Summary
rejecting appellant's invitation to abandon Keller standard of review in favor of Jackson standard of review in cases where defendant pleaded guilty and executed judicial confession
Summary of this case from Anglin v. StateOpinion
No. 01-08-00788-CR
Opinion issued July 9, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
On Appeal from the 400th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 47870.
Panel consists of Judges KEYES, HANKS, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sandra Ballesteros pleaded guilty to the state jail felony of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a)-(b)(1) (Vernon 2003). After a pre-sentence investigation report, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony and saw a video of the police chase that led to Ballesteros's arrest. The trial court found Ballesteros guilty of evading arrest with a motor vehicle and assessed punishment at five years' deferred adjudication probation, 120 days of which must be served in the Fort Bend County Jail. Ballesteros appeals, contending that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her guilty plea and conviction. We affirm the trial court's decision.
Background
In October 2007, Ballesteros, who was then on probation for driving while intoxicated, consumed five shots of tequila and then drove to a friend's house, where she consumed an entire bottle of tequila. Deputy C. Matthews of the Houston Police Department was on patrol when he noticed that Ballesteros's vehicle was not staying centered in the lane and that parts of the vehicle were dragging on the ground. He activated his overhead emergency lights and attempted to pull her over, but she failed to stop. She slowed down when he activated his siren, but she then fled, driving off when Matthews emerged from his car and approached her car on foot. Police arrested Ballesteros after her vehicle came to a stop when she crashed it into a curb. Ballesteros pleaded guilty to evading arrest, and she executed a sworn "Written Stipulations and Judicial Confessions." In her judicial confession, Ballesteros admitted that she "committed the acts alleged in the indictment in this cause, and that the evidence and testimony would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that acts and allegations in the indictment in this cause are true and correct." As the indictment listed out all of the elements of the offense, Ballesteros was admitting that the evidence and testimony would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she:intentionally fle[d] from Deputy C. Matthews, a peace officer employed by the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Office, who was lawfully attempting to arrest or detain the Defendant, and the Defendant knew that Deputy C. Matthews was a peace officer attempting to arrest or detain the Defendant and the Defendant used a vehicle while in flight.Following the completion of a pre-sentence investigation, the trial court held a punishment hearing. At her punishment hearing, Ballesteros testified that she has since obtained help with a severe drinking problem, which made her unable to remember the events of that evening after the time she departed her friend's house. The trial court viewed a videotape of the police chase. The trial court then ordered that Ballesteros be placed on deferred adjudication probation for a period of five years, 120 days of which she must serve in the Fort Bend County Jail.
Discussion
On appeal, Ballesteros contends that her judicial confession is insufficient evidence to support the judgment of guilt because she testified at the punishment hearing that she does not remember all of the events leading to her arrest. She argues that a reasonable doubt remains as to whether: (1) she intentionally fled from Deputy Matthews; (2) he was lawfully attempting to arrest or detain her; (3) she knew he was a peace officer attempting to arrest or detain her; and (4) she used a vehicle while in flight. She urges the court to abandon the Court of Criminal Appeals's standard of review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in cases where the defendant has pleaded guilty and executed a judicial confession in favor of using the Jackson standard for legal sufficiency review. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) (holding that the standard of review for legal sufficiency is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt). We reject Ballesteros's invitation. When the defendant "knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere," the Jackson standard does not apply. Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism'd). Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State must only offer sufficient proof to support any judgment based on a guilty plea. Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 678; Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 604. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires thatno person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing . . .; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005). A judicial confession alone is sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of article 1.15. Stewart v. State, 12 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979)). By signing a judicial confession, Ballesteros waived any challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Keller, 125 S.W.2d at 605 (citing Ybarra v. State, 960 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.)). Here, Ballesteros does not contest the validity of her judicial confession. She does not contend that she was improperly or insufficiently admonished; nor does she argue that she pleaded guilty as a consequence of ineffective assistance of counsel. She initialed all of the State's written admonishments. If a defendant is properly admonished, it supports "a prima facie showing that a guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily." Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (citing Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)). Once this prima facie showing has been made, "the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm." Id. Ballesteros has not put forth any evidence tending to show that she did not understand the consequences of the plea. Ballesteros's confession that the allegations in the indictment were "true and correct" is sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of article 1.15. See Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605 (holding that a judicial confession containing the statement, "I understand the above allegations and I confess that they are true . . ." was sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of article 1.15).