Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-07-006-FSS.
Submitted: February 19, 2004.
Decided: May 28, 2004.
R. Stokes Nolte, Esquire, Nolte Brodoway, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellant.
Mary Page Bailey, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Deputy Attorney General for the U.I.A.B.
Mr. William Webb, Milton, Delaware, Pro Se Appellee.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an appeal by Atlantis Communications from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's decision reversing an appeals referee's denial of benefits to William Webb. Although Atlantis provided three main reasons for terminating Claimant's employment, the Board curtly mentioned only two of them in its decision. Essentially, the Board found no just cause for Claimant's dismissal despite Claimant's alleged insubordination and responsibility for missing inventory. The Board failed, however, to address Atlantis's claim that Claimant's overall performance was unsatisfactory. Although the Board enjoys autonomy in fact-finding, the court cannot review the Board's decision without better understanding the Board's reasoning.
I.
Atlantis employed Claimant in several capacities from April 3, 2000 until January 20, 2003. Most recently, as a regional director, Claimant's responsibilities included coordinating technicians' work, organizing inventory returns and handling customers' damage claims. As mentioned, Atlantis contends it discharged Claimant because he was insubordinate, failed to perform work duties and engaged in acts of indiscretion. All of these things, says Atlantis, were willful and wanton acts that violated Claimant's expected standard of conduct.
Claimant's alleged insubordination stemmed from his missing work and failing to follow procedure in notifying supervisors of absences. Even after being warned on several occasions that he must telephone his supervisor directly to report absences, Claimant often called subordinates or emailed his supervisor well after Claimant should have reported to work. Claimant was to be at work by 7:00 a.m. in order to issue equipment and work orders to his technicians before they left for their work sites between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m.
When at work, Claimant's performance allegedly was unsatisfactory. While Claimant was responsible for inventory, nearly $40,000 worth of it went missing. One cause of the discrepancy was Claimant's failure to make proper inventory returns. Claimant allowed returns to collect at the warehouse, which distorted Atlantis's inventory figures. Claimant was aware of the proper procedure, which he followed up until a few months before Atlantis let him go.
Claimant also failed to properly handle customer claims for damage done by technicians. Regional directors were required to handle these claims, and all claims were to be settled within 72 hours. At the time of Claimant's discharge, there were some claims dating back almost five or six months. Again, Claimant was aware of the proper procedure.
Finally, Atlantis presented evidence highlighting several acts of indiscretion by Claimant. Approximately four months before being terminated, Claimant allegedly had a personal relationship with a subordinate. On one occasion, the two went to lunch and remained out of the office beyond their allotted hour. Upon returning, Claimant signed off on the subordinate's time sheet, indicating she had only been gone one hour. Claimant also got into verbal confrontations with Atlantis's human resources director and at least once slammed his office door closed after becoming frustrated.
II.
An appeals referee heard the case on March 17, 2003, and found Claimant ineligible for benefits. The appeals referee based her decision on 19 Del. C. § 3315(2), which details when discharged employees are disqualified from benefits. The appeals referee found just cause for Claimant's discharge, due mostly to insubordination and failure to fulfill job responsibilities. The appeals referee's decision is lengthy and includes a detailed factual history of the case.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3315(2) (1995).
Claimant then appealed to the Board, which held a hearing and rendered a decision on June 18, 2003. The Board considered the evidence previously presented to the appeals referee and heard testimony from both parties. Witnesses for Claimant testified that Atlantis employees were allowed to work from home and that there were problems with the company's inventory tracking system. Atlantis's witness was an inventory control person who testified about the $40,000 inventory error, which dated back to October 2002, and that when the inventory control person was hired, the inventory tracking system worked.
The Board decided:
Having heard the testimony of the new witnesses presented by the claimant, the Board concludes that claimant was permitted to work at home. It appears from the record below that the claimant attempted to let his employer know about absences due to illness by e-mail. He was trying to do the job required by his employer, but he was hampered by an ineffective inventory tracking system. There was no evidence that the claimant was responsible for any missing inventory.
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's decision, pg. 2.
After citing the standard for "just cause," the Board added:
Neither the absenteeism nor the inability to perform the job demonstrates willful or wanton conduct in this case. The employer has some responsibility for the inaccurate inventory records because of the system deficiencies.
Id.
Thus, on July 20, 2003, the Board reversed the appeals referee's decision and found Claimant eligible for benefits. Atlantis then filed this appeal.
III.
The standard of review for a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is whether the Board's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The Board, not the reviewing court, shall weigh the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in testimony. The Board's decision should provide the reviewing court with the Board's holding and reasoning. If there is substantial evidence and no legal error, the Board's decision will be affirmed.
Longobardi v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del.Super.Ct. 1971) (citing Air Mod Corporation v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434, 438 (Del. 1965)).
Oceanport Industries, Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. 1994) (citing Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)).
Starkey v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 340 A.2d 165, 166 (Del.Super.Ct. 1975) (citations omitted).
See Turbitt v. Blue Hen Lines, 711 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Del. 1998) (citing Lemmon v. Northwood Construction, 690 A.2d 912, 913-14 (Del. 1996) ("Rejection of evidence on the basis of credibility must be supported by specific references to the evidence of record which prompts disbelief."); The New Colony North Apartments Company v. Vaught, 1995 WL 109050, at *2 (Del.Super.) (citing R.C. Nehi Corp. v. Dillmore, 1986 WL 4570, at *3 (Del.Super.)) ("Without the Board's factual findings, the Court cannot determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision or whether the law was properly applied to the facts.").
City of Newark v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 802 A.2d 318, 323 (Del.Super.Ct. 2002) (citing Avon Products, Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 198 6)).
An individual is disqualified for benefits where "the individual was discharged from the individual's work for just cause in connection with the individual's work. . . ." The term "just cause" refers to a "wilful or wanton act in violation of . . . the employee's expected standard of conduct." Wilful or wanton conduct requires a showing that "one was conscious of his conduct or recklessly indifferent of its consequences . . . [but] [i]t need not necessarily connote bad motive . . . or malice."
Abex Corporation v. Todd, 235 A.2d 271, 272 (Del.Super.Ct. 1967).
Coleman v. Department of Labor, 288 A.2d 285, 288 (Del.Super.Ct. 1972).
IV.
As previously mentioned, the Board enjoys autonomy in fact-finding. Its curt opinion, however, is inadequate because it fails to address some material allegations at all, and the way it discusses other issues is incomplete. The court cannot review the decision without more explanation and reasoning to consider.The record indicates that until approximately four months before being let go, Claimant was an average employee, at least, and possibly even a good one. At that point, however, Claimant changed, leading to the accusations in this case. The court is not satisfied that the Board took into account the change. The Board does not mention the personal relationship between Claimant and his subordinate, the allegedly falsified time sheet, Claimant's lackluster handling of customer damage claims, and the confrontations between Claimant and his coworkers. Falsifying another's time sheet may be an isolated incident or it may itself be a willful or wanton act justifying discharge and disqualification. The Board must determine whether Claimant falsified a time sheet and if so, whether the Board considers it harmless and why.
McKoy v. Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, 1997 WL 819135, at *3 (Del.Super.) (citing Webb v. Interstate Battery, 1991 WL 53366, at *1 (Del.Super.) ("Falsification of time sheets can con stitute just cause for termination.").
Regarding Claimant's alleged insubordination, the Board found without explanation that "claimant was permitted to work at home." This is troubling in light of Atlantis's seemingly unrefuted evidence that Claimant's job responsibilities required him to be at work every morning. The Board also repeats a stipulated fact — that Claimant attempted to let his supervisor know about absences by email. The Board does not explain, however, why Claimant's emailing, rather than telephoning, his supervisor did not amount to insubordination and just cause for dismissal. Regarding the inventory issue, the Board says only that Claimant was "hampered by an ineffective inventory tracking system" and no evidence showed Claimant's responsibility for missing inventory. Yet, Atlantis's witness at the Board hearing spoke to that very thing. The Board's decision seemingly ignored Atlantis's witness. Finally, the Board recognizes Claimant's poor job performance, but merely states, again without explanation, that it does not demonstrate willful or wanton conduct.
Claimant knew the proper procedure for reporting absences and making inventory returns, and he must have known that falsifying a time sheet and angrily slamming an office door is not acceptable workplace behavior. Therefore, it is possible, as the appeals referee concluded, that Claimant acted willfully and wantonly under the circumstances. Again, the court is concerned that the Board recognized Claimant's chronic absenteeism and inadequate job performance, yet failed to explain why that was not cause for dismissal.
See Hundley v. Riverside Hospital, 1993 WL 542026 (Del.Super.) (employer may tolerate some expression of dissatisfaction by employee under certain circumstances, but slamming doors exceeds acceptable limit).
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the July 20, 2003 decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board awarding unemployment benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED for reconsideration and clarification as called for here. Under current administrative practice, on remand either party is entitled to a new hearing.
E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, Inc. v. Downes, 2003 WL 23274837, at *3 (Del.Super.) (citing Hitchens v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board of State of Delaware, 1987 WL 14872, at *1 (Del.Super.)).