Opinion
AV92000645.
March 11, 1994. Rehearing Denied April 15, 1994. Certiorari Denied August 12, 1994 Alabama Supreme Court 1931088.
Appeal from the Mobile Circuit Court, Rosemary de Juan Chambers, J.
Claude D. Boone, Mobile, for appellant.
Robert E. McDonald, Jr., Mobile, for appellee.
This post-divorce proceeding began when John E. Atchison filed a motion for a register's deed to effectuate the conveyance of the former wife's interest in the marital residence. Ultimately, following ore tenus proceedings, the trial court granted the motion and also ordered that the residence be sold after the youngest child reached the age of majority. The former husband appeals, contending that the later portion of the order was an impermissible modification of the property provisions of the 1990 divorce judgment.
The law is clear that property provisions of a divorce judgment become final and are not modifiable after 30 days from the date of the judgment. Smith v. Smith, 491 So.2d 983 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986); Robinson v. Robinson, 410 So.2d 426 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). Although a divorce judgment is final and not modifiable, it continues to be interlocutory in nature in the event it becomes necessary to refine, clarify, implement, or enforce its provisions. Boyd v. Boyd, 447 So.2d 790 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984); Mayhan v. Mayhan, 395 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981).
The divorce judgment in the instant case refers to the sale of the homeplace but makes no provision regarding the conditions or the time of that sale. The transcript of the testimony discloses the ambiguity by revealing that the parties had differing beliefs regarding the meaning of that provision. A court rendering a judgment has the inherent power to enforce its judgment and to make further orders as may be necessary to render it effective. Patchett v. Patchett, 469 So.2d 642 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985). Additionally, a trial court is empowered to correct an omission of the original divorce judgment to make it accurately reflect the court's intentions. See Ward v. Ullery, 442 So.2d 99 (Ala.Civ.App. 1983).
Our careful and thorough review of the record reveals that the trial court in this instance did not modify the property provision of the 1990 divorce judgment. The order was necessary to clarify the provision in the prior judgment, and to render it effective. We find no error.
The former wife's request for attorney fees in this appeal is denied.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs specially.
YATES, J., dissents.
I concur with the law as written in Judge Thigpen's opinion; however, my interpretation of the original judgment of divorce and the trial court's order, which is the subject of this appeal, differs from both Judge Thigpen and Judge Yates's interpretations.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court in this instance clearly modified the property division in the original divorce judgment. The trial judge on the post-judgment proceedings, no doubt, viewed the agreement based on the equities existing at that time. However, the intentions of the parties at the time the agreement is entered into must be determined.
A review of the entire agreement makes it absolutely clear that the homeplace was to be sold, as the wife testified, within a "reasonable time" following the divorce. Paragraph 6 of the agreement stated:
"6. That the [wife] shall convey to the [husband] all of her right, title and interest in and to the jointly owned homeplace located at 438 Scott Drive, Saraland, Alabama. Said conveyance shall be subject to a lien in the sum of $15,000.00. Said conveyance shall be satisfied upon the sale of the homeplace."
The parties to this divorce, by agreement, divided everything equally. Each party waived alimony, each was awarded custody of one minor child, and, because the husband's earnings were twice those of the wife, he was required to pay the wife $300 per month child support.
Each party was to maintain hospitalization insurance on the minor child in his or her custody. Each party was awarded the money in his or her own savings account, and the parties equally divided the Christmas Club account. Each party was awarded the vehicle he or she was driving. The personal property also appears to have been equally divided. There were no outstanding debts of the marriage, and each party was to pay his or her attorney's fees.
In view of the entire agreement, I find Paragraph 6 to be absolutely clear: that the parties intended and agreed that the house would be sold "within a reasonable time" following the divorce and that the wife would then receive $15,000 pursuant to her lien on the property. It is inconceivable, given the agreement in its entirety, that the wife would consent to allow the husband, as he testified, to live in the homeplace forever if he so chose. This would preclude her from ever collecting the $15,000 secured by the lien. Therefore, in my opinion, the trial court erred in granting the motion for a register's deed and to further modify the property division.