Opinion
Hearing Granted April 12, 1961.
Opinion vacated 14 Cal.Rptr. 641.
Spray, Gould & Bowers, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Schell & Delamer, by Fred B. Belanger, Los Angeles, for respondent.
BISHOP, Justice pro tem.
On April 8, 1956, the driver of a Buick and the driver of a Hudson each negligently operated his car in such a manner that the driver of a Cadillac was injured. The latter, with the assistance of a jury, obtained a judgment, entered April 7, 1958, against the two joint tort-feasors, awarding him, the Cadillac driver, $11,592.20. The driver of the Hudson appealed; the judgment was affirmed (Augustus v. Shaffer, 1959, 171 Cal.App.2d 160, 340 P.2d 37), and the Hudson driver, Aaron Shaffer, the respondent on this appeal, having completely satisfied the judgment, in the fall of 1959, moved for a judgment of contribution against his co-defendant, the Buick driver, Cecil Compton Bean. This motion was granted, and a judgment was entered decreeing that defendant Aaron Shaffer recover $5,796.10 from his co-defendant Cecil Compton Bean. It is from this judgment that the last-named defendant has appealed.
But for the provisions of sections 875-880, added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1957, defendant Shaffer would have had no recourse against his co-defendant, for as stated in Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School Dist., 1934, 1 Cal.2d 331, 334, 34 P.2d 994, 996: 'It is well settled in this state that there is no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors whose concurrent negligence has made them jointly liable in damages. (Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 170 [195 P. 389].)' As late as April, 1960 we find it stated: 'Prior to January 1, 1958, the law in California was the common-law rule that there was no right of contribution between joint tortfeasors.' Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy,
In 1957, however, there was legislation which 'adds California to the growing list of states which permit, to a greater or lesser degree, contribution among joint tort-feasors.' 32 State Bar Journal 553. Title XI, comprised of sections 875-880, was added to Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure. These are some of the provisions of sections 875 and 878: ' § 875. (a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of contribution among them as hereinafter provided. * * * (c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. * * *'
' § 878. Judgment for contribution may be entered by one tortfeasor judgment debtor against other tortfeasor judgment debtors by motion upon notice. * * *'
It is the last section of Title XI that gives rise to our problem. Section 880 reads: 'This title shall become effective as to causes of action accruing on or after January 1, 1958.' As applied to this case, the ultimate question is: Did the 1957 legislation give to the defendant Aaron Shaffer a right to the judgment of contribution that was entered in his favor against his codefendant Cecil Compton Bean, the appellant? The latter insists that it did not, for the reason that the cause of action, in this case, was not one that accrued on or after January 1, 1958, within the meaning of section 880.
The task set before us is one not infrequently met: 'What did the legislature mean by what it said?' There is no doubt about the meaning of 'accrue,' as the word is used in section 880. A cause of action accrues when a suit may be brought upon it. Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc., 1944, 23 Cal.2d 719, 733, 146 P.2d 673, 680, 151 A.L.R. 1062; Van Hook v. Southern California Waiters Alliance, 1958, 158 Cal.App.2d 556, 565, 323 P.2d 212, 217.
Our crucial question thus becomes this: To what 'causes of action' did the legislature refer, in section 880? In view of the nature of the subject matter of Title XI (sections 875-880) the choice is limited; the reference is either to causes of action accruing to persons who have been injured by joint torts, or it is to the causes of action created by the sections, that is causes of action for contribution.
Any uncertainty as to the answer, remaining from a reading of sections 875, 876 and 878 only, is swept away by a consideration of the provisions of section 877. If this last mentioned section is ever to become effective, the 'causes of action' must be those accruing to persons who have tort actions and not to causes of action for contribution. This we say, because, plainly, (in view of section 875) the latter causes of action do not accrue until (1) a money judgment has been entered against two or more defendants in a tort action, and (2) one tort-feasor has, by payment, either (a) discharged the joint judgment or (b) paid more than his pro rata share thereof, as measured by section 876. But section 877 deals, primarily, with steps taken by those who have suffered from torts, which steps are taken before any judgment is entered, and so , necessarily, before one is either partly or completely discharged. Section 877, with its first subdivision, reads: 'Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort
'(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater.' The conclusion to which we are brought is not inconsistent with any provision in Title XI. It is that the 'causes of action' of section 880, are those which accrue to persons injured by the joint action of two or more tort-feasors; they are not those created by the Title in favor of defendants who have paid part or all of a joint judgment. Applying the conclusion to this case, we recall that plaintiff's cause of action accrued in April of 1956, long before 'on or after January 1, 1958.' It results that the motion of defendant Shaffer for a judgment of contribution should have been denied.
The appeal from the order granting the motion for judgment of contribution is dismissed. The judgment for contribution is reversed.
SHINN, P.J., and FORD, J., concur.