Opinion
CIVIL 4:22-CV-1891
04-08-2024
VAN BAILEY, Plaintiff v. KEVIN KAUFFMAN, et al., Defendants.
Munley Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case is a pro se inmate lawsuit brought by Van Bailey against an array of correctional officials, including the former superintendent at SCI Huntingdon, Kevin Kauffman. (Doc. 212). On January 22, 2024, defense counsel filed a Suggestion of Death pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a), notifying Bailey and the Court that Defendant Kauffman had passed away. (Doc. 244).
We then entered an order instructing Bailey to notify us by March 6, 2024, if he wished to substitute a party for this deceased defendant. (Doc. 245). On February 26, 2024, Bailey filed a motion to substitute which sought to name the current superintendent at SCI Huntingdon to replace Defendant Kauffman. (Doc. 248). This request was curious in several ways. First, Bailey is no longer incarcerated at SCI Huntingdon. Therefore, the current superintendent at that facility has absolutely no custody, control, or contact with Bailey. Second, Bailey's claims against Defendant Kauffman were civil rights claims brought against Kauffman in his personal capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Bailey's motion provided no legal justification for the novel proposition that, through some sort of transitive property of legal claims, the current superintendent at SCI Huntingdon should now be personally liable for the past alleged acts of a deceased predecessor.
Recognizing the problematic nature of this motion we directed Bailey to file a brief in support of this motion by March 11, 2024. (Doc. 249). He has failed to do so and thus his motion may be deemed withdrawn. In any event, the motion to substitute is inappropriate and should be denied on its merits. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Bailey's motion to substitute, (Doc. 248), be denied, and Defendant Kevin Kauffman be dismissed from this lawsuit.
II. Discussion
Bailey's motion to substitute fails for at least two reasons.
First, Bailey has failed to support this motion with a brief justifying the extraordinary relief he seeks despite having been ordered to submit a brief in support of this motion by March 11, 2024. On these facts, pursuant to the rules of this court, we may deem the motion, which is not supported by a brief, to be withdrawn. See, e.g., Salkeld v. Tennis, 248 Fed.Appx. 341 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of motion under Local Rule 7.5); Booze v. Wetzel, 1:12-CV-1307, 2012 WL 6137561 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, 1:CV-12-1307, 2012 WL 6138315 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2012); Breslin v. Dickinson Twp., 1:09-CV-1396, 2011 WL 1577840 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2011) Prinkey v. Tennis, No. 09B52, 2010 WL 4683757 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2010) (dismissal under Local Rule 7.5); Griffin v. Lackawanna County Prison Board, No. 07B 1683, 2008 WL 4533685 (M.D. Pa. Oct.6, 2008) (dismissal under Local Rule 7.6).
More fundamentally, this motion fails on its merits. Under Rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Kauffman's death now affects the viability of this lawsuit against the defendant. Rule 25 provides that:
(a) Death.
(1) Substitution if the Claim Is Not Extinguished. If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent's successor or representative. If the motion is not made . . ., the action by or against the decedent must be dismissedFed. R. Civ. P., Rule 25(a).
Under Rule 25, substitution of parties upon the death of a defendant may be considered, “[i]f a party dies and the claim is not extinguished ....” Thus, at the outset we must determine whether this claim was extinguished by his death. In this regard, determination of whether a civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 survives a party's death is generally made in accordance with state law. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978). Pennsylvania law broadly favors the survival of civil actions following the death of a party. See, e.g., 20 Pa C.S.A. ''3371-3373, 42 Pa C.S.A. '8301. Therefore, we conclude that this action was not automatically extinguished by Kauffman's death.
Having reached this conclusion, however, we must next determine whether there is a proper substitute party who is willing and able to step forward to prosecute this case. In this regard, “[d]ecisions on . . . substitution are within the trial court's discretion.” McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 836 (3d Cir. 1994). The language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), which provides that the court “may order substitution of the proper party” is plainly permissive. Therefore, “the decision whether to substitute parties lies within the discretion of the trial judge and [the court] may refuse to substitute parties in an action even if the party so moves.” Froning=s, Inc. v. Johnston Feed Serv., Inc., 568 F.2d 108, 110 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1978).
In determining whether proper substitute representative exists that may be substituted for a deceased party, we may consider substitution of the “decedent's successor or representative.” In Sinito v. U.S. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Court noted that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 allows for the substitution of a “successor” for a deceased party, a term which means that a proper substituted party need not necessarily be the appointed executor or administrator of the deceased party's estate. Id. Rather, the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 is to allow more flexibility in substitution. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1969). As to who may be substituted as a proper party successor for a deceased defendant, it has been held that in this setting:
[Under] certain circumstances a person may be a “successor” under Rule25(a)(1) if she is (1) the primary beneficiary of an already distributed estate; (2) named in a will as the executor of the decedent's estate, even if the will is not probated; or (3) the primary beneficiary of an unprobated intestate estate which need not be probated.In re Baycol Products Litigation, 616 F.3d 778, 784-5 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
Yet, while the language of the rule allows for greater flexibility in the substitution of appropriate successor parties, the animating principle that governs the exercise of our discretion remains the same: “It is axiomatic that Rule 25 limits properly substituted parties to those individuals who can adequately represent the interests of the deceased party.” Sinito v. U.S. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d at 516. In this regard:
Because the purpose of Rule 25(a)(1) is to protect the estate of the decedent, district courts must ensure only “those individuals who can adequately represent the interests of the deceased party” are substituted under the Rule. Sinito, 176 F.3d at 516. District courts should therefore look at the facts and circumstances of each case and then determine whether the person [to be] substitute[d] will sufficiently prosecute or defend the action on the decedent's behalf.In re Baycol Products Litig., 616 F.3d at 788.
Because Rule 25(a) looks to the facts and circumstances of each case and then determines whether the person to be substituted will sufficiently defend the action on the decedent's behalf, matters of substitution are not defined mechanically by the mere fact that a person is related through blood or marriage to the decedent. See Robertson v. Wood, 500 F.Supp. 854 (S.D. Ill. 1980). In short, a substitute party's capacity to litigate, rather than any coincidence of biology, is what controls here. See Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04-3317, 2012 WL 104545 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2012) (declining to appoint children of penniless defendant as substitute parties). Furthermore, Rule 25(a)'s use of the term “successor” necessarily implies that there is some decedent's estate or interest which remains and as to which the substituted party has succeeded.
Judged against these legal benchmarks Bailey's motion to substitute the current superintendent at SCI Huntingdon for Mr. Kauffman plainly fails as a matter of law. There is absolutely no indication that this correctional official is the executor or administrator of Kauffman's estate, and the mere happenchance that this official has followed Kauffman into the post of superintendent at SCI Huntingdon does not make this proposed defendant Kauffman's “successor” as that term is defined by Rule 25.
Further, Bailey is no longer housed at SCI Huntingdon and the current superintendent at that facility has absolutely no custody, control, or contact with Bailey. In addition, Bailey's claims against Defendant Kauffman were civil rights claims brought against Kauffman in his personal capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Therefore, the unspoken basis for Bailey's efforts to substitute this new defendant is the legally bankrupt notion that there exists some sort of transitive property of legal claims under which the current superintendent at SCI Huntingdon would be personally liable for the past alleged acts of a deceased predecessor. This proposition is incorrect as a matter of law. Therefore, Bailey's motion to substitute fails on its merits and should be denied.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion to substitute, (Doc. 248), be DENIED and Defendant Kevin Kauffman be DISMISSED from this lawsuit.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.