Opinion
No. 5001514.
December 11, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, Joseph Somers, engaged the plaintiff law firm, Asselin Connolly, LLC, to represent him in a dissolution of marriage action. On July 11, 2003, the parties entered into a written representation agreement which set forth, inter alia, that "all disputes and/or claims either may have against the other which are in excess of $3500.00" would be submitted to binding arbitration.
The plaintiff billed the defendant for approximately $30,500 in outstanding legal fees. When the defendant failed to pay the fees, the plaintiff sought binding arbitration. On September 27, 2006, a preliminary telephone hearing was held whereby the plaintiff, the defendant and the arbitrator discussed the scheduling of the arbitration hearing. Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2006, defendant's counsel filed an appearance and a motion to stay the arbitration proceedings. On October 24, 2006, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to stay seeking a court order to compel the defendant to proceed with arbitration in compliance with the terms of the written representation agreement.
The court notes that the defendant's motion to stay the arbitration proceedings consists solely of one sentence: "The petitioner, Joseph Somers, hereby moves that the arbitration between the plaintiff and defendant be stayed as it is contrary to the laws and policies of the State of Connecticut." The defendant has not filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion to stay.
DISCUSSION
"It is well established that [a]rbitration is a creature of contract . . . It is designed to avoid litigation and secure prompt settlement of disputes . . . [A] person can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute only if, to the extent that, and in the manner which, he has agreed so to do . . . No one can be forced to arbitrate a contract dispute who has not previously agreed so to do . . . Moreover, [i]t is the province of the parties to set the limits of the authority of the arbitrators, and the parties will be bound by the limits they have fixed . . . The arbitration provision in an agreement is, in effect, a separate and distinct agreement. Courts of law can enforce only such agreements as the parties actually make." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MBNA America Bank v. Boata, 94 Conn.App. 559, 563, 893 A.2d 479 (2006).
"[Section] 52-408 evinces a public policy favoring arbitration as a vehicle for dispute resolution. It provides in relevant part that `[a]n agreement in any written contract, or in a separate writing executed by the parties to any written contract, to settle by arbitration any controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, or out of the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . to arbitrate any controversy which may arise between them in the future . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Cotrone, 81 Conn.App. 755, 758, 841 A.2d 1199 (2004).
"General Statutes § 52-410(a) provides for the enforcement of such agreements. It provides in relevant part that `[a] party to a written agreement for arbitration claiming the neglect or refusal of another to proceed with an arbitration thereunder may make application to the superior court . . . for an order directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in compliance with their agreement . . .' When confronted with such an application, the task of the court is to determine whether the parties did, in fact, enter into an agreement and whether the agreement provides for arbitration . . . Additionally, the issue of whether the parties to a contract have agreed to arbitration implicates their intention, an issue of fact for the court's determination." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Cotrone, supra, 81 Conn.App. 758.
In the present case, this court finds that the agreement to arbitrate is in writing. The defendant's initials on the bottom of page one and his signature on page two of the representation agreement suffices to bind him to the arbitration provision in paragraph four of the same document. The arbitration language in paragraph four is clear and direct, therefore, the agreement is enforceable.
Additionally, as noted by the plaintiff in its opposition to the motion to stay, the defendant has failed to supply the court with a memorandum of law in support of his argument that arbitration would be contrary to the laws and policies of the State of Connecticut in this case. "[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to [the] court through an inadequate brief . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valentine v. LaBow, 95 Conn.App. 436, 452, 897 A.2d 624 (2006). "These same principles apply to claims raised in the trial court." Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the above foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to stay arbitration and sustains the plaintiff's objection to same. The court further orders the defendant to proceed with the arbitration in compliance with the terms of the written representation agreement.