Summary
granting summary judgment on pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim "because under any potential potentially applicable standard," plaintiff failed to raise genuine dispute of material fact whether defendants knew of or disregarded an excessive risk of serious harm to his health
Summary of this case from Lau v. KekuaokalaniOpinion
No. 15-16517
03-01-2017
GREGORY BANKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KARINA CASTILLO; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00324-RCJ-PAL MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Nevada state prisoner Gregory Banks appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need arising out of his pretrial detention at Clark County Detention Center. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Summary judgment was proper on Banks's deliberate indifference claim because under any potentially applicable standard Banks failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants knew of or disregarded an excessive risk of serious harm to Banks's health. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-58 (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to a prisoner's health; neither a prisoner's difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment nor mere negligence in treating a medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference); Lolli v. Cty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003) (pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, but same standards apply); cf. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (setting forth elements of Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim by pretrial detainee).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.