Opinion
00 CV 8415 (RCC)
June 8, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Toyota Motor Credit Corporation ("TMCC") moves the Court for an order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer this class action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.
I. Background
Named Plaintiffs, Thad and Ethel Baltimore, residents of Bronx, New York, filed this class action on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and allege disparate impact on African-Americans with respect to Defendant's credit pricing policy. Defendant TMCC provides financing on motor vehicle purchases through the acquisition of retail installment contracts entered into by and between franchised Toyota and Lexus dealers and motor vehicle purchasers. It calculates the financing rate after an objective credit risk determination. Subsequently, according to Plaintiffs, Defendant's financing policy permits and encourages a subjective "mark-up" of that rate.
Plaintiffs dispute the financing process described in the Howard Declaration ¶ 3, however, the specifics of Defendant's process are not before the Court for purposes of this motion.
In January 1999 Mr. Baltimore purchased a new Toyota Camry at BL Toyota ("BL"), an authorized Toyota dealership located in Bronx, New York. He financed the purchase through TMCC, with BL acting as the arranger/originator. His mother, Ethel, co-signed his loan. After reading in The New York Times about similar cases proceeding in the Middle District of Tennessee, Mr. Baltimore contacted Plaintiffs' counsel on the belief that he had been a victim of an unlawfully inflated mark-up.
Defendant is a California corporation with corporate headquarters in Torrance, California, and customer service operations in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Howard Decl. ¶ 4. Additionally, TMCC has three Regional Offices located in California, Illinois and New Jersey. Id. Finally there are thirty-two origination branches nationwide, with seven in California and one in New York. Id. The computer systems containing copies of all customers' credit applications and installment contracts are located in the Torrence location, while the origination branches keep the originals. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Defendant maintains that employees responsible for setting policy, procedure and objectives concerning its retail motor vehicle financing program are located at the Torrence location. Id. ¶ 4. Accordingly, as Plaintiffs' claims concern Defendant's financing policy that is developed and administered in California, Defendant requests the Court to transfer the action to the Central District of California. Both parties agree this action could have been filed there originally. See Plaintiffs' Brief at n. 1
II. Discussion
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." The purpose of § 1404(a) is to avoid "waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616(1964) (internal citations omitted). While the district court maintains broad discretion in deciding whether to transfer the case, the moving party bears the burden of making out a strong case for transfer. Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 521 (2d Cir. 1989).
A court's considerations in weighing such a motion can vary and are determined on a case by case basis. Dealtime.com v. McNulty, 124 F. Supp.2d 750, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 17 Moore's Federal Practice § 111.13 (3d ed. 1997) (stating "there is no definitive list of factors that must be considered," and noting courts generally look to some or all of the factors outlined below). Generally, however, after it has been determined that venue in the transferee district is proper, courts evaluate the following factors, based on the totality of the circumstances: (1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the location of the relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice. Id. The Court's determination of the present motion rests primarily on the convenience of witnesses and the location of documents. Viacom Int'l. Inc. v. Melvin Simon Prods., 774 F. Supp. 858, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating convenience of witnesses is usually the most important consideration in analyzing motions to transfer); Amersham Pharmacia Biotech, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 11 F. Supp.2d 729, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating "each factor need not be accorded equal weight").
As the Court finds the questions of convenience and location of documents dispositive, it will not address those factors that do not weigh in one forum's favor over another.
Here, Plaintiffs allege the proposed class "encompasses many thousands or tens of thousands of individuals who are geographically dispersed throughout the United States." Complaint ¶ 10. By filing a class action, Plaintiffs have essentially placed themselves on equal footing with Defendant with respect to their means. Similarly, Plaintiff's choice of forum has lost any preference it would otherwise be afforded. Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Cas Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524(1947) ("[W]here there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs . . . all of whom could with equal show of right go into their many home courts, the claim of any one plaintiff that a forum is appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably weakened."); IBJ Schroder Bank Trust Co. v. Mellon Bank. N.A., 730 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating in class actions the "accidental residence of the named plaintiff is discounted in weighing the transfer factors"); Shulof v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting plaintiff's choice of forum has little weight in class actions).
Moving to questions of convenience and evidence, Defendant maintains that all of its personnel responsible for developing financing policy and procedure, maintaining the computerized records and administering the finance contracts work from the Torrence location and live in Southern California. Additionally, all customer records concerning the retail finance programs are located in the Torrence computer system and Defendant argues it would be unduly expensive to ship those documents to New York.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that their case will not depend on testimony of TMCC's employees in Torrence. Rather, they maintain that TMCC's policy, testimony by personnel from regional offices and dealerships who implement the policy and a statistical analysis will support their case. Watkins Decl. ¶¶ 4-6 (relying on his experience in litigating similar suits proceeding in Tennessee). Plaintiffs also submit that they will bear the cost of copying and shipping the relevant documents to their counsel. Finally, Plaintiffs urge the Court to respect their choice of the New York forum because that is where the Baltimores reside and where they financed the car.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' arguments. First, even if Plaintiffs choose to attempt to prove their case with facts gleaned from personnel other than those with knowledge of and responsibility for the financing policy located at Defendant's Torrence location, "it is to be presumed (if not certain) that [Defendant] will wish to call such witnesses in person on defense." Shulof, 402 F. Supp. at 1264 (transferring class action, in part, for convenience of witnesses who were located at Defendant's headquarters location). In contrast, Plaintiffs' only witnesses that are in New York are the Baltimores and, presumably, personnel from BL and the origination branch. Witnesses from other branches and dealerships will have to travel regardless of the location of the litigation. New York would be convenient for only a handful of Plaintiffs' witnesses while California would be convenient for a majority of Defendant's.
Although in the past this Court has required an affidavit from transfer proponent regarding potential witnesses and substance of their testimony, Citibank. N.A., v. Transcontinental Prods. Servs., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 6889(RCC), 1999 WL 595658, *2 (S.D.N Y Aug. 6, 1999), such an affidavit is unnecessary here where all of Defendant's employees responsible for establishing financing policy and procedure live and work in Southern California. Howard Decl. ¶ 4; Chrome Hearts. Inc. v. Montana Street Wear. Inc., No. 95 Civ. 10736(RPP), 1996 WL 306368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996) (transferring the case because of convenience of witnesses and finding no need for affidavit witness list where a demonstrated majority of witnesses would be inconvenienced by New York trial).
Similarly, the only documents located in New York are the originals of Plaintiff Baltimore's financing agreement, copies of which exist on computer files located in Torrence. It would be an unnecessary inconvenience and expense for Plaintiffs to fund transporting these records to New York. Moreover, to date, the Baltimores are the only New York plaintiffs. The anticipated class, numbering in the thousands, is geographically dispersed throughout the United States. See In re Nematron Corp. Secs. Litig., 30 F. Supp.2d 397, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating residence of named plaintiffs in class action is merely fortuitous). While there is no telling where the thousands other Plaintiffs reside or financed their automobiles, it is definite that Defendant's defense will rely on testimony from its Torrence personnel, as well as documents located there. Accordingly, the Court finds the convenience of TMCC, its witnesses and the location of the records in Torrence weigh heavily in favor of transfer to California. See APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 49 F. Supp.2d 664, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding transfer appropriate where Defendant's headquarters and most of the relevant documents were in transferee forum).
III. Conclusion
For all the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the interests of justice weigh in favor of transferring the instant class action to the Central District of California. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is ordered to transfer the case.
So ordered.