Summary
In Augustine the court held that "[t]he cases that have considered statutes identical to § 10-6-7 universally hold that amounts paid by settling defendants must be credited to the verdict amount returned against nonsettling joint tortfeasors."
Summary of this case from Margadonna v. Otis Elevator Co.Opinion
July 3, 1979.
PRESENT: Bevilacqua, C.J., Joslin, Kelleher, Doris and Weisberger, JJ.
1. STATUTES. Plain and Obvious Meaning. When a statute is free of ambiguity there is no room for construction and the words will be given their plain and obvious meaning.
2. DAMAGES. Proscription Against Double Recovery. The fundamental principle that an injured person is entitled to only one satisfaction of the tort, even though two or more parties contributed to the loss, was not altered by enactment of the provision which proscribes double recovery by unequivocally mandating that a release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors by the amount of the consideration paid for the release. Gen. Laws 1956, § 10-6-7.
3. DAMAGES. Release of One Joint Tort-Feasor. The statute which provides that a release by an injured person of one joint tort-feasor reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors by the amount of the consideration paid for the release clearly directs that the award of damages must be reduced by either the amount of consideration paid for the release, or the proportion of reduction provided by the release, whichever is greater. Gen. Laws 1956, § 10-6-7.
4. DAMAGES. Release of One Joint Tort-Feasor. Where personal injury plaintiffs had entered into a pretrial settlement with one joint tort-feasor, subsequent jury award of $33,513 in damages plus accrued interest amounting to $9,458.24 was properly reduced by the $42,000 which plaintiffs had previously received in settlement where the consideration paid for the release exceeded the pro rata reduction of damages by the amount chargeable to the released tort-feasor. Gen. Laws 1956, § 10-6-7.
Personal injury suit arose out of multi-vehicle collision. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs and one of the defendants executed a release for the sum of $42,000. The case proceeded to trial, and the Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties, Bourcier, J., entered judgment on a verdict for plaintiffs but reduced the award by the $42,000 the plaintiffs had received in settlement. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court, Doris, J., held that: (1) under statute, amounts paid by settling defendants must be credited to the verdict amount returned against nonsettling joint tort-feasors, and (2) where the consideration paid for the release exceeded the proportional reduction provided by the release, the trial court properly reduced the verdict by the amount of consideration paid for the release.
Appeal denied and dismissed, judgment affirmed and case remanded.
John Quattrochi, Jr., for plaintiffs.
Edward E. Dillon, Jr., Hugh L. Moore, Jr., John T. Madden, for defendants.
The plaintiffs, Vincent and Harriet Augustine, were injured as a result of a multi-vehicle collision that occurred on August 17, 1974, in Providence. The defendants in the ensuing negligence action were the drivers and owners of two of the other automobiles involved in the accident. For convenience we shall hereinafter refer to the defendants as Langlais and Otero. Prior to trial the plaintiffs and Otero executed a release pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §§ 10-6-1 to 11, for a sum of $42,000 and the complaint against Otero was dismissed with prejudice. Otero remained in the case, however, because of a cross-claim filed by the nonsettling joint tortfeasor Langlais. The case proceeded to trial in the Superior Court and the jury, in response to special interrogatories, found Otero 85 percent negligent, Langlais 15 percent negligent, and the plaintiffs totally free of negligence. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $33,513 in damages. Accrued interest was $9,458.24. The trial justice entered judgment for the plaintiffs in the aforementioned amounts but reduced by the $42,000 the plaintiffs had previously received in settlement. The plaintiffs appeal from this judgment contending that Langlais should be liable for 15 percent of the jury verdict and interest without any credit for the prior settlement.
The release stated in pertinent part:
"FURTHER, in consideration of the aforementioned sum, we, Vincent J. Augustine and Harriet Augustine, reduce any and all damages which we may recover against any person, firm or corporation adjuged to be a tortfeasor with respect to the aforementioned accident, by and to the extent of the pro-rata share of the common liability for such damages chargeable to the Star of Jacob, Inc. and Angelo R. Otero, no right of contribution has yet accrued to any other Joint Tortfeasor."
General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 10-6-7 provides that:
"A release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid." (Emphasis added.)
It is well-settled that when a statute is free of ambiguity there is no room for statutory construction and the words will be given their plain and obvious meaning. E.g., Gomes v. Rhode Island State Board of Elections, 120, R.I. 951, 956, 393 A.2d 1088, 1090 (1978); Andreozzi v. D'Antuono, 113 R.I. 155, 158, 319 A.2d 16, 18 (1974); Reardon v. Hall, 104 R.I. 591, 595, 247 A.2d 900, 902 (1968); Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 95 R.I. 366, 369, 187 A.2d 262, 264 (1963). Section 10-6-7 is such a statute and must be literally applied.
Section 10-6-7 is a verbatim enactment of section four of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 which has been adopted by several other states. The cases that have considered statutes identical to 10-6-7 universally hold that amounts paid by settling defendants must be credited to the verdict amount returned against nonsettling joint tortfeasors. E.g., Woodard v. Holliday, 235 Ark. 744, 750, 361 S.W.2d 744, 748 (1962); Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del. 343, 348, 91 A.2d 245, 247 (1952); Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 199-200, 107 A.2d 73, 80-81 (1954); Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 372-73, 126 A.2d 730, 733-34 (1956); Degen v. Baymen, 90 S.D. 400, 409, 241 N.W.2d 703, 707 (1976); see Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 26.29 at 573 (1977); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 49 at 304-05 (4th ed. 1971). We perceive no reason to adopt a different view. These decisions are predicated upon the fundamental doctrine that an injured person is entitled to only one satisfaction of the tort, even though two or more parties contributed to the loss. See, e.g., Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. at 199, 107 A.2d at 80; Prosser, § 48 at 299-300. This principle was not altered by the enactment of § 10-6-7 which proscribes double recovery by unequivocally mandating that a release "reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release."
[3, 4] The plaintiffs rely upon the language in the release concerning a pro rata reduction of their damages by the amount chargeable to Otero. See note 1 supra. The plaintiffs fail, however, to read § 10-6-7 in its totality. The statute clearly directs that the damage award must be reduced by either the amount of consideration paid for the release, or the proportion of reduction provided by the release, whichever is greater. See Daugherty v. Herschberger, 386 Pa. at 373, 126 A.2d at 733. In this case the consideration paid for the release exceeded the proportional reduction and was therefore the appropriate amount to be credited against the jury verdict.
The plaintiffs also argue that the trial justice committed reversible error because he relied upon a proposed 1976 amendment to § 10-6-7 that was never enacted by the Legislature. This amendment would have had two effects. First, it would have eliminated the last clause of § 10-6-7 ("or in any amount * * * consideration paid"). As we have already indicated that clause is irrelevant to the instant case. Second, it would have mandated that the release not be admitted into evidence before the jury. The plaintiffs do not argue that this portion of the proposed amendment affected the trial justice's decision. Accordingly, the trial justice's mistaken reliance upon the never-enacted amendment did not affect his decision. Furthermore, we have frequently stated that we will accept a lower court decision that is correct even though it is based upon erroneous reasoning. E.g., Souza v. O'Hara, 121 R.I. 88, 90, 395 A.2d 1060, 1061 (1978); DiRaimo v. DiRaimo, 117 R.I. 703, 708, 370 A.2d 1284, 1287 (1977).
The plaintiffs' appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.