Summary
permitting testimony from owner on value of personal property including clothing and children's toys
Summary of this case from Bozievich v. MoreauOpinion
C.A. No. 02C-12-003WLW.
Submitted: November 14, 2006.
Decided: February 14, 2007.
Upon Defendant Richard Davis' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law to Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiff as to Her Personal Property Damages. Denied in part; Granted in part.
William D. Fletcher, Jr., Esquire of Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware and Marry F. Higgins, Esquire, Odessa, Delaware; co-counsel for Plaintiffs.
Robert K. Pearce, Esquire o f Ferry Joseph Pearce, P .A., W ilmington, De law are; attorneys for Defendant Richard Davis.
Norman H. Brooks, Esquire of Marks O'Neill O'Brien Courtney, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; attorneys for Defendant RHIS.
ORDER
Defendant Richard Davis renewed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Tina Atwell concerning the value of her personal property. Specifically, the Defendant argues that Ms. Atwell's claims of $20,000 for the loss of personal property, $10,000 for damages to clothing and $7,500 for damages to toys are speculative and conjectural as a matter of law and should not be considered by a jury.
The Plaintiff opposes Mr. Davis' Motion arguing that Ms. Atwell's damages are not speculative. Also, Ms. Atwell argues that the Defendant's speculation argument goes to the weight of the evidence and is therefore a question for jury determination.
The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendant waived the issue addressed in Mr. Davis' current Motion because the Defendant did not raise the issue in the pre-trial stipulation and order. The Court finds that the issue is properly before the Court as a result of the evidence presented in Plaintiffs' lengthy civil trial resulting in a mistrial. Further, Plaintiffs' argument that the Motion is procedurally improper due to the fact that there will be a new trial is incorrect because the Court has authority to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when no jury verdict is returned, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 50(b).
For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Tina Atwell concerning the value of her personal property is denied in part and granted in part.
Standard of Review
Superior Court Civil Rule 50(b) provides in relevant part: "Whenever a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the Court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. If no verdict was returned, the Court may, in disposing of the renewed motion, direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law or may order a new trial."
Under Rule 50, this Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pursuant to that standard, the Court must determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom could justify a jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. In order to find for the moving party, the Court must find that there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-movant.
Mumford v. Paris, 2003 WL 231611, *2 (Del.Super.).
Id.
Discussion
Generally, the owner of personal property is usually permitted to state their estimate as to its value. The overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the sufficiency of lay testimony concerning value, including [the Delaware Supreme] Court, have concluded that owners are in the best position to estimate the worth of their personalty. However, a party must prove claimed damages, and they may not be speculative or conjectural.
Ligon v. Brooks, 196 A. 200 (Del.Super. 1937).
Carello v. State of Delaware, 2004 WL 2520905, *3 (Del.Supr.). In Carello, the Supreme Court addressed a situation in a criminal case where an owner/victim testified concerning the purchase price of personal property and not about the market value at the time of the crime or replacement costs as required by statute. The Supreme Court found that in that situation the question becomes whether the fact finder can infer market value or replacement costs from the record evidence. The Court found that there was a sufficient basis in which a jury could make a determination concerning market value based on the proffered testimony.
Joseph T. Dashiell Builders v. Andrews, 2002 WL 31819895, *1 (Del.Super.).
The case sub judice is on point with the Court of Common Pleas ("CCP") Ausejo decision where the Court addressed a plaintiffs' claim for damages for the loss of stored personal items in a basement. The CCP pointed out that damages may not be speculative or conjectural. Photographs and testimony by the owner of personal property, in Ausejo, evidenced damage to the property. As in this case, the CCP stated that while of sentimental value, plaintiffs must establish some "reasonable basis in fact" to support their damage claim of $16,590. The court continued: Difficulty of measurement, however, will not frustrate a damage award, and the Court has "discretion to employ a flexible approach to damages in order to achieve a just and reasonable result." The CCP noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide objective information about the actual value of the [personal] property. The only reliable evidence was photographs of the personal property after the incident. The Court pointed out that although plaintiffs had not offered a realistic estimate of their personal property damage, they did suffer harm. Based on the photographs and testimony, the CCP found that personal property damages were suffered in the amount of $1,000, as opposed to $16,590.
Ausejo v. Delmarva Power and Light Co., 1999 WL 1847437 (Del. Com. Pl.).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5. The Court pointed out that the personal property were older items not being used by the Plaintiff, but the reasoning applies regardless of the age of the items.
Id. citing to Drozdov v. Webster, 345 A.2d 895, 896 (Del.Super. 1975).
Id. citing Council of Unit Owners v. Freeman Assoc., 564 A.2d 357, 363 (Del.Super. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Ms. Atwell claims $20,000 in personal property damage. The Plaintiff proffered testimony concerning what she thought the value of her destroyed personal property was worth, and there were photographs of an allegedly contaminated couch. Ms. Atwell presented evidence as to when the items were purchased, how they had been used, how they were destroyed and what she did with the destroyed items. However, there was no inventory or appraisal of the destroyed items and no testimony about purchase price or replacement costs. The Plaintiff may testify concerning the value that she estimates her property to have, but that must be balanced with the fact that the damage claims cannot be speculative. The Court finds that Plaintiff's personal property damage claim is speculative and conjectural, because there is not a reasonable basis in fact to support the $20,000 claim. There is not a solid objective basis to support the claim. Therefore, the Court will limit the Plaintiff's personal property damages claim to $10,000 as opposed to $20,000.
Plaintiffs also argue this concerning their clothing and toy damage claims.
The Plaintiffs claim $10,000 in damages for loss of clothing. Ms. Atwell testified that she had to throw all of her daughter Ashley's clothing away, and she also had to throw all of her own destroyed clothing out. The Plaintiff estimated the value of her and Ashley's clothing loss at $5,000 each. Ashley was only two years old when the Atwell's moved into the home, and the Court finds it very questionable that the value of Ashley's clothing was equivalent to the value of Ms. Atwell's clothing. The Plaintiff failed to provide any reliable breakdown of the types of clothing or estimated values of destroyed clothing. There is not a reasonable basis in fact to support the Plaintiffs' $10,000 claim for loss of clothing. The lack of a reliable objective basis concerning the clothing damage claim causes the claim to be speculative and conjectural. Consequently, the Court will limit Plaintiffs' damage claim for clothing loss to $5,000 as opposed to $10,000.
It is noteworthy to point out the fact that children of Ashley's age (at the time of the alleged incident) outgrow clothing quickly, which diminishes the value of the clothing. As noted in Ausejo, Plaintiff needs to show more than "sentimental value". There must be a "reasonable basis in fact" to support the claims.
Ms. Atwell claims $7,500 for damages to Ashley's toys. The Plaintiff proffered pictures of allegedly contaminated toys, and testified that she threw out around 20 trash bags that were full of toys. Again, Ms. Atwell's testimony lacked specificity concerning the value of the destroyed toys. The jury would have to speculate as to whether the relatively large claim was reasonable, because the claim lacks an objective basis concerning the damages suffered. The Plaintiff has failed to proffer a reasonable basis in fact concerning damages suffered through the loss of Ashley's toys. Therefore, the $7,500 claim for damaged toys is speculative and conjectural. Consequently, the Court will limit the Plaintiffs' damage claim for toys to $3,750 as opposed to $7,500.
Viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that there is not a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the Plaintiffs concerning their damage claims for loss of person al property, clothing and toys. Although the Court finds that the Plaintiffs did not offer realistic damage claims, the Plaintiffs did suffer harm. Consequently, the Court will not exclude the Plaintiffs' testimony concerning these damages, but the damages will be limited as discussed above.
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff Tina Atwell concerning the value of her personal property is denied in part and granted in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.