Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-202-KS-MTP
02-04-2016
DAVID GARLAND ATWOOD, II PLAINTIFF v. SHERIFF BEN FORD, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [19] filed by Defendants Tommy Moss, Ronnie Pennington, and Eddie Thompson, the Motion to Dismiss [48] filed by the Defendants Ben Ford and Stann Smith, and sua sponte pursuant to the Court's screening responsibility under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having considered the motions and the Plaintiff's submissions, the undersigned recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment [19] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, the Motion to Dismiss [48] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim alleged against the Rankin County Defendants be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Atwood, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought the instant civil rights action challenging his arrest and the conditions of his confinement in the Covington County Jail, City of Collins Jail, and Rankin County Jail. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on August 19, 2011, he was arrested by Defendant Detective Moss of the Rankin County Sheriff's Department and charged with felony exploitation of a minor. Plaintiff states that the charges were dropped in May 2013. He also alleges that Defendants Sherriff Ronnie Pennington and Captain Eddie Thompson were involved in his arrest, detainment, and prosecution. The Plaintiff characterizes his claims against these three Defendants as false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Defendants Pennington, Thompson and Moss will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the "Rankin County Defendants."
See Complaint [1] at 8; 19-21.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was then held in the Rankin County Jail, where Defendants Sheriff Pennington and Captain Thompson refused him access to the law library and outside recreation area. The Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Captain Thompson confiscated and destroyed some of his legal documents.
Id. at 9; 22-23.
On October 31, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to the Collins City Jail, where Defendant Unknown Police Officer ignored his requests for medical attention.
Id. at 10. As the screening of the Plaintiff's complaint is ongoing, this Defendant has not yet been identified and has not been served with process.
Within a few days, the Plaintiff was transferred to the Covington County Jail ("CCJ"), Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly told Defendant Deputy Jim Williams of the Covington County Sheriff's Department that he should not be placed in the "holding tank" with general population inmates, as he had been attacked in the holding tank of CCJ on previous occasions. According to the Plaintiff, Defendant Williams ignored his requests and placed him in the holding tank anyway, and the Plaintiff was soon thereafter assaulted by other inmates. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ben Ford, the then Sheriff of Covington County, was involved in the decision to place him in the holding tank.
Defendant Williams has only recently been identified, and though process has issued, he has not yet been served. See Order [60].
Id. at 10-11.
See Response [51] at 13.
Finally, Plaintiff claims he was denied adequate medical care at the CCJ. Plaintiff claims he suffers from a terminal illness that causes chronic infections, but that Defendant Nurse Practitioner James Shivers did not treat him appropriately. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Shivers promised that he would be taken to a specialist, but that Defendant Ford told him that there was not any money to take inmates to the doctor. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Williams told him that he would not receive medical care. Plaintiff states that when Defendant Stann Smith was elected Sheriff and took office January 1, 2012, he was finally taken to see Nurse Shivers again, but she again provided inadequate treatment and only promised to "try" to find a way to get Plaintiff to a specialist.
See Complaint [1] at 12. Plaintiff set forth additional allegations in this complaint, but these were dismissed for failure to state a claim by Order [12].
The Rankin County Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment [19] and Memorandum in Support [20] on June 25, 2015, in which they argue that the Plaintiff's claims are both time barred and precluded by res judicata. On October 5, 2015, Defendants Ben Ford and Stann Smith filed their Motion to Dismiss [48] and Memorandum in Support [49], arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity from the Plaintiff's claims. In addition, the Covington County Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff's claims are also time barred. Plaintiff has filed Responses [26] [51] [53] to the motions, and they are now ripe for disposition.
Defendants Ben Ford and Stann Smith will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the Covington County Defendants.
ANALYSIS
Motion for Summary Judgment [19] filed by Rankin County Defendants
"The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of apprising the district court of the basis for its motion and the parts of the record which indicate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Once the moving party presents the district court with a properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary judgment is inappropriate." Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). The nonmovant must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, the Court must "examine each issue in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.
Statute of Limitations
The Rankin County Defendants argue that the all the claims asserted against them by the Plaintiff are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. There is no dispute between the parties that the statute of limitations governing Plaintiff's claims is three years. Because there is no limitations period specified in Section 1983, "federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995). In Mississippi, the relevant limitations period is three years from the day the cause of action accrues. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (2015); see also James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that "the three year residual period provided by Section 15-1-49, Miss. Code Ann. applies" in a federal civil rights case).
The issue before the Court is whether the Plaintiff's complaint should be deemed filed, for limitations purposes, on the date he signed it, October 28, 2014, or the date it was stamped as filed by the clerk of court, December 30, 2014.
See Complaint [1] at 25.
Plaintiff argues that his complaint was timely filed on October 28, 2014, as that was the day he signed his complaint and handed it over to prison authorities for mailing. He states that the clerk of court returned his complaint to him, after holding it for several weeks, because Plaintiff did not submit an affidavit and application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff states that he did not have IFP forms available to him until the clerk's office returned blank copies along with his complaint. Plaintiff states that he immediately filled out the IFP forms and mailed all his submissions once again to the clerk's office, where it was finally stamped "filed" on December 30, 2014.
See Response [26] at 2-3.
Pursuant to the "mailbox rule," a pro se prisoner's pleading is deemed to have been filed on the date that the pro se prisoner submits the pleading to the prison authorities for mailing. Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988)). The prison mailbox rule applies to the filing of Section 1983 complaints. Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 378-81 (5th Cir. 1995). Although the Plaintiff did not attach an application to proceed IFP to his complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has clearly held that the mailbox rule applies even if the pro se litigant has not paid the required filing fee at the time the petition is turned over for mailing. Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he timeliness of [a] petition . . . depends, not on a fee payment, but on when [the plaintiff] delivered his papers to the prison authorities for filing.")).
Therefore, the Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims arising from events that occurred at the Rankin County Jail between October 28, 2011, and his transfer on October 31, 2011—including his complaints of denial of access to the courts and denial of adequate recreation opportunities—should remain before the Court.
The Plaintiff does not delineate the specific point in time during his incarceration at the Rankin County Jail when he was denied access to the courts and adequate recreation time. Taking into consideration the date that the statute of limitations began to run, October 28, 2011, there were only three days time when the events alleged by the Plaintiff could have timely occurred for limitations purposes. However, at this early stage in the proceedings, and given that the screening of the Plaintiff's claims is ongoing, the Court will allow these claims to proceed.
However, even giving the Plaintiff the full benefit of the mailbox rule, his false arrest and false imprisonment claims are nonetheless time barred. The Fifth Circuit has held that for "[f]or false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims, the limitations period accrues when the plaintiff 'becomes held pursuant to legal process—when for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.'" Reed v. Edwards, 487 Fed. App'x 904, 905-06 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007) ("the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.")).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims alleging wrongful arrest and detention accrued on August 19, 2011—the date Plaintiff was arrested and detained pursuant to a warrant. See Reed, 487 Fed. App'x at 905-06; see also Leonard v. Jackson County, Missisisppi, 2015 WL 7302745, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 18, 2015) (holding that "[the plaintiff's] § 1983 claims based on wrongful arrest and detention accrued on the date of his arrest and detention."). Plaintiff had three years from that date to file his false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Because he filed his complaint, at the earliest, on October 28, 2011, the Plaintiff's claims are untimely, and the undersigned recommends they be dismissed with prejudice.
See Bench Warrant [19-2] at 5.
Res Judicata
The Rankin County Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata. The Defendants state that the Plaintiff filed suit against Rankin County Officer Ben Blaine on August 2, 2013, regarding events related, in part, to the Plaintiff's arrest and confinement in the Rankin County Jail. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that Blaine threatened and sexually harassed him during his incarceration at the RCJ because the two had previously been involved in a romantic relationship. This action was dismissed pursuant the parties' agreed settlement on April 2, 2015.
See Complaint [1] in Civil Action No. 3:13cv535-FKB, United States Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
See Order of Dismissal [104] in Civil Action No. 3:13cv535-FKB.
The rule of res judicata refers to the preclusive effect of a prior judgment. In order for a prior judgment to preclude the rejudication of a claim or issue, four requirements must be met: "(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions." Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Defendants' motion must be denied on this ground, as they have failed to establish the requisite elements of res judicata. First, the parties in this case are not identical, nor are they in privity with the parties in the previous suit. In this instant action, Plaintiff has alleged claims against the former Rankin County Sheriff Ronnie Pennington and Captain Eddie Thompson—he makes no allegations against Ben Blaine. Second, the claims alleged in this case arise from different events from that alleged in Plaintiff's previous suit—namely denial of access to the law library, destruction of legal papers, and denial of adequate exercise opportunities. The Plaintiff's former lawsuit involved allegations of sexual harassment and arose from events that occurred both prior to and during his incarceration at the RCJ. Accordingly, as to this ground, summary judgment should be denied. Failure to State a Claim
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the district court is directed to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any time if it determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007) (holding that Prison Litigation Reform Act mandates judicial screening of prisoner complaints). A complaint is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. See Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999)). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff attempts to bring a malicious prosecution claim against the Rankin County Defendants under Section 1983. This claim should be dismissed, as it is well established that there is generally no constitutional right to be free from wrongful prosecution. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[C]ausing charges to be filed without probable cause [does] not without more violate the Constitution.").
Motion to Dismiss [48]
Although the Covington County Defendants' motion is entitled as a motion to dismiss, the Defendants are requesting a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), as a responsive pleading has been filed. Judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 12(c) is appropriate when the facts are undisputed and only questions of law remain. See Voest-Apline Trading Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998). The standard for addressing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as that used to address a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, Co, 624 F.3d 201, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2010). A court considering a motion to dismiss is limited to a consideration of the matters contained in the pleadings. Kane v. Enterprises v. MacGregor, Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2003). The court must determine whether the plaintiff has pled "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate only "if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations." See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002).
See Answers [38] and [39].
Statute of Limitations
Like the Rankin County Defendants, the Covington County Defendants argue that the Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 30, 2011, and thus, any claims alleged against them arising before that date are time barred. Defendants cite Thompson v. Raspberry, 993 F.2d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1993), in support of their argument. In Thompson, the Fifth Circuit held that the mailbox rule does "not relieve a prisoner of the responsibility of doing all that he or she can reasonably do to ensure that documents are received by the clerk of court in a timely manner." Id. The court further held that "[f]ailure to stamp or properly address outgoing mail or to follow reasonable prison regulations governing prisoner mail does not constitute compliance with this standard." Id.
As outlined above, the Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the mailbox rule, meaning that his complaint is deemed filed on October 28, 2011. The Defendants do not allege that the Plaintiff failed to stamp or properly address his complaint, but rather that his failure to submit an IFP application along with his pleadings constitutes noncompliance with the rule under Thompson. However, the Defendants cite neither a "reasonable prison regulation" nor any other authority stating that an inmate's failure to submit IFP documents with his complaint is a forfeiture of the mailbox rule. Given the Fifth Circuit's clear holding that the mailbox rule applies even if the pro se litigant has not paid the required filing fee at the time the petition is turned over for mailing, Defendants' motion must be denied in this respect for the reasons set forth above. See Cousin, 310 F.3d at 847.
Qualified Immunity
The Covington County Defendants also argue that, in any event, they are entitled to qualified immunity from the Plaintiff's claims. They argue that the Plaintiff has provided insufficient facts against them as to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Defendants request the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims, or, in the alternative, that the Plaintiff's be ordered to file a Schultea reply.
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995). --------
The undersigned recommends that the Defendants' motion be denied without prejudice in this respect, as the screening of the Plaintiff's claim is ongoing. The Court intends to conduct an omnibus hearing in this matter, but has not yet been able to do so in light of the appeal of the Court's Order of Partial Dismissal [12] that was, until recently, pending in the United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit. At the hearing, the Plaintiff's claims will be clarified and amended, rendering a Schultea reply unnecessary at this juncture.
In his Response [51], Plaintiff states that he did not intend to file a failure to protect claim against Defendant Sheriff Stann Smith. Accordingly, to the extent the Defendants' motion requests dismissal of the claim against Defendant Smith for a failure to protect, the motion should be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends as follows:
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment [19] filed by Defendants Sheriff Ronnie Pennington, Captain Eddie Thompson, and Detective Tommy Moss should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART:
a. Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims alleged against Defendant Pennington, Thompson and Moss should be dismissed with prejudice as time barred, and Defendant Tommy Moss should be dismissed as a party to this action;
b. Plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claim and denial of adequate exercise claim alleged against Defendants Pennington and Thompson should remain before the Court;
2. Plaintiff's allegation of malicious persecution alleged against Defendants Pennington, Thompson and Moss should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
3. The Motion to Dismiss [48] filed by Defendants Sheriff Ben Ford and Sheriff Stann Smith should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
a. To the extent the Motion [48] requests dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity, the motion should be denied without prejudice; and
b. Plaintiff's failure to protect claim against Defendant Stann Smith should be dismissed with prejudice.
RIGHT TO OBJECT
In accordance with the rule and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party within fourteen days after being served a copy of this recommendation, may serve and file written objections to the recommendations, with a copy to the judge, the magistrate judge and the opposing party. The District Judge at the time may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, or may receive further evidence or recommit the matter to this Court with instructions. The parties are hereby notified that failure to file written objections to the proposed finding, conclusions, and recommendations contained within this report and recommendation within fourteen days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except on grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court to which the party has not objected. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).
THIS the 4th day of February 2016.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge