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AUSTIN v. DARE COUNTY

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Sep 1, 1954
240 N.C. 662 (N.C. 1954)

Summary

In Austin v. Dare County, 240 N.C. 662, 663, 83 S.E.2d 702, it is said: "It is quite obvious that a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated."

Summary of this case from Adams v. College

Opinion

Filed 29 September, 1954.

Appeal and Error 5 — When pending appeal from the denial of plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order, the act sought to be restrained has been consummated, whether defendant should have been restrained pendente lite becomes an academic question, and the appeal will be dismissed.

APPEAL by plaintiffs from Carr, J., Presiding Judge of the First Judicial District, heard 17 March, 1954, in Elizabeth City, N.C., by consent, from DARE.

Frank B. Aycock, Jr., for plaintiffs, appellants.

Martin Kellogg, Jr., and John H. Hall for defendants, appellees.


Plaintiffs appeal from Judge Carr's denial of their application for a temporary restraining order.

In 1942, David L. Lindquist, reserving a life estate, gave to Dare County a tract of some 680 acres in Nags Head Township. A deed therefor was executed and delivered, reciting that the gift was made "to the end that this land will be ultimately for the public benefit and in the advancement of the County's recreational and material interest." In 1944, part of said tract was condemned for the use of the United States Coast Guard. The remainder, referred to as the 640-acre Bodie Island tract, lies within the Cape Hatteras Seashore National Park. Established by Act of Congress, this park, under the direction of the Secretary of Interior, is for the recreation, benefit and enjoyment of the public.

Pursuant to a Declaration of Taking, the right of the United States of America to said land was adjudged in condemnation proceedings, leaving at issue only the amount of damages to be paid Dare County as compensation therefor. Under these circumstances, Dare County, acting through its Board of County Commissioners, agreed to sell and convey the land to the United States of America for the sum of $50,000.00.

Plaintiffs alleged that the value of the land was not less than $125,000.00; that the taxpayers of Dare County would suffer irreparable damage if defendants made the sale and conveyance for a consideration less than $125,000.00; and that the contemplated transaction should be enjoined. After hearing, Judge Carr denied plaintiffs' application. Plaintiffs appealed.


The court below denied plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order, thus deciding the only question presented at the hearing. Thereafter, Dare County conveyed the lands to the United States of America for the consideration of $50,000.00. It was so stated upon the argument here. The sale and conveyance having been consummated, whether Judge Carr should have restrained the defendants, pendente lite, is now an academic question. It is quite obvious that a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated. Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 233 N.C. 644, 65 S.E.2d 137; Saunders v. Bulla, 232 N.C. 578, 61 S.E.2d 607; Efird v. Comrs. of Forsyth, 217 N.C. 691, 9 S.E.2d 466. Hence, plaintiffs' appeal must be dismissed. Cf.: Savage v. Kinston, 238 N.C. 551, 78 S.E.2d 318.

Appeal dismissed.


Summaries of

AUSTIN v. DARE COUNTY

Supreme Court of North Carolina
Sep 1, 1954
240 N.C. 662 (N.C. 1954)

In Austin v. Dare County, 240 N.C. 662, 663, 83 S.E.2d 702, it is said: "It is quite obvious that a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated."

Summary of this case from Adams v. College

dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's denial of its application for a temporary restraining order to stop the sale and conveyance of a certain piece of real property and noting that the County had already sold and conveyed the land in question and the restraint of the County's sale of the property “is now an academic question” as “[i]t is quite obvious that a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated”

Summary of this case from In re Wilson

stating that, because the real property at issue had already been sold, any appeal from the denial of a temporary restraining order sought for the purpose of preventing the sale of the property raised merely "an academic question" given that "a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated"

Summary of this case from Cnty. of Cumberland v. Barton

stating that, because the real property at issue had already been sold, any appeal from the denial of a temporary restraining order sought for the purpose of preventing the sale of the property raised merely "an academic question" given that "a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated"

Summary of this case from County of Cumberland v. Barton

dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's denial of its application for a temporary restraining order to stop the sale and conveyance of a certain piece of real property, and noting that the County had already sold and conveyed the land in question and the restraint of the County's sale of the property "is now an academic question" as "[i]t is quite obvious that a court cannot restrain the doing of that which has been already consummated."

Summary of this case from In re Foreclosure the Deed Trust Ormsby
Case details for

AUSTIN v. DARE COUNTY

Case Details

Full title:A. S. AUSTIN, LLOYD STYRON, LEO PEELE, JR., AND PRESTON BASNETT, TAXPAYERS…

Court:Supreme Court of North Carolina

Date published: Sep 1, 1954

Citations

240 N.C. 662 (N.C. 1954)
83 S.E.2d 702

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