Opinion
03 Civ. 3865 (LAK)
June 13, 2003
ORDER
On March 20, 1999, in New York State Supreme Court, Dutchess County, Kenyon Baker was convicted of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed Baker's convictions on October 29, 2001. People v. Baker, 287 A.D.2d 726, 732 N.Y.S.2d 420 (2d Dept. 2001). On August 20, 2002, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Baker, 98 N.Y.2d 708, 778 N.E.2d 556 (2002). Baker has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), habeas relief may not be granted when a claim in State court was adjudicated on the merits, unless the adjudication: (1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, the provision relevant to petitioner's claim, to give independent meaning to the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the] Court on a question of law" or if it "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite" to that of the Court. Id. at 405. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent if it "identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts" of a particular case or if it "either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407.
Petitioner essentially offers one ground for relief. He argues that his federal constitutional rights were violated because the court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life imprisonment and a second concurrent term, which represented a multiple of the five year sentence allegedly offered to him by the prosecution at the pre-trial Wade hearing. Pet. 5. Petitioner asserts that by imposing this sentence the court punished him for "refusing to accept the plea and exercising his Constitutional [sic] right to a trial." Id. He claims that this sentence, which was "wholly disproportionate to the plea offer," violated his "Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights, his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, and his Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 6.
Baker asserts that the court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of twenty years to life. Pet. 5. The Appellate Department's opinion states that the second term was twelve years to life imprisonment. Baker, 287 A.D.2d at 727, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 421. For the purposes of this disposition, the inconsistency is immaterial.
The Appellate Department held that the sentence imposed by the trial court did not violate petitioner's federal or state constitutional rights. Baker, 287 A.D.2d at 727, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 421. It explained further that the sentence offered during plea negotiations was lower than the one imposed after conviction because "the proposed plea agreement did not take into account the defendant's status as a second violent felony offender." Id.
Prosecutors have broad latitude in conducting plea negotiations. The Supreme Court has recognized "that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system" and "can benefit all concerned." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71, (1977). "Although every [plea bargain] has a discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] . . . an inevitable attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973). The Court has:
"squarely held that a State may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea. The plea may obtain for the defendant `the possibility or certainty . . . [not only of] a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty . . .,' Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970), but also of a lesser penalty than that required to be imposed after a guilty verdict by a jury." Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Smylis v. City of New York, 25 F. Supp.2d 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[A]n offer by a prosecutor to accept a plea to a lesser offense or to accept a lower punishment in exchange for a guilty plea simply does not offend the Constitution.").
In another case, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's due process rights were not violated when a state prosecutor, as the prosecutor threatened to do, reindicted a defendant on a more serious charge after the defendant refused to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978). Unlike in other contexts where a prosecutor unconstitutionally penalizes a defendant for exercising essential rights, with the "`give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Id. at 362.
Petitioner's claim fails. He was free to accept any sentence offered during plea negotiations, but he chose otherwise. Petitioner does not allege that the prosecutor brought charges against him for which the prosecutor lacked probable cause or that the court imposed a sentence not authorized by statute. Although petitioner knew of his prior offender status, Pet. 6, he decided to take his chances at trial, and he lost.
In sum, the Court's preliminary consideration under Rule 4 of the habeas rules reveals that the challenged state court determination was not "a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The petition is denied in all respects. The Clerk shall close the case. As no substantial question is presented, the Court denies a certificate of appealability and certifies that any appeal herefrom would not be taken in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
SO ORDERED.