmates are generally entitled to minimum due process protections prior to the revocation of their earned credits. However, Oklahoma law prohibits the application of earned credits to reduce sentences imposed for certain crimes, including first degree robbery, until the convicted individual has served 85% of his sentence. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(9) (“Persons convicted of these offenses[, including first degree robbery, ] shall not be eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits which have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence to less than eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.”).
As Respondent established, Petitioner was sentenced in 2014 to essentially 15 years imprisonment for his conviction of First-Degree Robbery. Doc. No. 10-2. Petitioner will have served 85% of that sentence as of January 1, 2026. Doc. No. 10 at 2; Doc. No. 10-1 at 2. Because Petitioner is not entitled to the application of earned sentence credits to reduce his sentence, he has no state-created liberty interest in said credits. The Due Process Clause “confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the sentence imposed.” Sandin, 515 U.S at 480 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, Petitioner cannot establish a due process violation and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition should be granted.
In light of this recommendation, it is not necessary to address Respondent's additional bases for dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10) be GRANTED and the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by August 17 th, 2021. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States of America, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); see, cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.”).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.