Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:06-CV-132-Y.
May 16, 2007
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court has before it the motion to dismiss of defendant Diane Heslep under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (doc. #29). After review of the pleadings, the Court concludes that it should be DENIED.
I. Factual Background
Collectively, Plaintiffs are recording companies who own or control exclusive rights to copyrights in sound recordings. On February 17, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a copyright-infringement action against Heslep under 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. Plaintiffs assert that they own certain copyrighted sound recordings, including the recordings listed on Exhibit A attached to their amended complaint. Plaintiffs also assert ownership in certain unspecified sound recordings found in Exhibit B attached to their amended complaint. Exhibit B consists of several pages of computer-screen printouts listing numerous computer files of copyrighted sound recordings allegedly contained on Heslep's computer.
Plaintiffs claim that each of the sound recordings to which they assert ownership is subject to a valid certificate of copyright issued by the register of copyrights. Plaintiffs refer to these recordings as their copyrighted recordings, and contend that they hold the exclusive rights for the recordings' reproduction and distribution.
Defendant Dianae Heslep is a person who resides in this Court's district. Plaintiffs allege that
on January 6, 2005, at approximately 5:42 p.m., [Heslep], without the permission or consent of Plaintiffs, used an online media distribution system to distribute the copyrighted recordings to the public and/or to make the copyrighted recordings available for distribution to others, and that, on other occasions on or before January 6, 2005, and continuously through January 6, 2005, [Heslep], without the permission or consent of Plaintiffs, used an online media distribution system to download the copyrighted recordings, to distribute the copyrighted recordings to the public, and/or to make the copyrighted recordings available for distribution to others. In doing so, [Heslep] has violated Plaintiffs' exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution. [Heslep's] actions constitute infringement of Plaintiffs' copyrights and exclusive rights under copyright.
(Pls.' Compl. at 3.) Plaintiffs contend that they placed the proper notices of copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 401 on each respective album cover of each of their copyrighted recordings they allege Heslep infringed. For relief, Plaintiffs seek an injunction against Heslep's continued or future infringement, statutory damages, and attorney's fees.
II. Analysis
A. Standard
A motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court must accept as true all well pleaded, non-conclusory allegations in the complaint, must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050; Collins, et al. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent the granting of a motion to dismiss. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993); Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dept., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997); Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974). "Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief." Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 930 (5th Cir. 1995). A court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt from the face of the plaintiff's pleadings that he cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 938 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1991); Kaiser Aluminum, 677 F.2d at 1050.
The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2002).
B. Discussion
Heslep argues that Plaintiffs' amended complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In particular, Heslep objects to Plaintiffs' amended complaint because they "have failed to allege the requisite time of infringement under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a)." (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) She argues,
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege "during what time" the infringing acts occurred by any fair construction of that phrase, which necessarily requires that Plaintiffs state a beginning and ending date, unless, of course, the infringing conduct has not yet ended.(Id.) She contends this is necessary to give her fair notice of the claim being asserted against her so as to permit her the opportunity to file a responsive pleading and prepare an adequate defense. (Id. at 9.) The Court is confused, however, because in other parts of her motion Heslep asseverates,
Incredibly, the legal department [referring to the legal department of America Online] has confirmed the exact opposite of what is claimed in the amended complaint: [Heslep] was NOT herself online at the time in question. ( Id. at 2, n. 1.) (All caps emphasis in original, underline emphasis added.) . . .
Plaintiffs' amended complaint states a precise time at which [Heslep] was supposedly online accessing the Kazaa media service. Yet documents from [Heslep's] employer . . . establish beyond dispute that [Heslep] was at work at the time in question. . . . ( Id. at 3.) (Emphasis added.)
Undersigned counsel can assure the Court that we can establish beyond significant dispute each of the following: that [Heslep] was NOT online at the time in question; that any user of [Heslep's] account at the time in question is NOT a Texas citizen, was NOT in Texas at the time in question, and is therefore beyond this Court's jurisdiciton; that America Online cannot identify the computer in use at the time, . . . and that [Heslep] was able to obtain information regarding the use of her account at the time in question. . . . ( Id. at 5.) (All caps emphasis in original, underline emphasis added.)
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. See FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement need only "give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests." Arista Records LLC, et al. v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (N.D.Tex. 2006) (Means, J.). Based on Heslep's very emphatic and confident asseveration that she can prove she did not infringe on Plaintiffs' copyright recordings as alleged in their complaint, it is obvious to the Court that Plaintiffs' complaint gives Heslep all of the notice she needs to successfully defend against this law suit.
Nevertheless, Heslep contends that to allege copyright infringement, Plaintiffs are required to assert "by what acts and during what time the defendant infringed the copyright." (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) One of the many cases Heslep relies on for this assertion, Sefton v. Jew, 201 F. Supp. 2d 730 (W.D.Tex. 2001), has described this requirement as part of "a heightened pleading requirement" in applying Rule 8 to copyright-infringement cases. This Court has already rejected the notion that there is a heightened pleading standard for copyright-infringement cases under Rule 8. See Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (rejecting any heightened pleading standard for copyright-infringement cases). And indeed, so has the Supreme Court. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions. Rule 9(b), for example, provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or mistake. This Court, however, has declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts."); Leatherman v. Tarrant County-Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, et al., 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading standard under Rule 8 and recognizing only limited exceptions contained in Rule 9); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) ("To establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.").
Finally, Heslep argues dismissal is proper because Plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege enough time had elapsed to allow for someone to download one of Plaintiff's copyrighted recordings. She further argues that dismissal is proper because counsel for Plaintiffs is supposedly well aware that he cannot prove Plaintiffs' allegations of copyright infringement. And she argues that dismissal is proper because Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' amended complaint omits a very important piece of exculpatory evidence that she contends will prove her computer could not have been used in the alleged downloading or sharing of Plaintiffs' copyrighted recordings.
The problem with Heslep's arguments is that they are inappropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to accept all of the allegations in Plaintiffs' amended complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor. While the Court accepts that Heslep is remarkably confident in her ability to successfully defend against Plaintiffs' allegation of copyright infringement, for purposes of this motion, the Court must accept their allegations of her infringement as true.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Heslep's motion to dismiss is DENIED.