Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11498 No. 6103
10-15-2014
JACLYN M. BAISCH, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Catherine Boruff, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3PA-10-3294 CR MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Beverly W. Cutler, Judge. Appearances: Catherine Boruff, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Hanley, District Court Judge. Judge ALLARD.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Jaclyn M. Baisch pleaded guilty to charges of felony driving under the influence and first-degree failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer, and admitted two probation violations. Following her change of plea, but before sentencing, Baisch entered Stepping Stones, a residential alcohol treatment program.
AS 28.35.030(a)(1) & (n).
AS 28.35.182(a).
At sentencing, Superior Court Judge Gregory Heath imposed a composite sentence of 8 years and 8 months with 3 years suspended (5 years and 8 months to serve). The judge allowed Baisch to delay her remand to jail so that she could complete the Stepping Stones program. The judge noted that Stepping Stones is "one of the best programs the state has to offer, it's run by Akeela House, it's a lock-down facility. If any program is eligible for Nygren credit, it's that program."
(A defendant is entitled to jail time credit for time spent at a residential treatment program under AS 12.55.027, provided that certain conditions are met. This jail time credit is often referred to as "Nygren credit" based on the original Nygren decision authorizing courts to grant jail time credit for time spent at a residential treatment program.)
Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141 (Alaska App. 1983), superseded by statute, AS 12.55.017 (2007), as recognized in McKinley v. State, 275 P.3d 567, 567-68 (Alaska App. 2012).
After Baisch completed the Stepping Stones program, she filed a motion under former AS 12.55.027 for jail time credit for the 313 days she spent in the program. Pro tem Superior Court Judge Beverly Cutler held oral argument on the motion on January 28, 2013. Based on this Court's interpretation of former AS 12.55.027 in McKinley v. State, Judge Cutler found that Baisch was only entitled to jail time credit for the initial ten days of the program when she was in lock-down status.
The Alaska legislature recently amended AS 12.55.027 to increase the types of programs eligible for jail time credit. These amendments became effective on July 14, 2014. See ch. 83, § 23, SLA 2014 (S.B. 64).
275 P.3d 567, 573 (Alaska App. 2012).
Baisch now appeals, arguing that the superior court was estopped from denying her credit for the full 313 days she spent in Stepping Stones because she reasonably and detrimentally relied on Judge Heath's assertion at sentencing that the Stepping Stones program would likely qualify for jail time credit.
Why we conclude that Baisch's estoppel claim has no merit
The parties dispute whether Baisch's claim is properly characterized as a claim for promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel. As a general matter, the distinction between promissory and equitable estoppel is that "promissory estoppel involves a clear and definite promise while equitable estoppel involves only representations and inducements." Thus, promissory estoppel can be used offensively for affirmative enforcement of a promise, whereas equitable estoppel is generally used defensively to prevent an opposing party from raising a particular claim or defense.
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 34 (2014) ("Promissory estoppel is applicable to promises while equitable estoppel is applicable to misstatements of fact.").
Mortvedt v. State, Dep't of Natural Resources, 858 P.2d 1140, 1143 n.7 (Alaska 1993).
We do not need to resolve the exact nature of Baisch's estoppel claim in this case because her claim fails under either test. Both forms of estoppel require proof that there was detrimental reliance and that the reliance was reasonable. Here, the record does not support Baisch's claim that she relied on Judge Heath's comments at sentencing nor does it support Baisch's claim that such reliance would have been reasonable.
See, e.g., Nelson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 186 P.3d 582, 585 (Alaska 2008) (equitable estoppel requires proof that (1) the party to be estopped asserted a position by words or conduct; (2) the other party reasonably relied on that assertion; (3) the reliance resulted in prejudice; and (4) estoppel serves the interest of justice); Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass'n v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 45 P.3d 657, 668 (Alaska 2002) (citing Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1284 (Alaska 1985)) (promissory estoppel requires proof that (1) the promisor's action induced a substantial change of position; (2) this change was either actually foreseen or reasonably foreseeable by the promisor; (3) an actual promise was made and itself induced the action or forbearance in reliance thereon; and (4) enforcement is necessary in the interest of justice).
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As the State points out, Baisch had already enrolled in the Stepping Stones program at the time Judge Heath made the comments suggesting that the program would likely qualify for Nygren credit, and Baisch had already expressed her commitment to completing the program at the time the comments were made.
Moreover, contrary to Baisch's arguments on appeal, neither the superior court nor the State treated Baisch's ability to obtain jail time credit for the Stepping Stones program as a "forgone conclusion." While there was discussion about whether Baisch might be eligible for credit for some portion of her time in the Stepping Stones program, neither the superior court nor the State ever asserted that she would be eligible for such credit, and the State clearly expressed its opposition to her receiving credit. Nor is there any indication that Baisch was misled about whether she would receive credit — indeed, in the course of asking for an opportunity to file a Nygren motion for credit for her time in treatment, Baisch's counsel conceded the possibility that she "may qualify, she may not" qualify for credit for her time in Stepping Stones.
Viewed as a whole, Judge Heath's comments at sentencing — which were phrased in the conditional — likewise indicated that the question of whether Baisch would receive full credit for her time at Stepping Stones was still an open question. In addition, Judge Heath's remark that "if any program is eligible for Nygren credit, it's that program" was directly premised on his mistaken belief that Stepping Stones was a full "lock-down facility" — an assumption that Baisch, who had already graduated beyond the initial ten day lock-down period by the time of sentencing, knew or should have known was not accurate.
Thus, because the record does not support that Baisch detrimentally relied on Judge Heath's comments at sentencing, or that any such reliance would have been reasonable under the circumstances, we find no merit to Baisch's claim that the superior court was estopped from denying her full credit for all the time she spent in the Stepping Stones program.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.