Opinion
A22-0914
03-14-2023
Danny Aune, Respondent, v. Robin Johnson, Appellant.
Becker County District Court File No. 03-CV-22-1026
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey, Judge.[*]
ORDER OPINION
MATTHEW E. JOHNSON, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. This appeal is taken by a tenant from an eviction action in which the district court entered judgment for the landlord and issued a writ of recovery. We affirm.
2. In 2019, Robin Johnson agreed to rent a house in the city of Lake Park in Becker County from Danny Aune for $600 per month on a month-to-month basis.
3. Aune commenced this eviction action in June 2022, alleging that Johnson had not paid rent for the months of March, April, and May of 2022. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, by Zoom, on June 20, 2022. Johnson was the only witness. She testified that she did not pay rent for the months of March, April, May, and June of 2022. She stated that a non-profit organization may have paid approximately one month of rent for March 2022, but she was unsure about it and did not possess any documentary evidence of such a payment. Aune's attorney represented to the court that the non-profit organization had paid some rent on Johnson's behalf until February 2022. Johnson conceded that, in any event, she was not current on her rent.
4. On the same day as the hearing, the district court filed a three-page order with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment. The district court found that Johnson did not pay the rent that was due for the months of March, April, May, and June of 2022; that Johnson owed Aune $2,790 for unpaid rent and fees; and that Johnson had not vacated the premises. The district court ordered the entry of judgment in favor of Aune and the issuance of a writ of recovery, to be stayed until midnight on June 27, 2022. The district court administrator entered judgment on June 21, 2022, and issued the writ of recovery on June 28, 2022.
5. Johnson appeals on a self-represented basis. We discern two arguments in her pro se appellate brief.
6. First, Johnson argues that there is a lack of evidence to support the district court's findings and the judgment on the ground that Aune "failed to introduce proper evidence to prove [the] allegations of [his] complaint." It is true that Aune did not testify at the hearing and did not introduce any exhibits. Johnson was the first and only witness at the hearing. She candidly admitted that she had not paid rent for at least three months (April, May, and June of 2022), and she was unable to deny that there also was unpaid rent for March 2022. In an eviction action based on an allegation of non-payment of rent, if the evidence shows that rent is due but unpaid, "the analysis is straightforward and clear"; the landlord's "'cause of action . . . is complete,'" and the landlord is entitled to judgment. SVAP III Riverdale Commons LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms, LLC, 967 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn.App. 2021) (quoting Leifman v. Percansky, 243 N.W. 446, 448 (Minn. 1932)); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 504B.291, subd. 1(a), .345, subd. 1(a) (2022). Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the district court's findings and the judgment.
7. Second, Johnson argues that the district court erred by not allowing her to introduce evidence to prove a defense to the eviction action. During the eviction hearing, Johnson testified that Aune had entered her home when she was not present and also had entered her home when she was taking a shower. The district court interrupted Johnson's testimony and stated that she could not introduce evidence about that issue because she had not given Aune prior notice that she had a defense to the eviction action.
8. The eviction statute provides, in relevant part, "At the court appearance specified in the summons, the defendant may answer the complaint, and the court shall hear and decide the action ...." Minn. Stat. § 504B.335(a) (2022). Accordingly, the district court incorrectly stated that Johnson was required to give prior notice of any defense to Aune's eviction action. But the evidence Johnson sought to introduce is not relevant to any recognized defense to an eviction action. Affirmative defenses are strictly limited in eviction actions. See SVAP III, 967 N.W.2d at 85-87. The eviction statute allows a tenant to defend against an eviction action by proving "that the plaintiff increased the tenant's rent or decreased the services as a penalty in whole or part" because of the tenant's "good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease" or "good faith report to a governmental authority of the plaintiff's violation of a health, safety, housing, or building code or ordinance." Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subds. 2, 3 (2022). The supreme court has recognized only two common-law defenses to an eviction action: first, a breach of the statutory covenant of habitability and, second, a retaliatory eviction for a tenant's complaint about a landlord's breach of a lease or violation of law. See SVAP III, 967 N.W.2d at 86 (citing Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 340-43 (Minn. 1973), and Central Housing Assoc., LP v. Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398, 409 (Minn. 2019)). A landlord's improper entry into leased premises is not a recognized defense to an eviction action. Thus, the district court did not err by excluding Johnson's evidence of Aune's alleged entry into the leased premises.
9. We note the existence of a tenant's-rights statute that may be relevant to the issue raised by Johnson. A statute captioned "residential tenant's right to privacy" provides that "a landlord may enter the premises rented by a residential tenant only for a reasonable business purpose and after making a good faith effort to give the residential tenant reasonable notice under the circumstances of the intent to enter." Minn. Stat. § 504B.211, subd. 2 (2022). The statute provides examples of reasonable business purposes and provides for exceptions to the general prohibition. Id., subds. 3-4. The statute also provides for specified penalties for a violation of the general prohibition, including a rent reduction, recovery of a damage deposit, and a civil penalty of $100. Id., subd. 6. Most importantly, the statute provides that a tenant must "enforce the provisions of" the right-to-privacy statute in a separate tenant's-remedies action. Id. (referencing Minn. Stat. §§ 504B.381, .385, .395-.471 (2022)). This subdivision of the tenant's-rights statute confirms that a landlord's violation of a tenant's right to privacy is not an affirmative defense to an eviction action.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.