Opinion
CASE NO. 12cv3069 - IEG (BGS)
07-13-2013
PAMCHAL AZODI; IGNACIO BARRAGAN NADlNE DAHDAH; KENT GLINTZ; HANINA HOFFMAN; EMILY JOHNSON; SAMUEL SANTOS: BRIAN SOASH; and KIP WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, v. TEPL, INC., doing business as MC ADMINISTRATORS, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS
[Doc. No. 9]
Presently before the Court is the motion of Defendant TEPL, Inc. doing business as MC Administrators ("Defendant") to dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiffs Pamchal Azodi, Ignacio Barragan, Nadine Dahdah, Kent Glintz, Hanina Hoffman, Emily Johnson, Samuel Santos, Brian Soash, and Kip Williams (collectively "Plaintiffs"). [Doc. No. 9.] For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that they incurred a financial obligation to an original creditor, Kaiser Permanente, in 2010. [Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 20.] Without taking any position as to whether any debt was actually owed, Plaintiffs further assert that this obligation was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant subsequently, after Plaintiffs fell behind on payments allegedly owed. [Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.] Plaintiffs further allege that on or about January 3, 2012, Defendant disclosed Plaintiffs' personal information to an unauthorized third party, along with the information of hundreds of other consumers who purportedly owe debts to Defendant. [Id. ¶¶ 23-26.] Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant violated the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. [Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 31-33.]
Plaintiffs filed the instant action in this Court on December 28, 2012 asserting two causes of action against Defendant. Count I claims violation of the RFDCPA, and Count II claims violation of the FDCPA. [Id.] Plaintiffs assert federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the basis of the FDCPA claim. [Id. ¶ 8.]
Defendant subsequently filed the present motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint arguing failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for both the FDCPA and RFDCPA claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Doc. No. 9, Def's Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") at 2.] In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs conceded to the dismissal of the FDCPA claim and requested the Court remand the remaining RFDCPA state claim to State Court. [Doc. No. 10, Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp.") at 6.]
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's FDCPA Claim
Because Plaintiffs concede to Defendant's motion to dismiss with regard to the FDCPA claim, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss this claim without prejudice.
II. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claim
Having dismissed the single federal claim, the Court now evaluates any remaining basis for subject matter jurisdiction over Count I, the state claim for violation of the RFDCPA. Plaintiffs, in their opposition brief, concede that "this Court may no longer have jurisdiction" over the remaining claim. [Doc. No. 10, Pl.'s Opp. at 6.]
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and as such "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any party or sua sponte by the court. Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982).
With Plaintiffs' sole claim supplying original federal jurisdiction dismissed, only a state law claim remains. A court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim "after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary." Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); accord Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 649 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). Per 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), "[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Supreme Court precedent "makes clear that whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is distinct from whether a court chooses to exercise that jurisdiction." Carlsbad Tech., Inc., 556 U.S. at 639 (citations omitted).
In exercising its discretion, the court may look to a host of factors, "including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims." City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In the usual case, where federal claims are dismissed before trial, "the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims." Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted); accord Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim,971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 268 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the sole claim over which the Court had original jurisdiction, the FDCPA claim, has been dismissed. Looking at the balance of factors—including the fact that this case is still in its infancy and that the present motion is the only motion that has been filed to date—the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim for violation of the RFDCPA.
III. Disposition of Remaining State Law Claim
Plaintiffs request that the Court remand the RFDCPA claim to state court. [Doc. No. 10, Pl.'s Opp. at 6.] Defendant argues for dismissal of the remaining state law claim either by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction or, alternately, based on failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 11, Def.'s Reply Mem. at 2.]
The procedural process of remanding an action from federal district court to state court is codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1447, entitled "[p]rocedure after removal generally." 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (emphasis added). Removal, per 28 U.S.C. § 1446, is the process by which a case is transferred from state court to federal court. Based on this statutory framework, "[f]ederal district courts do not have the authority to remand an action originally commenced in federal court . . . to a state tribunal . . . ." E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Estate of Kirk, 821 F. Supp. 2d 543, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Schiffman v. Epstein, 2009 WL 1787760, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009)). "Thus, a case originally commenced by a plaintiff in federal court cannot then be removed . . . from federal to state court." E. Sav. Bank, FSB at 545-46 (quoting Hatheril v. Michael, 1993 WL 385754, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1993).
As Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in federal court [Doc. No. 1, Compl.], it is procedurally improper for the Court to remand the remaining RFDCPA claim to state court. Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiffs' request to remand, and instead GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss the RFDCPA claim without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to file this action in state court if they choose to do so. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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IRMA E. GONZALEZ
United States District Judge