Opinion
July 8, 1952.
Harold B. Wahl, Jacksonville, Frank G. Kurka, Charles Cook Howell, Wilmington, N.C., and Russell L. Frink, Jacksonville, for petitioners.
F.C. Hillyer and R.Y. Patterson Jr., Tallahassee, for United States Sugar Corp.
Lewis W. Petteway, Tallahassee, Guyte P. McCord, Jr., and D. Fred McMullen, Tallahassee, for Florida R. Public Utilities Commission, respondents.
One phase of this case was adjudicated in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States Sugar Corp., Fla., 47 So.2d 513. The present phase arises from an order of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, dated January 30, 1950, directing petitioners to amend their published tariffs governing the transportation of sugar cane from the fields to the mill at Clewiston, so as to establish carload minimum weights of 36000 pounds from October 1st to midnight December 31st of each year (the first period of the harvest season) and 38000 pounds from January 1st to June 1st of each year (the second period of the harvest season) in lieu of carload minimum weights of 40000 pounds from October 1st, to January 31st and of 44000 pounds from February 1st to June 1st of each year. The said tariff was made effective retroactively to 12:01 A.M. October 15, 1949.
The Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission will hereinafter be referred to as the Commission and petitioners will hereinafter be referred to as the railroads. The railroads contend that the requirement of carload minimum weights of 40000 pounds from October 1st to January 31st and 44000 pounds from February 1st to June 1st of each year are not unreasonable and that the charges computed upon carload minimum weights in excess of 36000 pounds from October 1st to midnight December 31st of each year and 38000 pounds from January 1st in lieu of the larger amounts "have been, are and for the future will be unfair and unreasonable." The order of the commission found that to the extent that the weights exceeded or may exceed carload minima of 36000 pounds from October 1st to December 31st of each year, and 38000 pounds from January 1st to June 1st of each year, they are and for the future will be unreasonable.
The point for determination is whether or not the commission has the right to require the railroads to reduce the minimum carload weights in computing the transportation charges for the shipment of sugar cane from field to mill without regard to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rates for handling that will result from the reduction.
The gist of the railroads' contention is that the commission is without authority to reduce minimum carload weights without regard to the reasonableness of the charges for hauling that will result from the reduction. The commission takes the position that it had no concern with the rate that would result from the order under review and not only that, it refused to admit evidence relating to the result that would follow.
Carload weights are unquestionably the primary concern of the sugar corporation while rates are equally the concern of the railroads. They are so intermingled and the one is so affected by the other that there must be some consideration given to rates when carload weights are being raised or lowered to such an extent as to affect rates. The evidence here shows that more than half the cars loaded during the season in question exceeded established minimum weights and that the penalty for failure to meet the required minimum was assessed only against 3.6 of the total volume of cane that moved for the season.
The railroads also contend that the order of the commission will reduce from ten to thirteen per cent the present minimum carload charges for transporting sugar cane from field to mill and the commission admits that this contention is in part true. It is further contended that this reduction had a devastating effect on the present low minimum carload charges, yet the commission refused to hear evidence on the issue. If it is true that the minimum weight reduction had a depressing effect on carload rates, the failure and refusal of the commission to hear evidence on and consider the issue so raised, was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of authority.
This brings us to a consideration of the second question presented, which is very closely related to the first and has to do with what the evidence shows as to how the carload minimum weights were not without difficulty in most instances. It is admitted, and the evidence shows, that 18900 cars handled during the season failed to meet the minimum weights. It is further shown that 85 per cent of all cars were loaded to or above 36000 and 38000 pounds, though it is shown that the 40000 and 44000 pound minima had been restored. It is also shown that the cars were of uniform size and capacity and that many of them were loaded much heavier than the 40000 pound minima, the restoration of which precipitated this litigation.
The commission contends that the railroads cannot in reason impose charges on the basis of minimum weights greater than the physical capacity of the car. As heretofore pointed out, the sugar cane cars are regular in size and capacity and it is shown that they could carry the load imposed on them. It is true, that some of them were not loaded to capacity but this was not due to any fault on the part of the railroads. It is further significant that in this case no consideration whatever was given to minimum weights. The application for rehearing on the part of the railroads proferred facts in the way of exhibits and other evidence to demonstrate all this and show that the shippers were in position to meet the minimum weights in all or substantially all cases, but their application was denied. This proffer was material to the main issue in the case and its refusal was arbitrary and unreasonable.
Other questions contend that the order of the commission was retroactive and that it was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter of weights and rates in a case like this. These questions have been considered but they present no reversible error so it becomes unnecessary to discuss them. We do not overlook the contention of the commissioners that by Section 350.12(2) (m), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., its orders shall be deemed to be prima facie just and reasonable "unless the contrary plainly appears * * * by clear and satisfactory evidence, and shall not be set aside or held invalid unless the contrary so appears."
We appreciate the force of this mandate, at the same time it implies nothing in the way of infallibility and from what we have pointed out it clearly appears that the order appealed from was unreasonable in that the Commission refused to hear evidence or make any determination as to the manner in which its order affected the railroads. Certiorari is granted and the order appealed from is quashed.
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, ROBERTS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
SEBRING, C.J., and MURPHREE, Associate Justice, dissent.