Opinion
2017–02479 Index No. 130270/14
01-16-2019
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc., Respondent, v. Sanije RUCI, Appellant, et al., Defendants.
Richard A. Rosenzweig, P.C., Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant. Day Pitney, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Rachel G. Packer of counsel), for respondent.
Richard A. Rosenzweig, P.C., Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant.
Day Pitney, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Rachel G. Packer of counsel), for respondent.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, HECTOR D. LASALLE, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Sanije Ruci appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Judith N. McMahon, J.), dated February 23, 2017. The order denied her motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate her default in opposing the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In this action to foreclose a mortgage, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint. The appellant moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate her default in opposing the motion. The Supreme Court denied the appellant's motion.
"In order to vacate a default in opposing a motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), the moving party is required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion" ( Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Bomba, 149 A.D.3d 704, 705, 51 N.Y.S.3d 570 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see NYCTL 1998–2 Trust v. McGill, 138 A.D.3d 1077, 1079, 30 N.Y.S.3d 308 ). "The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court" ( Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Saketos, 158 A.D.3d 610, 612, 72 N.Y.S.3d 167 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hudson City Sav. Bank v. Bomba, 149 A.D.3d at 705, 51 N.Y.S.3d 570 ).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's motion. The appellant's vague and unsubstantiated claim of law office failure by an unidentified attorney was insufficient to establish a reasonable excuse for her default (see LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. LoRusso, 155 A.D.3d 706, 707, 64 N.Y.S.3d 102 ; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Barr, 139 A.D.3d 937, 938, 30 N.Y.S.3d 576 ; M & T Bank v. Morris, 138 A.D.3d 939, 28 N.Y.S.3d 623 ). Since the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default, it is not necessary to determine whether she demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. LoRusso, 155 A.D.3d at 706, 64 N.Y.S.3d 102 ; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Colucci, 138 A.D.3d 1047, 1048, 30 N.Y.S.3d 667 ; M & T Bank v. Morris, 138 A.D.3d at 940, 28 N.Y.S.3d 623 ).
CHAMBERS, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, LASALLE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.