Opinion
C.A. No. 97C-12-87 RRC.
Submitted: October 4, 1999.
Decided: December 22, 1999.
Jeffrey M. Weiner, Esquire 1332 King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Attorney for Plaintiff Steven Bailey.
John W. Morgan, Esquire Assistant City Solicitor City/County Building, 9th Floor 800 N. French Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Attorney for Defendant City of Wilmington.
Dear Counsel:
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56, Defendant City of Wilmington has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the final remaining claim of Plaintiff Steven Bailey (a state procedural due process claim) should be dismissed based on the principles of res judicata because of a prior federal court ruling that had dismissed identical claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] party against whom a claim . . . is asserted . . . may, at any time, move, with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof . . ."
Summary of Facts and Procedural History
This lawsuit arises from two arrests made by the Plaintiff, in his capacity as a City of Wilmington police officer, on January 15, 1995 and September 26, 1995. Based on complaints filed against the Plaintiff by the person arrested, the Wilmington Police Department Office of Professional Standards (OPS) brought administrative charges against Plaintiff for violation of several City of Wilmington Police Department regulations. Plaintiff was suspended for approximately 41 days and was subsequently terminated.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint in United States District Court against Defendant and there asserted claims that (1) Defendant deprived him of his right to due process and equal protection of the law as secured by a) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, b) Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution, and c) the Delaware "Law-Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights" (Chapter 92 of Title 11 of the Delaware Code,) (2) Defendant breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by its administrative actions, and (3) Defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, maliciously and/or with gross and/or wanton negligence by its conduct in the investigation, suspension, and termination of Plaintiff.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress."
Plaintiff then filed the instant case in the Superior Court alleging identical claims. This Court stayed the proceedings until the final disposition of the federal lawsuit. The United States District Court ultimately granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's claims. Subsequently, the Superior Court stay was vacated. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of (1) Plaintiff's federal and state procedural due process claims, (2) Plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, maliciously and/or with gross and/or wanton negligence. The motion was heard on September 15, 1999 at which time this Court orally granted summary judgment for Defendant as to (1) the federal due process claim, (2) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, and (3) the negligence claim. This Court ordered supplemental briefing on the remaining Delaware procedural due process claim.
Bailey v. City of Wilmington, Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-12-87, Del Pesco, J. (April 14, 1998) (ORDER).
The United States District Court essentially ruled that Defendant had not deprived Plaintiff of any constitutional rights because "municipal governments may be sued only for their own constitutional or illegal policies, not for the acts of their employees under respondeat superior liability." Bailey v. City of Wilmington, D. Del., C.A. No. 96-264, Schwartz, J. (Nov. 19, 1997) (Mem. Op.) at 6, aff'd 3rd Cir., C.A. No. 98-7009, Nygaard, J. (Dec. 3, 1998) (Mem.Op.).
The stay was vacated by this Court on March 16, 1999 after the Third Circuit affirmance became a final judgment. Bailey v. City of Wilmington, Del. Super., CA. No. 97C-12-87, Cooch, J., (Mar. 16, 1999) (ORDER).
Bailey v. City of Wilmington, Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-12-87, Cooch, J. (Sept. 15, 1999) (Bench Ruling).
Standard of Review
Summary judgment will be granted where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. If there is any evidence to support an outcome favorable to the non-moving party, summary judgment must be denied.
Borish v. Graham, et al., Del. Super., 655 A.2d 831, 833 (1994).
Plant v. Catalytic Construction Co., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 682, 684 (1972).
Discussion
The issue to be decided is whether Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted pursuant to principles of ret judicata where a federal court has previously granted summary judgment on the same issues.I. The Defendant Has Satisfied the Elements of Res Judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes a second attempt to litigate the same cause of action. "[A] valid, final and personal judgment entered on the merits of a controversy puts to rest all matters litigated." When a party claims that the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action, that party must show that the five elements of res judicata exist: (1) the court making the prior adjudication must have had jurisdiction; (2) the parties to the second action must be the same or be in privity to those in the first action; (3) the cause of action must be the same in both cases or the second must arise from the same transaction that formed the basis of the prior adjudication; (4) the issues in the prior action were decided adversely to the contentions of the plaintiff(s) in the pending case; and (5) the prior decree must be final. Defendant has satisfied each element. This Court will address each element individually below.
Hughes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. Del. Supr., 336 A.2d 572 1975).
K/B Fund II v. NCC Department of Finance and NCC Board of Assessment Review, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-10-019, Toliver, I. (Mar, 22, 1999) (Mem. Op.) at 3-4 (citing Fox v. Christina Square Assoc. v. Mayor Counsel of City of Wilmington, Del. Super., C.A. No. 91L-04-6-1, Alford, J. (April 5, 1994) (Mem. Op.) at 3.).
A. The United States District Court had Original Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff brought a lawsuit in United States District Court in which Plaintiff alleged that he had been deprived of his right to due process and equal protection of the law as secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is a federal claims and the United States District Court had original jurisdiction. Plaintiff also pleaded a State of Delaware due process claim under Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. This Court finds that the first element of res judicata has been satisfied.
In its ruling, the Court stated that "Plaintiff's federal actions must therefore be dismissed because plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted for municipal liability under § 1983. As a result, there remains no federal question jurisdiction and the pendent state law claims must be dismissed as well." Bailey, supra note 4, at 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) which provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . ." See also New Rocket Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1504 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Lovell Manuf. v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 843 F.2d 725, 734 (3d Cir. 1988))
B. The Parties Involved in the Lawsuit Filed in the United States District Court and in This Lawsuit filed in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware are the Same.
Plaintiffs lawsuit that was filed in federal court is identical to the lawsuit filed in the Delaware Superior Court. Each of Plaintiff's suits allege the same causes of action against the same Defendant in both courts. The parties that were named in the federal court lawsuit are the same parties named in this Superior Court action. This Court finds that the second element of res judicata has been satisfied.
C. The Analysis Employed by the United States District Court in determining Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim Would be Identical to the Analysis Used by the Superior Court if the Superior Court Were to Decide Plaintiff's Article I, § 7 Claim.
Pursuant to the principles of res judicata, Plaintiff has no cause of action under Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution after his cause of action under the substantially similar clause of the Federal Constitution had been dismissed. The Delaware Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Klein stated that "[i]t would seem to follow that in deciding a case of due process under [Delaware's] Constitution we should ordinarily submit our judgment to that of the highest court of the land, if the point at issue has been decided by that. . . ." In Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Article I, § 7 has "substantially the same meaning as the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution." In State v. Fortt, this Court addressed a criminal defendant's state constitutional due process claim in relation to a federal claim and said:
Del. Supr., 106 A.2d 206, 210 (1954) (holding that the term "law of the land" in Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution has "the same meaning as the phrase 'due process of law'" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution).
Id. at 210.
Del. Supr., 246 A.2d 90, 92 (1968) (holding that Article I, § 7 has "substantially the same meaning as the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution").
Id. at 92.
Del. Super., I.D. No. 9710005008, Silverman, J. (Oct. 15, 1999) (ORDER).
the State Supreme Court [in Klein] addressed the contention that the State due process clause afforded greater protection than the federal clause. Finding that the State protection was not greater than the federal protection . . . in deciding a due process challenge under the State Constitution, the Court should ordinarily follow the United States Supreme Court if it has already addressed the issue.
Id. at 3 ( citing General Electric Co. v. Klein).
The Court in Fortt, relying on Klein, further said that "[o]ne who asks a Delaware Court to disregard a direct ruling of the United States Supreme Court [where the comparable state and federal due process clauses have been held to have substantially the same meaning] carries a heavy burden."
Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not met that "heavy burden." In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the United States Supreme Court held that local governments can be held liable for constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Supreme Court stated in Monell that local governments may be sued only for their own constitutional or illegal policies, not for the acts of their employees under respondeat superior liability. This Court is satisfied that the ruling made by the United States District Court in Plaintiff's first filed action is consistent with how this Court would apply the holding of Monell to a state due process claim. This Court finds that the holding of Monell applies to Plaintiff's pending state due process claim and that Defendant cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior, for all the reasons set forth in the opinion of the United States District Court.
436 U.S. 658 (1978)
Id. at 691.
See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Klein; Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme court, State v. Fortt (citations omitted).
See Bailey, supra note 4, at 5-16.
Plaintiffs lawsuit filed in the Superior Court is substantially similar to the lawsuit filed in the United States District Court. The Delaware Constitution does not provide any additional due process rights not provided by the Federal Constitution. This Court finds that the analysis under the Delaware constitution would be the same as the Monell analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution has substantially the same meaning as the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. This Court finds that the third element of res judicata has been satisfied.
See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Klein; Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court; State v. Fortt (citations omitted).
D. The United States District Court Ruled Adversely to the Plaintiff in Ruling That the Plaintiff Was Not Deprived of Any Constitutional Right.
The District Court ruled that the Defendant did not deprive Plaintiff of any constitutional right because "municipal governments may be sued only for their own constitutional or illegal policies, not for the acts of their employees under respondeat superior." The Court in Bailey went on to say that
See Bailey, supra note 4, at 6.
[s]imply put, the actions of OPS, the Trial Board, and the Appeals Board may have violated Bailey's constitutional rights, and the Court assumes as much for the purposes for the City's motion [for summary judgment]. That being said, those actions taken by particular officials within these entities were no more than discretionary acts which cannot give rise to municipal liability."
Id. at 13.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the issues in the prior action in District Court were decided adversely to the contentions of the Plaintiff in the pending case. This Court finds that the fourth element of res judicata has been satisfied.
E. The Prior Decree was Final.
The Third Circuit of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court. No writ of certiorari was taken to the United States Supreme Court. This Court finds that the fifth element of res judicata has been satisfied.
Bailey v. City of Wilmington, 3rd Cir., C.A. No. 98-7009, Nygaard, J. (Dec. 3, 1998) (Mem. Op.).
Conclusion
This Court finds that the doctrine of res judicata precludes Plaintiff's second attempt to litigate the same cause of action. There is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.