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affirming an ALJ's decision to discount a physician's opinion when the physician stated that plaintiff's limitations would last for six months
Summary of this case from Rebecca M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.Opinion
CASE NO. 3:18-CV-05752-JLR-DWC
06-19-2019
AUTUMN G., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Noting Date: July 5, 2019
The District Court has referred this action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to United States Magistrate Judge David W. Christel. Plaintiff filed this matter seeking judicial review of Defendant's denial of her application for supplemental security income ("SSI").
After considering the record, the Court concludes the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") did not err in her assessment of the medical opinion evidence from Dr. David T. Morgan, Ph.D. Because the ALJ's decision finding Plaintiff not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability as of August 1, 2014. See Dkt. 12, Administrative Record ("AR") 16. The application was denied upon initial administrative review and on reconsideration. See AR 16. ALJ Cynthia D. Rosa held a hearing on February 15, 2017. AR 75-97. In a decision dated September 29, 2017, the ALJ determined Plaintiff to be not disabled. AR 13-38. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See AR 1-7; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.
In Plaintiff's Opening Brief, Plaintiff maintains the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific, legitimate reasons to reject Dr. Morgan's opinion. Dkt. 14, pp. 3-9.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits if the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence.
Plaintiff's sole argument is that the ALJ failed to properly consider Dr. Morgan's medical opinion. Dkt. 14, pp. 3-9.
In assessing an acceptable medical source, an ALJ must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of either a treating or examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)); Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). When a treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted, the opinion can be rejected "for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). The ALJ can accomplish this by "setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Dr. Morgan completed a psychological/psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff on January 26, 2016. AR 708-12. Dr. Morgan's evaluation included a clinical interview and mental status examination of Plaintiff. See AR 708-12. Dr. Morgan diagnosed Plaintiff with panic disorder without agoraphobia; major depressive disorder - recurrent, moderate severity; and borderline personality disorder. AR 709. Dr. Morgan opined Plaintiff is moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, and persist in tasks by following detailed instructions. AR 710. Further, Dr. Morgan rated Plaintiff as markedly limited in her ability to perform several areas of basic work activities, such as in her ability to learn new tasks, perform routine tasks without special supervision, and adapt to changes in a routine work setting. AR 710. Dr. Morgan found Plaintiff markedly limited in her ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances without special supervision. AR 710.
Additionally, Dr. Morgan opined Plaintiff has marked limitations in her ability to make simple work-related decisions, be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, ask simple questions or request assistance, and communicate effectively in a work setting. AR 710. Dr. Morgan found Plaintiff markedly impaired in her ability to maintain appropriate behavior in a work setting and set realistic goals and plan independently. AR 710. Likewise, Dr. Morgan determined Plaintiff is markedly impaired in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically basic symptoms. AR 710. Dr. Morgan rated Plaintiff's overall severity as marked. AR 710.
When asked about the "[d]uration" of Plaintiff's impairments, Dr. Morgan wrote "6 months." AR 711. Further, in response to what "[a]dditional treatment" Dr. Morgan would recommend, he wrote Plaintiff "could benefit from ongoing mental health treatment, where counseling is probably going to be most effective in the long term in helping her manage her emotional condition." AR 711.
The ALJ summarized Dr. Morgan's opinion and assigned it "little weight" for several reasons. See AR 30. In part, the ALJ remarked: "Dr. Morgan stated these limitations would last for six months, which is inconsistent with the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")] requirement of impairments lasting for 12 months or more." AR 30. In the Social Security context, a "disability" is an impairment "which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-222 (2002) (upholding the SSA's regulatory interpretation of the Social Security Act's "disability" definition, which requires an "impairment" and inability to engage in substantial gainful activity for "not less than 12 months").
Here, the ALJ discounted Dr. Morgan's opinion because the physician stated the limitations would last for six months, which is "inconsistent" with the SSA's disability requirements. See AR 30. The evaluation form Dr. Morgan completed defines "[d]uration" as the "length of time the individual will be impaired with available treatment." AR 711. Dr. Morgan wrote, as the ALJ found, Plaintiff's disability duration would be for six months. See AR 711. Because a claimant must have an impairment "which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months" to be disabled, the Court finds this is a specific, legitimate reason, supported by substantial evidence, to discount Dr. Morgan's opinion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 217-222; Hicks v. Colvin, 2017 WL 243354, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2017) (affirming an ALJ's decision to discount a medical opinion where the physician opined the claimant "would be so impaired for only six months"); Woeppel v. Colvin, 2014 WL 868808, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2014) (finding an ALJ properly discounted a physician's opinion because the physician "did not identify any impairment that [was] . . . expected to last for at least 12 months").
Plaintiff argues "the ALJ failed to account for the period around Dr. Morgan's opinion," and "Dr. Morgan did not affirmatively state that Plaintiff's mental health concerns would resolve in 6 months." Dkt. 14, p. 8; see also Dkt. 16, p. 3. But given that Dr. Morgan wrote the "duration" of Plaintiff's impairments would be six months, the ALJ provided a reasonable interpretation of the evidence when she found Dr. Morgan opined Plaintiff's limitations would last for six months. See AR 711 (defining "duration" as "length of time the individual will be impaired with available treatment"); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) ("we must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record"); see also Allen, 749 F.2d at 579 (citation omitted) ("If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation," the Commissioner's decision must be upheld). Hence, Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive.
Although the ALJ provided other reasons to discount Dr. Morgan's opinion, the Court need not assess whether these reasons were proper, any error would be harmless. See Presley-Carrillo v. Berryhill, 692 Fed. Appx. 941, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)) (although an ALJ erred on one reason he gave to discount a medical opinion, "this error was harmless because the ALJ gave a reason supported by the record" to discount the opinion). As the ALJ provided a proper reason to reject Dr. Morgan's opinion, the undersigned recommends the Court affirm the ALJ's decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above stated reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be affirmed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) consistent with this Report and Recommendation. The undersigned also recommends judgment be entered for Defendant and the case be closed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of de novo review by the district judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on July 5, 2019, as noted in the caption.
Dated this 19th day of June, 2019.
/s/_________
David W. Christel
United States Magistrate Judge