Opinion
No. 30325
Decided March 6, 1946.
Garnishment — Special examination of garnishee — Sections 11830 and 11847, General Code — Judgment creditor may put leading questions to and cross-examine garnishee, when.
Where, by virtue of Sections 11830 and 11847, General Code, a garnishee is called for a special examination to answer under oath all questions put to him touching property of every description and credits of the judgment debtor in the possession of the garnishee or under his control and to truly disclose the amount owing by him to the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor may not only put leading questions to the garnishee but may, if necessary to elicit full information, cross-examine him as to all pertinent facts within the scope of such inquiry.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county.
On January 10, 1944, there was filed an affidavit in aid of execution to the effect that Henry C. Stumpe had, in 1930, recovered a judgment in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton county against Morris Kwartler for the sum of $1,926.97 and interest, upon which judgment $75 had been paid. The present unpaid amount of this judgment is $3,867.41. In this affidavit, the Monarch Building Loan Association Company and Joseph Goldhagen were named as garnishees. Certain other persons were also named as garnishees but the proceedings were discontinued or dismissed as to them during the hearing.
Upon the filing of the affidavit the usual order was made by the court requiring the garnishees to appear in court on February 27, 1944, to answer questions under oath or to file answers respecting their liability to the judgment debtor Morris Kwartler; and to retain moneys due to the judgment debtor in their hands until further order of the court.
A notice, to which a copy of the order above described was attached, was served by the sheriff upon the judgment debtor and upon each of the garnishees. Joseph Goldhagen and the Monarch Building Loan Association Company, as garnishees, each filed answers to the effect that they were not indebted to Morris Kwartler. The court, on the motion of Henry C. Stumpe, also ordered a revivor of the judgment above referred to.
The matter was continued from time to time but went on trial July 5, 1944. After hearing, the proceedings in aid were dismissed as to the garnishees, the Monarch Building Loan Association Company and Joseph Goldhagen, the court finding that such garnishees were not indebted to the judgment creditor. A motion for new trial was overruled.
An appeal on questions of law was taken to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court.
This court sustained the motion of the appellant, the judgment creditor, to certify the record and the case is now here for review.
In 1940, a residence property was purchased in the name of Becky Goldhagen, a cousin of Kwartler, the judgment debtor. Kwartler occupied the property as his residence from about the date of its purchase until it was sold to Ida Kauffman in January 1944. The entire purchase price of the property in 1940, approximating $5,400, was obtained from a $5,500 mortgage loan granted to the Goldhagens by the Monarch Building Loan Association Company.
When Ida Kauffman purchased the property in 1944 for $6,350, she borrowed $5,500 from the same loan association to finance the transaction. Under these circumstances counsel for the judgment creditor sought to show that the Goldhagens purchased the property for the judgment debtor and that when the property was sold the equity in it was to be transferred to the judgment debtor.
On hearing, counsel for the judgment creditor called as a witness Harry R. Weber, an attorney who represented the loan association in closing the Goldhagen loan. The loan application signed by "Joe Goldhagen," to which was attached Weber's certificate as to title, was identified and offered in evidence. The certificate certified that the fee simple title to the property was vested in the name of the Monarch Building Loan Association Company, but a line had been drawn through the written name of the company and there had been inserted the words "Separate report submitted."
When inquiry was made of Weber concerning the distribution of the proceeds of the Goldhagen loan and the closing of the Kauffman loan he stated that he had not yet deposited the proceeds of the Kauffman loan. The record then shows the following:
"Q. There is a fund in your hands. What is the fund that you have in your hands on that loan that has not been distributed? * * * A. I haven't any fund, because I deposited no check to date in bank as the proceeds of that loan.
"Q. That is, you haven't deposited any check in bank? A. Correct.
"Q. Then what was the amount of the checks you have not deposited? * * *
"Witness: I claim the privilege. I gave the association certain advice, and took a certain stand, and if he interrogates me further it will require me to reveal a confidential communication.
"The court: I understand you to say you have no fund in your hand? A. I am holding a check. I have not deposited it because I gave the building association certain advice about it.
"The court: Objection sustained."
Later on Joseph Goldhagen was called as a witness as upon cross-examination by counsel for the judgment creditor. An objection was made by personal counsel for the witness on the ground that the witness was not a party and could not be cross-examined. The court then said:
"That is correct. He cannot be called on cross-examination. He will be your witness."
It is true that the court later remarked "you may ask anything you want to ask him," but the record indicates that such inquiry was to be subject to the limitation already imposed by the court. This is indicated by the fact that when counsel called a subsequent witness, Becky Goldhagen, to testify, and suggested that he supposed "Your Honor will rule I cannot cross-examine her either," the court replied: "That is right. She will be your witness."
Mr. Mitchell Wilby, for appellant.
Mr. Henry L. Kelsch, for appellee Morris Kwartler.
Mr. Philip A. Cohen and Mr. Sam J. Ginsburg, for appellee Joseph Goldhagen.
The appellant complains that the trial court erred in holding that an attorney at law representing a loan association in the distribution of the proceeds of a loan to be made by such association could refuse to answer questions concerning such distribution on the ground that to answer would disclose a confidential communication to his client, the loan association; and that the trial court erred in holding that a garnishee ordered by the court to appear for examination as to his indebtedness to the judgment debtor was the witness of the judgment creditor and could not be called for cross-examination or cross-examined by the latter.
This court is of the opinion that the trial court did not err in not requiring counsel for the garnishee, the Monarch Building Loan Association Company, to disclose the nature of what appeared to the court to be a privileged communication. It might be claimed that where a corporation as garnishee authorizes its legal counsel to answer for it concerning its indebtedness to the judgment debtor, it thereby waives the privilege and makes its counsel available as a witness to answer fully for it. However, the judgment creditor may call as a witness some other officer of the corporation as to whom the privilege does not attach. Since counsel for the judgment creditor did not see fit to pursue that course, he cannot claim prejudice in the court's ruling.
Although a garnishee is not a party in the action in the sense that he does not have his day in court and that a final order or judgment may not be made or taken against him ( Secor v. Witter, 39 Ohio St. 218, 231), he is not subpoenaed into court as a witness but is brought into the action by the service of process (Section 11828, General Code) and is required to answer under oath as to his indebtedness to the judgment debtor. The garnishee is the witness of neither the judgment creditor nor the judgment debtor. He is a stakeholder or custodian of the funds or property in his hands for one or the other of the litigants as the law may determine. His duty is to let the law have its course between them. He is only bound to disclose the truth, but since the rights of the parties must depend upon his legal relationship with respect to any indebtedness to the judgment debtor, his disclosure must be full and complete.
To secure such a disclosure the statute provides that in addition to the formal answer which shall be made, a special examination of the garnishee shall be had. Section 11830, General Code. And all questions put to him relating to his indebtedness to the judgment debtor shall be answered. Section 11847, General Code.
The judgment creditor is not concluded by the answer of the garnishee ( Myers v. Smith, 29 Ohio St. 120), and if the garnishee fails to appear and answer, or if he appears and answers and his disclosure is not satisfactory to the judgment creditor, the latter may proceed against the garnishee by civil action in which proceedings may be had as in other actions (Section 11851, General Code); and as an incident to such action the judgment creditor as plaintiff may require the garnishee, as defendant in that action, to answer any and all interrogatories pertaining to the issue, which interrogatories the plaintiff may attach to and file with his petition. Sections 11348, 11349 and 11350, General Code.
The court denied the judgment creditor the right to cross-examine the garnishee on the ground that the garnishee was not a party to the action and was the judgment creditor's own witness. Although the matter of admission of testimony in chief in the form of leading questions is largely within the discretion of the court, yet there are many circumstances under which such testimony should be admitted. A garnishee ordered by the court to answer concerning his indebtedness to the judgment debtor is not a partisan witness presumably favorable to the judgment creditor calling him, and consequently the reason for the rule against propounding leading questions on direct examination does not apply. In fact, the disposition of a witness under such circumstances involving an admission or commitment as to his own indebtedness is often to minimize such obligation or to deny that it exists. He is not a witness of the judgment creditor's own choice, but he is one whom the judgment creditor is obliged to call through force of circumstances.
The statute is broad in its terms requiring the garnishee to "answer all questions put to him touching property of every description, and credits of the defendant in his possession or under his control and truly disclose the amount owing by him to the defendant." From the very nature and scope of the inquiry it may be and often is impossible to develop the facts through the medium of an examination which does not permit leading questions. In fact, a searching cross-examination is often the only means of securing the information within the knowledge of a garnishee.
Furthermore, if the answers of the garnishee are unsatisfactory to the judgment creditor the latter may sue the garnishee and before trial require him to answer interrogatories most leading and searching in character. At the trial, the judgment creditor may cross-examine the garnishee as a party defendant. If such an examination may be pursued, there is no good reason why similar questions may not be put to the garnishee upon his garnishment examination without incurring the annoyance and expense of an action at law. In fact, a full disclosure by the garnishee may be the means of ending the litigation, whereas less than such may be the means of prolonging it.
Under the circumstances of this case, which need not be further recounted, there were facts which cast suspicion upon the bona fides of the relationship and transactions between the Goldhagens and the judgment debtor. The Goldhagens were represented by their own personal counsel who placed them in the category of hostile witnesses by his objections to pertinent questions. In the interests of justice, a complete and, if necessary, a searching examination of Joseph and Becky Goldhagen as to whether the judgment debtor had an equity in the property, title to which stood in her name and which she is now selling, should have been allowed by the court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the Common Pleas Court for further proceedings according to law.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, BELL, WILLIAMS, TURNER and MATTHIAS, JJ., concur.