Opinion
A-14018
11-22-2023
RALPH LOREN BARENZ II, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Ralph Loren Barenz II, in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant. RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, No. 3PA-14-02277 CR, Palmer, Jonathan A. Woodman, Judge.
Appearances:
Ralph Loren Barenz II, in propria persona, Wasilla, Appellant.
RuthAnne Beach, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Ralph Loren Barenz II was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree sexual assault, and this Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. He subsequently filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the legislature's 2006 increase in the presumptive ranges for sexual offenses was invalid and that he should be resentenced under the pre-2006 sentencing range for first-degree sexual assault. The superior court denied the motion. Still proceeding pro se, he now appeals.
Barenz v. State, 2019 WL 2157362 (Alaska App. May 15, 2019) (unpublished); former AS 11.41.410(a)(1) (2014).
See SLA 2006, ch. 14.
Barenz first argues that the 2006 increase in presumptive sentencing ranges for sexual offenses violated the prohibitions in Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Alaska Constitution against bills of attainder. A bill of attainder, as safeguarded against in these constitutional provisions, is a "legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups." Barenz notes that, when the legislature passed the increase in presumptive sentencing ranges, one of the stated reasons for doing so was that sex offenders typically have committed many offenses before being caught. He argues that increasing the presumptive sentencing ranges was a legislative punishment for the specific class of sex offenders. But the legislature did not target any particular people or groups by name, and the punishment was tied to present conduct, as opposed to past conduct. The 2006 increase in sentencing ranges for sex offenders was thus not a bill of attainder.
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965).
See 2006 Senate Journal 2207-09; see also Collins v. State, 287 P.3d 791, 795 (Alaska App. 2012) ("[The] legislative history makes clear that the current sentencing ranges are based on legislative findings that the typical sex offender is a repeat offender with very poor prospects for rehabilitation.").
See, e.g., Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86-87 (1961) (concluding that an act was not a bill of attainder, in part, because "[t]he incidents which it reache[d] [were] . . . present incidents").
Barenz next argues that the 2006 increase in presumptive sentencing ranges for sexual offenses violates the right to reformation in Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska Constitution. A statutory sentencing scheme may violate the right to reformation by unreasonably restricting judicial sentencing discretion. In Nell v. State, we rejected the argument that the presumptive sentencing scheme adopted by the legislature as part of the Revised Criminal Code violated Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska Constitution's principle of reformation. We reasoned that the legislature essentially incorporated the Chaney criteria into the criminal procedure code as the basis for determining a sentence and the sentencing court may refer the case to the three-judge sentencing panel. The legislature retained these provisions in its 2006 increase in presumptive sentencing ranges for sexual offenses. These aspects of the sentencing scheme are sufficient to safeguard the right to rehabilitation.
See Antenor v. State, Dep't of Corr., 462 P.3d 1, 14 (Alaska 2020) ("We have held that this provision confers on prisoners a constitutionally protected right to rehabilitation that must be made 'a reality and not simply something to which lip service is being paid.'" (quoting Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 533 (Alaska 1978))).
See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361, 1369-70 (Alaska App. 1982).
Id.
Id. (discussing State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970), AS 12.55.005, and AS 12.55.175).
See former AS 12.55.005 (2006); former AS 12.55.175 (2006); see also King v. State, 487 P.3d 242, 249-52 (Alaska App. 2021) (remanding for reconsideration of whether referral to the three-judge sentencing panel was appropriate in a case where the defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses).
Finally, Barenz argues that the 2006 increase in presumptive ranges for sexual offenses violated due process because the decision to increase the range was based on faulty findings and was poorly reasoned. But a statutory penalty generally passes due process muster "as long as it bears any rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal." Because rational inferences would allow the legislature to set the presumptive ranges it did, Barenz has not shown that the legislature violated due process when it increased the sentencing ranges.
State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 267 (Alaska 2000).
As part of his argument that the increase in sentencing ranges was poorly reasoned, Barenz notes that other crimes besides sexual offenses are often committed many times before being caught. To the extent that this argument can be construed as an equal protection challenge to the sentencing ranges, this challenge fails under Alaska's three-part, sliding-scale equal protection analysis. See Anderson v. State, 904 P.2d 433, 436 (Alaska App. 1995). The individual right purportedly infringed is "the relatively narrow interest of a convicted offender in minimizing the punishment for an offense," while the State "has a strong and direct interest in establishing penalties for criminal offenders and in determining how those penalties should be applied to various classes of convicted felons." See id. (quoting Maeckle v. State, 792 P.2d 686, 689 (Alaska App.1990)). There is "no marked deficiency in the challenged statute's approach to fulfilling the state's legitimate interest in punishing criminal offenders." Id.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.