Opinion
C.A. No. 05C-01-222 MJB.
Submitted: February 13, 2007.
Decided: May 9, 2007.
Upon Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, GRANTED.
Upon Defendants' Motion for Costs, DENIED.
Bernard A. Van Ogtrop, Esquire, Seitz, Van Ogtrop Green, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Louis J. Rizzo, Esquire, Reger Rizzo, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This personal injury case arises from an automobile collision in which a vehicle driven by Defendant, Louis Freeman, struck Plaintiff, Lynn Balderson, as she walked across the street. Trial was held on January 31, 2007, and on February 1, 2007, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. Subsequently, on February 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for New Trial, and on February 9, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion for Costs. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for New Trial is GRANTED and the Motion for Costs is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At trial, Plaintiff testified as follows: on the morning of October 12, 2004, at around 6:00 a.m., she had taken the bus to the intersection of 9th and Orange streets; she then walked off of the bus, and proceeded to walk toward 9th and Shipley streets; when she arrived at that intersection, she stopped and waited for a white pedestrian light; once the light turned white, she looked to her left, to her right, and down 9th street, and seeing no one, she proceeded to cross the street by entering the crosswalk on the right side of the roadway; as she continued to cross the street, she heard something and immediately turned to the left and saw the Defendant's vehicle as the impact occurred; she does not know how far into the street she was when she was struck by Defendant's vehicle; she was transported to Christiana Hospital where she stayed for three days; as a result of the incident, she suffered injuries to her wrists, arms, back, neck, and hands; she was in a lot of pain and took pain medication on a regular basis; she has missed many days from work due to the injuries and the pain.
Defendant testified that as he traveled on 9th Street, he slowed down because the light was red; that the red light turned to green as he was about half way up the block; that as he turned onto 9th Street at a speed of about five to fifteen mph, he did not see the Plaintiff; that it was a dark morning; that the Plaintiff "came out of nowhere" and he did not see her until just as his vehicle struck her; that Plaintiff was about two to three steps into the right side of the street when she was struck; that Plaintiff rolled off of the front of the vehicle and landed on the ground; and that the right side of the front of the vehicle, about one foot past the headlight, was damaged as a result of the impact. Additionally, Officer Connelly testified that his sketch of the accident scene was a fair and accurate representation of the area when the accident occurred and that by all accounts, Plaintiff was struck within two or three steps from the curb.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
In support of her Motion for New Trial, Plaintiff argues that the jury verdict was not supported by substantial evidence and reflects a total disregard of the testimony that Plaintiff was in the crosswalk when she was struck. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the jury was advised that 21 Del. C. 4142(a) related to Plaintiff's right of way in the crosswalk and they were told the law was that "when an operator of a vehicle is making a turn at an intersection, the driver shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling." Plaintiff believes that her testimony along with Defendant's testimony that the grille on the vehicle was broken by the impact, established that Plaintiff was within the crosswalk when she was struck. As such, Plaintiff argues that pursuant to 21 Del. C. 4142(a), and the relevant jury instruction, the jury should have found Defendant at least partly liable. Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the Court to set aside the jury verdict and grant a new trial.Defendant contends that the verdict should stand because it is supported by the testimony presented at trial. Defendant argues that the jury was properly advised of the relevant law, specifically 21 Del. C. 4142(b): "No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard." The jury was instructed that if they found that the evidence demonstrated Plaintiff suddenly left the curb and walked into the path of the vehicle when the vehicle was so close as to constitute a hazard, the jury must find Plaintiff's conduct was negligent. Defendant contends the jury correctly found that Plaintiff failed her burden of proof and thus rendered a verdict for the Defendant. Therefore, Defendant believes the jury's decision was supported by the evidence and should be upheld by the Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury verdicts. In the face of any reasonable difference of opinion, courts will yield to the jury's decision." "The factual findings of a jury should not to be disturbed if there is any competent evidence upon which the verdict could reasonably be based." Thus, the Court will not disturb a jury's verdict unless "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result." "The denial of a motion for a new trial will constitute an abuse of discretion if the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, no reasonable jury could have reached the result, and the denial was untenable and unreasonable."
Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997).
Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc. v. Norman Gershman's Things to Wear, Inc., 596 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Del. 1991).
Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979).
Wilhelm v. Ryan, 903 A.2d 745, 755 (Del. 2006).
ANALYSIS
"A trial court must give instructions to a jury as required by evidence and the law whether the parties request the instruction or not." "The trial judge is charged with the responsibility for instructing the jury. This [responsibility] is not controlled by the parties, as their function and duty is to bring to the court's attention the instructions they consider applicable and the reasons why they should be given." "While some inaccuracies and inaptness in statement are to be expected in any charge," the verdict will be set aside if the alleged deficiency in the instructions "undermined . . . the jury's ability to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict."Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the jury instruction related to 21 Del. C. 4142(b) was given in error and that the improper charge led to confusion by the jurors and resulted in a verdict that is not supported by the evidence offered at trial. Specifically, the Court's instruction on 21 Del. C. 4142(b) was improper because during the trial neither party presented evidence to establish that Plaintiff had suddenly walked into the path of the vehicle or that, when the Plaintiff walked off the curb, the vehicle was close enough to constitute a hazard. Although this instruction was agreed upon by both parties, upon review of the actual testimony, the Court finds the instruction was inappropriately given because there was no evidence adduced to support it.
At the end of the trial, the jury was instructed as follows:
Delaware Code annotated Title 21, Section 4142(b) reads in part as follows, no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. If you find from the evidence that Mrs. Balderson, when Mr. Freeman's vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, suddenly left the curb and walked into the path of the vehicle, you must find her conduct constituted negligence.
This charge was unsupported by the facts of the case. Both parties admitted during trial that they did not see one another until the moment of impact. There was no testimony or evidence to suggest that Plaintiff suddenly left the curb. In fact, Mrs. Balderson testified that she waited on the sidewalk until the light changed before she began to cross. Nor is there any testimony or evidence to establish that when she left the curb, Mr. Freeman's vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Indeed, at trial, theDefendant testified he was approximately one half block away from the intersection when the light turned green.
Considering the testimony and evidence offered at trial, the 21 Del. C. 4142(b) instruction misled the jury and may have led them to conclude, without factual support, that Plaintiff suddenly walked off of the curb and into the crosswalk when Defendant's vehicle was close enough to constitute a hazard. As stated above, it is the Court's obligation to fairly instruct the jury on the relevant law for which there is a reasonable basis in the record. Because there were no facts in the record on the issue of Plaintiff suddenly stepping off of the curb and into the roadway, and because no evidence was offered that at the time she did so, the vehicle was so close as to constitute a hazard, the Court finds that the 4142(b) instruction was improperly given. Consequently, because this instruction may have misled the jury and resulted in a verdict unsupported by the evidence, the Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. Having concluded that a new trial is warranted, the Court will not address Plaintiff's argument that the jury disregarded testimony and evidence related to the instruction on 21 Del. C. 4142(a).
Finally, the Court has before it a Motion for Costs filed by Defendant. Since a new trial will be conducted on the issues of liability and damages in this case, the motion is inappropriate at this juncture. Accordingly, the Motion for Costs is DENIED.