Opinion
1:21-cv-4702-OTW
07-25-2024
JOHN BAL, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY'S OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
GREGORY H. WOODS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
On July 23, 2022, the Court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang for general pretrial purposes and for motions requiring a report and recommendation. Dkt. No. 36. On February 15, 2023, this matter was reassigned to Judge Wang in full pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), by consent of all parties, including pro se Plaintiff John Bal. Dkt. No. 60. On July 19, 2024, Mr. Bal filed a motion to withdraw his consent to the jurisdiction of Judge Wang. Dkt. No. 116 (the “Motion”). In the Motion, Mr. Bal requests that Judge Wang recuse herself from this matter and that this case be reassigned back to this Court. Because Mr. Bal has failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting the withdrawal of the reference to Judge Wang, Mr. Bal's motion is denied.
“Litigants enjoy no absolute right to withdraw a validly given consent to proceed before a magistrate judge.” Savoca v. United States, 199 F.Supp.3d 716, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The district court “may, for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); see Fellman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Once a case is referred to a magistrate under section 636(c), the reference can be withdrawn only by the district court ....”).
“The ‘extraordinary circumstances' standard is a high bar that is difficult to satisfy.” Savoca, 199 F.Supp.3d at 721. “The high standard of proof prevents gamesmanship.” Id. “Particular caution is warranted when it appears that the party seeking to vacate a referral to which it previously consented simply wants to ‘rehash' before a district judge motions decided by the magistrate judge.” Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 251 F.Supp.2d 171, 174 (D.D.C. 2003). “[P]rior adverse rulings, even drastic reduction of an award, are not extraordinary circumstances[.] Perceived friction between the party and the magistrate judge, even coupled with adverse rulings, is not extraordinary, but is, in fact, quite ordinary and normal.” Id. (quotations omitted). “In the absence of a showing of extraordinary circumstances, the remedy [of a perceived legal error in an adverse ruling] is not evicting the magistrate judge from the case, but the taking of an appeal.” Id. (quotations omitted); accord Savoca, 199 F.Supp.3d at 721.
While the Second Circuit has not established what constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” in the context of a § 636(c)(4) inquiry, the Fifth Circuit provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider:
undue delay, inconvenience to the court and witnesses, prejudice to the parties, whether the movant is acting pro se, whether consent was voluntary and uncoerced, whether the motion is made in good faith or is dilatory and contrived, the possibility of bias or prejudice on the part of the magistrate, and whether the interests of justice would best be served by holding a party to his consent.I F G Port Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 82 F.4th 402, 414 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Carter v. Land Sea Servs., Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Mr. Bal fails to show any extraordinary circumstances here. Mr. Bal's asserted bases for the Motion do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting the withdrawal of the reference to Judge Wang. As already noted, an adverse ruling is not an extraordinary circumstance, and the proper avenue for challenging such a ruling is an appeal, not seeking to re-assign the matter to the district judge. See Savoca, 199 F.Supp.3d at 721 (“The proper means by which to correct perceived erroneous rulings is to take an appeal, not to seek the eviction of the magistrate judge from the case.” (quotations omitted)). Mr. Bal complains of purported errors in Judge Wang's October 5, 2023 opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 67. For example, Mr. Bal takes issue with Judge Wang's analysis of whether Mr. Bal adequately pleaded a Bivens claim, her “libel” of Mr. Bal regarding the potential involvement of a “sanctions target,” and what Mr. Bal asserts are other misstatements or oversights made by Judge Wang in the opinion. See Motion at 2-3, 5-6. Mr. Bal also objects to Judge Wang's May 2, 2024 order denying his request to extend the time to file cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 94. All of these are objections based on perceived errors in Judge Wang's decisions in this case. Such objections are challenges to a judge's actions in a matter, which do not fall into the category of extraordinary circumstances. See Manion, 251 F.Supp.2d at 174 (“Perceived friction between the party and the magistrate judge, even coupled with adverse rulings, is not extraordinary, but is, in fact, quite ordinary and normal.”).
Mr. Bal also objects to the scope and nature of the Department of Justice's legal representation of Defendants Charles Bishop, Jason E. Prince, and Marshall Fields (the “Individual Defendants”). See Motion at 3-4, 5. Mr. Bal's objections to how Defendants are choosing to litigate this case are unmoored from the referral of this case to the magistrate judge, and they do not show an extraordinary circumstance to warrant a withdrawal of such a referral.
Nor do any of the factors considered by the Fifth Circuit show that extraordinary circumstances exist here. Mr. Bal fails to point to any undue delay in the proceedings warranting a withdrawal of the reference. While Mr. Bal argues that he filed a May 2, 2022 application for a default judgment against certain of the Defendants that still has not been ruled on by Judge Wang, see Dkt. No. 21, that application is no longer pending, as Mr. Bal voluntarily withdrew it on July 22, 2022, Dkt. No. 35. Mr. Bal also does not identify any inconvenience to the court or witnesses that might result from a continued referral to Judge Wang. And, although Mr. Bal believes he is prejudiced by the referral of this matter to Judge Wang and her rulings on the parties' motions, he identifies no prejudice that is outside the ordinary scope of the effects of an adverse ruling on a party.
While Mr. Bal does proceed pro se, and the Court accepts that his motion is made in good faith, these two factors do not constitute an extraordinary circumstance on their own. There is no indication that the parties' consent to proceed before Judge Wang was involuntary or coerced. Nor do Mr. Bal's complaints of Judge Wang show any bias or prejudice by Judge Wang warranting a withdrawal of the reference to her jurisdiction-as already noted, Mr. Bal's objections to Judge Wang's rulings are of the nature ordinarily raised in a potential appeal of an adverse ruling. As for the final factor, the Court finds that “the interests of justice would best be served by holding a party to his consent” to jurisdiction before a magistrate judge, I F G Port Holdings, 82 F.4th at 414, given that this case has been referred to Judge Wang for nearly two years and she is well familiar with the parties and issues in this case. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's factor test weighs against finding “extraordinary circumstances” warranting a withdrawal of the reference to Judge Wang.
Finally, Mr. Bal's request for the recusal of Judge Wang from this matter is not properly before this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (emphasis added). Mr. Bal must address any motion to recuse Judge Wang from this matter to Judge Wang herself, and her decision on such a motion is subject to review by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as with any other purported legal error Mr. Bal identifies in Judge Wang's decisions in the case. Such a ruling does not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting a withdrawal of the reference to Judge Wang.
Judge Wang has already denied a motion to recuse filed by Mr. Bal. Dkt. No. 110.
Accordingly, because Mr. Bal has failed to show that extraordinary circumstances warrant a vacatur of the assignment of this matter to Judge Wang, Mr. Bal's motion to withdraw consent of jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 116, is DENIED.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No. 116 and to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.