Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-00570-JD-KFM
03-24-2023
Genuine Truth Banner, Plaintiff, v. Audrey Daniels-Moore; Dennis Patterson, Sr.; Joel Anderson; Stacey Richardson; Joseph Stines; Dr. Stephanie Skewes; Brandon Byrd; Terrie Wallace; Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on February 10, 2023 (doc. 1). On February 28, 2023, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 8). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his claims be dismissed (id. at 8-9). The plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided; accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by the plaintiff, proceeding pro se (doc. 1). The plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and currently housed at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) (id. at 2). The plaintiff alleges violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (id. at 6).
The plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to maximum security on April 2, 2020, based upon allegations that he attempted to murder an officer (id. at 8). The plaintiff contends that a disciplinary hearing was not held within 21 days as required (id.). The plaintiff's disciplinary hearing was not held until October 2021 (id.). The plaintiff contends that he was tried in General Sessions court and found “not guilty” of the charges, but was still required to attend a disciplinary hearing for the same charges in October 2021 (id.). The plaintiff contends that the disciplinary hearing was flawed because he did not have access to certain evidence or witnesses based on the age of the offense (id. at 9). Due to this, the plaintiff alleges that Ms. Daniels-Moore was not impartial and wrongfully found him guilty of the disciplinary charge (id. at 9, 10). As a result of the charge, the plaintiff was sanctioned the loss of 12 days of good time and sentenced to time served on maximum security (id. at 9).
After the hearing, the plaintiff's custody classification was not changed, and his motions and requests to lower his custody classification continue to be denied (id. at 9, 11). The plaintiff contends that his ongoing stay in solitary confinement is cruel and unusual punishment (id. at 11). The plaintiff contends that his equal protection rights have been violated because other inmates had their disciplinary charges dismissed if their hearings did not take place within twenty-one days (id. at 10). The plaintiff also contends that his disciplinary charge violated double jeopardy since he was found not guilty of the charges in General Sessions court (id.). The plaintiff alleges that he exhausted his state court remedies by appealing his disciplinary conviction to the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (id. at 15; see doc. 1-1).
The plaintiff's injuries include the loss of 12 days of good time and emotional pain and suffering (doc. 1 at 12). For relief, the plaintiff seeks to have his disciplinary conviction overturned, his good time restored, and money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even though the plaintiff has prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Due Process Claim
The plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants because he has been kept on maximum security/solitary confinement since 2020, as well as based upon the disciplinary hearing proceeding/conviction because he was found not guilty in general sessions court (doc. 1 at 8-11). To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). First, to the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based upon his custody classification, asserting that he should not be held in maximum security, the claim is subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Additionally, the plaintiff's inability to earn good credit time credit on maximum security is not a protected liberty interest. See Mills v. Holmes, 95 F.Supp.3d 924, 935 (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing West v. Angelone, 165 F.3d 22 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (“Inmates have no protected liberty interest in remaining in or being assigned to a particular good conduct allowance level . . . .”); James v. Robinson, 45 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished)).
Further, to the extent the plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was improperly found guilty of a disciplinary charge by Ms. Daniels-Moore, his request is also subject to dismissal. Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, § 1983. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004); see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, (1973) (an application seeking release from custody is an application for habeas corpus and is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act). “Habeas corpus, and not § 1983, is the exclusive federal remedy for state prisoners seeking actual release from confinement,” Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 804 F.3d 692, 694-95 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. 475, 487-90), and “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action,” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750. Here, in seeking to overturn the disciplinary conviction, the plaintiff seeks to recover the 12 days of good time credit that he lost as a result of the disciplinary charge; however, this court cannot order the return of his good time credit in this civil rights action. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (noting that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”).
Even presuming the plaintiff was not seeking the return of good time credit -meaning his claim could actually be considered in this action - his damages claim is subject to dismissal because his disciplinary offense conviction has not been set aside. See Harris v. Martin, C/A No. 1:14-cv-015925, 2015 WL 66513, at *6-7 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 5, 2015) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Thompson v. Clarke, C/A No. 7:17-cv-00111, 2018 WL 4764294, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2018); Mukuria v. Mullins, C/A No. 7:15-cv-00451, 2015 WL 6958343, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2015)). A finding that the defendants violated the plaintiff's due process rights during a disciplinary proceeding would imply the invalidity of the resultant disciplinary conviction and penalties; thus, without any information that the disciplinary conviction was set aside, the plaintiff's due process claim is barred under Heck. As noted above, the plaintiff challenges the disciplinary conviction - meaning that it has not been set aside. Thus, the plaintiff's due process claim is subject to dismissal. See Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289, 294-96 (4th Cir. 2022) (published).
Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff alleges that his double jeopardy rights were violated when he was found guilty of a disciplinary charge after being found not guilty in General Sessions court, his claim fails. Disciplinary convictions are not criminal prosecutions under the Double Jeopardy Clause; thus, the plaintiff's double jeopardy rights were not violated when he was convicted of a prison disciplinary charge after the General Sessions court found him not guilty. See Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1950) (finding that disciplinary charges did not implicate the double jeopardy clause because they are not criminal prosecutions for jeopardy purposes).
Likewise, to the extent the plaintiff brings an equal protection claim regarding SCDC's failure to dismiss his disciplinary conviction when the hearing was not held on time (although other inmates' convictions have been dismissed when the hearing was not held on time), such a claim is also subject to summary dismissal. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourth Circuit has held that
[t]o succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that he has been treated differently than other inmates based upon a suspect class - as being a prisoner is not a suspect classification. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that circuit precedent clearly holds “that prisoners are not a ‘suspect class'”). Therefore, the plaintiff's equal protection claim also fails.
Further, the plaintiff's alleged injuries - emotional pain and suffering - are not constitutionally cognizable. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (finding that there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims regarding his disciplinary conviction are subject to summary dismissal - as outlined in more detail above.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Liberally construed, the plaintiff may allege cruel and unusual punishment based on his continued assignment to maximum security/solitary confinement (doc. 1 at 11). However, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants are or were aware of an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health or safety based on his placement on maximum security/solitary confinement and the plaintiff has not alleged that he has been denied minimal civilized necessities. See Thorpe v. Clarke, et al., 37 F.4th 926, 940 (4th Cir. 2022). Further, as noted above, the plaintiff's only alleged injuries are emotional pain and suffering, which are not constitutionally cognizable. See Williams, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 (internal citations omitted). As such, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are also subject to summary dismissal.
Duplicative Litigation
Of note, this case represents the second attempt by the plaintiff to seek damages and the return of good time based upon his 2020 transfer to maximum security/solitary confinement and resultant disciplinary conviction that resulted in the loss of 12 days good time. See Banner v. Anderson, C/A No. 6:21-cv-03738-JD-KFM (D.S.C.). The plaintiff's first case was dismissed for failure to state a claim with a note that the plaintiff had yet to exhaust his remedies with respect to his disciplinary conviction. Banner, 2022 WL 1537320 (D.S.C. May 16, 2022). Although the plaintiff in the instant matter obtained a decision from the South Carolina Administrative Law Court regarding his disciplinary conviction prior to filing the instant action, it is duplicative of his earlier case and the plaintiff still has not corrected any of the pleading deficiencies noted in the prior action.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued February 28, 2023, the undersigned provided the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 8). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).