Opinion
CIVIL 1:23-CV-1666
04-30-2024
SAMIR BAPTISTA, Petitioner, v. CRAIG LOWE, Respondent.
Mannion, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Statement of the Case
This case comes before us for consideration of a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by the petitioner, Samir Baptista, an immigration detainee. (Docs. 1, 12). Baptista is a citizen of Cape Verde who has lived as a lawful permanent resident in the United States for almost two decades. (Doc. 12 ¶ 1). In 2016, Baptista pleaded guilty to state criminal assault charges in Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 13). Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued Baptista a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable from the United States. (Id.). In January of 2023, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Baptista removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). (Id. ¶ 14).
Baptista has been in ICE custody since September of 2022pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), as his state criminal conviction was found to constitute an aggravated felony under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). (Doc. 12 ¶¶ 13-14). His removal proceedings are currently ongoing. Thus, following the IJ's decision and order of removal in March of 2023, Baptista appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Id. ¶ 15). Specifically, Baptista argued that his state conviction in Massachusetts did not qualify as an “aggravated felony” under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and thus, he was not removable. (Id.). The BIA dismissed Baptista's appeal in October of 2023, and Baptista filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶ 16). Thereafter, Baptista filed for a stay of removal while his petition for review is pending, which the Fourth Circuit granted in January of 2024. (Id.).
Baptista was initially detained at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center until August of 2023, when he was transferred to the Pike County Correctional Facility where he currently remains detained. (Doc. 12 ¶ 13).
Baptista has been in ICE custody for roughly 19 months without ever having received a bond hearing. He filed this petition, and subsequently a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking an order directing that he receive an individualized bond hearing because his continued detention violates Due Process. (Docs. 12, 23). After review, we recommend that the Court grant Baptista's petition for habeas corpus and order an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.
II. Discussion
Section 1226 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) “generally governs the process of arresting and detaining . . . aliens pending their removal.” Guerrero-Sanchez v Warden York County Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 538 U.S. 281, 287 (2018)). While § 1226(a) provides for a mandatory bond hearing for certain categories of aliens, § 1226(c) mandates the detention of aliens convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1226(c). Here, it is undisputed that Baptista is being held pursuant to § 1226(c).
While § 1226(c) provides for the mandatory detention of aliens convicted of certain crimes, like Baptista, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that prolonged detention may raise due process concerns. Demore v. Kim, 583 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). In addressing these due process concerns, the Third Circuit held that even in the context of mandatory detention under § 1226(c), “[a]t a certain point, continued detention becomes unreasonable,” and at this point, “the Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of proving that continued detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention statute.” Diop v. ICE Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Diop Court, relying in part on the canon of constitutional avoidance, highlighted the reasoning in Demore, which arose from the understanding that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) lasts for a “very limited time” in most cases. Id. at 233 (quoting Demore, 583 U.S. at 529 & n.12). Thus, in Diop, the Third Circuit had no trouble concluding that the petitioner's 35-month long detention without a hearing, as compared to Demore's 6-month period of detention, was unreasonable. Id. at 234. Several years later, in Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015), the Court of Appeals went a step further, concluding that detention for a period between six months to one year becomes presumptively unreasonable, and the burden then shifts to the Government to justify the prolonged detention of the individual. Id. at 478.
Both Diop and Chavez-Alvarez relied, in part, on the canon of constitutional avoidance in determining a time frame for the reasonableness of civil immigration detention. Then, in 2018, the Supreme Court decided Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). Jennings expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding-which relied on the canon of constitutional avoidance-that §§ 1225, 1226(a), and 1226(c) require bond hearings after six months. Id. at 296-97. Thus, to the extent Diop and Chavez-Alvarez relied on the canon of constitutional avoidance, those decisions were abrogated by Jennings. The Jennings Court, however, did not address the question of the constitutionality of § 1226(c), and instead remanded that issue to the Ninth Circuit. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312.
Following Jennings, courts within the Third Circuit disagreed as to whether aliens detained under § 1226(c) could still bring as-applied challenges to their detention. The Court of Appeals clarified this postJennings confusion in German-Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020). In German-Santos, the Third Circuit held that aliens detained under § 1226(c) may still bring as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of their detention:
Faced with as-applied challenges under [§ 1226(c)], we have held that the Due Process Clause limits detention without a bond hearing to a “reasonable” period. Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 474-75; Diop, 656 F.3d at 233. But in those cases, we also invoked the constitutional-avoidance canon to construe the statute as limiting detention without a bond hearing. Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 475; Diop, 656 F.3d at 231. So after the Supreme Court held in Jennings that § 1226(c) does not limit the length of detention, district courts in this Circuit have disagreed about whether aliens can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention under that statute. See 138 S.Ct. at 846.
We hold that they can. Though Jennings abrogated our construction of the statute as implicitly limiting detention without a bond hearing, it left our framework for as-applied constitutional challenges intact.Id. at 208.
The Court of Appeals reiterated that the constitutional analyses in Diop and Chavez-Alvarez still control and provide a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether detention under § 1226(c) has become unreasonable. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 210-11. These factors include: (1) the duration of detention; (2) “whether detention is likely to continue”; (3) the reasons for delay; and (4) whether the “conditions of confinement are ‘meaningfully different [ ]' from criminal punishment.” Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, we conclude that these factors weigh in favor of a finding that Baptista's 19-month detention without a bond hearing is unreasonable. First, as to the duration of detention, which is the “most important factor[,]” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211, courts in this district have found detention for similar periods of time unreasonable. See eg., Clarke v. Doll, 481 F.Supp.3d 394, 398 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (20 months); Malede v. Lowe, 2022 WL 3084304, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2022) (Schwab, M.J.) (18 months); Davydov v. Doll, 2020 WL 969618, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2020) (Kane, J.) (14 months); Chikerema v. Lowe, 2019 WL 3891086, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019) (Rambo, J.) (over 20 months); Bah v. Doll, 2018 WL 6733959, at * (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2018) (Carlson, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5829668 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2018) (14 months). Accordingly, we conclude that this factor weighs in favor of granting Baptista relief.
As to the second factor, whether Baptista's detention is likely to continue, we similarly find that this factor weighs in favor of granting Baptista relief. While the Government contends that “this factor relies on unhelpful hypothesizing of future events,” (Doc. 21 at 27), it is undisputed that the Fourth Circuit has granted Baptista a stay of removal, and his petition for review is pending before that Court. (Doc. 12-10). Thus, it is undisputed that Baptista's detention will continue, at a minimum, for as long as it takes the Court of Appeals to review and render a decision on his petition. See Davydov, 2020 WL 969618, at *5; Bah, 2018 WL 6733959, at *8.
As to the third factor, the reasons for delay, we conclude that this factor does not weigh in favor of or against either party. For its part, the Government posits that Baptista's immigration proceedings have moved at a normal pace. (Doc. 21 at 27). While Baptista asserts that certain delays are attributable to the Government, such as the failure to serve Baptista with the initial removal order and the failure to provide the correct interpreter, we conclude that there has been no showing of bad faith of unreasonable delay by the Government. See German Santos, 965 F.3d at 212; Clarke, 481 F.Supp.3d at 397.
Finally, the fourth factor undoubtedly weighs in favor of Baptista. Here, Baptista is detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility, where he is housed among convicted criminals and is granted only an hour and a half out of his cell. (Doc. 12 ¶ 18). As the Government concedes, “the Third Circuit found that the conditions at Pike County Correctional Facility were punitive as to immigration detainees.” (Doc. 21 at 29) (citing German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213); see also Malede, 2022 WL 3084304, at *7 (finding that the conditions at the Pike County Correctional Facility “strongly favor[ed] a finding of unreasonableness[.]”). Thus, we conclude that this factor weighs in favor of granting Baptista relief.
Accordingly, given the length of time Baptista has been detained without a hearing, the likelihood of continued detention while his petition for review is pending in the Court of Appeals, and the conditions in which he has been detained, we conclude that Baptista's detention has become constitutionally unreasonable, and he is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge in accordance with German Santos. Clarke, 481 F.Supp.3d at 398.
While we reach this conclusion, we take no position on what the ultimate outcome of such a bond hearing should be.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this petition for writ of habeas corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be GRANTED, and that the court order that an immigration judge conduct a bond hearing. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 23) be denied as moot.
The petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.