Opinion
H049403
03-14-2024
JASON ASHTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RICHARD A. CLARKE, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV133094
Greenwood, P. J.
This is the second appeal in a civil action between neighbors, appellant Jason Ashton and respondent Richard Clarke, over damage caused by a landslide from the property of the original defendant in this action, Edwin Etherington (Defendant). In 2003, pursuant to Ashton's motion to enforce a settlement agreement between Ashton and Defendant, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay Ashton money to build a wall between their properties. A few years after Defendant paid Ashton, Defendant assigned all rights to the debris wall to respondent Clarke.
For clarity, we shall refer to the original defendant, Etherington, in this action as Defendant and the parties in this appeal, the assignees, Ashton and Clarke, by their surnames.
In the prior appeal, Ashton v. Clarke (Jan. 14, 2021, H045967) [nonpub. opn.] (Ashton v. Clarke I), Clarke successfully argued the 2003 court order was void. We reversed the order and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether to set aside the void 2003 order. The trial court then set aside the 2003 order and, at Clarke's request, ordered Ashton to pay Clarke restitution for the money previously paid by Defendant to Ashton under the 2003 order, along with interest.
Ashton now appeals the order for restitution arguing, among other things, Clarke lacked standing to seek restitution. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the trial court's restitution order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case has a long history, some of which is detailed in Ashton v. Clarke I. We recite only the factual and procedural background from our prior opinion necessary to resolve the issues in this appeal, in addition to the information provided in the record for this appeal.
In 1996, landslides originating on Defendant's property damaged properties belonging to his neighbors, Clarke and Jacob Eringer. Clarke and Eringer each filed separate lawsuits against Defendant in the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County. The lawsuits, and related cross-complaints filed by Defendant, were consolidated. Due to a conflict unrelated to this appeal, the trial court transferred the consolidated case to the Superior Court of Monterey County. While the case was pending in 1998, Eringer sold his property and assigned his rights in the case to Ashton. The trial court denied Ashton's request to be added as a party in Eringer's case against Defendant and, thus, Ashton remained an assignee of Eringer's rights in the case as opposed to a party plaintiff.
In 1999, Defendant entered into separate settlement agreements with Clarke (Clarke settlement) and with Ashton and Eringer (Ashton/Eringer settlement). The Clarke settlement required Defendant to pay Clarke $205,000 and hold an additional sum of $60,000 in a trust account for Defendant to hire contractors to build a debris wall. Clarke was to pay Defendant $25,000. Neither Eringer nor Ashton were parties to Clarke's settlement agreement with Defendant. The Ashton/Eringer settlement required Defendant to pay Eringer $135,000, and Eringer to pay Defendant $75,000 for Defendant
3 to build a debris wall at the base of his property. Clarke was not a party to the settlement agreement between Ashton, Eringer and Defendant. Following these settlements, the case was dismissed with prejudice in late 1999.
Between 2001 and 2003, Ashton filed motions to enforce the Ashton/Eringer settlement against Defendant, claiming Defendant failed to build the debris wall promised under their agreement. Clarke opposed the motions, asserting the wall contemplated in the Ashton/Eringer settlement interfered with Clarke's settlement agreement with Defendant and Clarke's plans to build a wall to protect Clarke's property. It appears that in 2000, Clarke and Defendant modified their settlement in which the $60,000 originally held in trust for Defendant to build the wall would be given to Clarke to build the debris wall required under the Clarke settlement.
Ultimately, on June 12, 2003, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay Ashton $95,000 so that Ashton could have the debris wall built himself (the 2003 order). The 2003 order states, in part: "1. [Defendant] is ordered to pay Jason Ashton the sum of $95,000. Said sum of $95,000 will be deposited into a separate bank account and used to pay the engineering costs, permit fees and construction costs for a wall to be constructed at the base of Blueberry Hill between the Ashton and [Defendant] properties. [¶] 2. Ashton is granted authority to act on behalf of [Defendant] in obtaining permits and plans and the construction of the wall."
In November 2004, pursuant to the 2003 order, Defendant paid Ashton the sum of $110,300, which included accrued legal interest. A few months later, Clarke filed an enforcement motion in the consolidated case requesting Ashton to provide an update on the construction of the wall required under the 2003 order. Ashton opposed the motion, arguing Clarke was neither a party to his former lawsuit against Defendant nor a party in the Ashton/Eringer settlement and thus had no grounds to insert himself in the dispute between Ashton and Defendant. The trial court denied Clarke's motion, concluding the
4 court's involvement was not necessary because the city was already proceeding with Ashton's application for construction of the debris wall.
On May 4, 2006, Defendant executed an "Assignment of Rights" (Assignment), assigning the following to Clarke: "1. All rights, claim, title, and interest to the debris wall that was order [sic] by the Monterey Court to be built by Jason Ashton on my property. [¶] 2. All rights to maintain, or prosecute any and all legal causes of action to enforce this obligation against Jason Ashton." The Assignment included introductory language summarizing the litigation and the following: "To date, Ashton has not build [sic] the debris wall and he now informs Clarke that he has spent the $110,000 elsewhere and intends to sell the property 'as is' without constructing the debris wall. Clarke and [Defendant] think that Ashton's actions are wrong, that the money should stay with the land and be spent on the intended debris wall or as otherwise agreed by the parties. [¶] Since Clarke's home is downhill of the intended debris wall and since Clarke owns an easement on the debris wall site, Clarke clearly has the primary interest in the debris wall. This ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS is hereby executed to enable Clarke to file a lawsuit against Ashton to enforce the Ashton/[Defendant] settlement agreement regards [sic] expenditure of said money."
Over the next 16 years, disputes continued between Ashton and Clarke over the construction of the debris wall, with each side faulting the other for delays in constructing the wall. Defendant-whose direct involvement in the dispute decreased over time- passed away in 2014. That same year, as Defendant's assignee under the Assignment, Clarke sought orders for contempt against Ashton for failing to comply with the 2003
Ashton requests we take judicial notice of a police report concerning Ashton's allegation that Clarke trespassed onto his property in 2019. We deny the request because the document is irrelevant to the issues on appeal and not a matter that we can properly consider on appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.; Barri v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 437.)
5 order to build the wall. In 2015, the trial court ordered Ashton to complete the wall by July 2015.
When Ashton still had not built the wall by 2016, Clarke filed a "motion to enforce settlement agreement." Ashton opposed the motion, in part, on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction as the case had already been dismissed in 1999. Agreeing with Ashton, the trial court denied Clarke's motion stating, in part, "Here, the case was dismissed in 1999. Thus, the court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] § 664.6. It is true that the parties have been before the court many times since 1999, and the court has taken action to enforce the settlement many times. However, the jurisdictional issue was never raised in the past. Moving party did not present any authority or basis to enforce any other orders."
The record is unclear as to what settlement agreement Clarke sought to enforce in his motion.
Thereafter, Clarke initiated contempt proceedings against Ashton for failing to comply with the 2015 court order requiring him to complete the wall by July 2015. The trial court again denied Clarke's request on the basis of jurisdiction, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to make the post-dismissal order requiring Ashton to complete the wall by July 2015. Since the 2015 court order was invalid, the court could not enforce it by way of contempt.
In 2018, citing the two orders denying his requests for relief based on a lack of jurisdiction, Clarke filed a motion to set aside the 2003 order, alleging it was void on its face for lack of jurisdiction, as the case had been dismissed in 1999 without any reservation of jurisdiction. Clarke also asked the court to order Ashton to make restitution to Clarke in the amount paid to Ashton by Defendant under the 2003 order, that Ashton be made a constructive trustee of the money he had received, and/or that the court impose an equitable lien on Ashton's property. The trial court denied Clarke's
6 motion to set aside, finding the 2003 order was not void. Clarke appealed that order in Ashton v. Clarke I.
In the prior appeal, we reversed the trial court's order. We concluded that, after the case was dismissed in 1999, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to make the 2003 order and thus the 2003 order was void. We remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether to set aside the void 2003 order. We declined to address Clarke's request for restitution as premature at that time.
On remand, on May 14, 2021, the trial court granted Clarke's request to set aside the 2003 order, and set a further hearing date and briefing schedule for Clarke's request for restitution. In his pleadings, Clarke claimed he was entitled to restitution for the $110,300 paid by Defendant to Ashton because Clarke was Defendant's assignee. Clarke alleged that, on May 4, 2006, he became "the assignee of the rights of [Defendant]" by virtue of the Assignment executed on that date, a copy of which he attached to his declaration. Ashton opposed the request on the same grounds asserted in this appeal, except as to the issue of standing, which Ashton asserts for the first time on this appeal.
The May 2021 order setting aside the 2003 order is not before us on this appeal. Ashton's notice of appeal identified only the July 2021 order and no separate notice of appeal for the May 2021 order has been filed. (Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 625 [when a notice of appeal manifests a clear intent to appeal only from one order, we cannot construe the notice to apply to a different, omitted order]; Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1007 [separately appealable orders occurring close in time must be expressly specified in a single notice or multiple notices to be reviewable on appeal].)
After briefing and oral arguments from Ashton and Clarke, the trial court granted Clarke's request for restitution and ordered Ashton to pay restitution to Clarke "in the amount of $110,200 plus interest at 7% interest starting November 4, 2004." In reaching its conclusion at the hearing, the trial court stated, "The Court does find that Mr. Ashton is in the unusual position of having obtained the order in 2003 to enforce the settlement, and then in 2016 successfully argued that the Court didn't have jurisdiction to enforce it.
7 From the receipt of the funds in November of 2004 through Mr. Clarke's motion to enforce in 2016, Mr. Ashton did not complete the wall. [¶] . . . And equity is served by ordering restitution of the full amount that was paid under the void order [with interest at 7% from and after November 4, 2004]...."
Ashton appealed the trial court's order awarding restitution.
Ashton requests we strike all or portions of the respondent's brief because Clarke did not provide headings in his brief and, instead, copied the headings from Ashton's brief and added his response below each of Ashton's headings. We conclude the format of Clarke's brief is compliant with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204. Ashton also claims Clarke failed to provide adequate legal authority but does not specify exactly which issue was lacking in legal authority. Nonetheless, we will disregard any issue that is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.)
Ashton contends the trial court erred in awarding restitution to Clarke because (1) Clarke lacks standing; (2) restitution is a claim for assumpsit requiring a jury trial; (3) the circumstances-Clarke's alleged misconduct and Ashton's reliance on the 2003 order-do not justify the award and Ashton is entitled to a setoff for funds already spent on the wall; and (4) the amount awarded is unjust and inequitable. Clarke contests each of these arguments. He contends he has standing as Defendant's assignee under the Assignment executed by Defendant in 2006, and the award was the only fair resolution because Ashton failed to build the wall after 18 years. We conclude Clarke did not have standing to seek restitution under the Assignment. Given our conclusion, we do not address the other arguments on appeal.
Clarke uses the terms "assignee" and "successor in interest" interchangeably. These terms have different legal meanings. (Compare Cal. Concrete Co. v. Beverly Hills Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 260, 272 [successor in interest becomes the entity it replaces] with Cal. Insurance Guarantee Assn. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1335 [assignee receives rights transferred to it pursuant to an agreement].) As Clarke has clarified through his supplemental briefing, he is Defendant's assignee, not successor in interest.
8
A. Authority to Consider Standing and Standard of Review
Ashton raised the issue of standing for the first time on this appeal. While generally an objection that was not raised in the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, because a contention based on a lack of standing involves a jurisdictional challenge, it may be raised at any time in the proceeding. (Common Cause of Cal. v. Bd. of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 438; Steadman v. Osborne (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 950, 954-955 ["It is well settled that a party may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal."].)
"Courts will decline to resolve lawsuits that do not present a justiciable controversy, and justiciability 'involves the intertwined criteria of ripeness and standing.' [Citation.]" (County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 813.) "Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) "The real party in interest is generally the person who has the right to sue under the substantive law. [Citation.] 'A party who is not the real party in interest lacks standing to sue because the claim belongs to someone else.' [Citation.]" (River's Side at Wash. Square Homeowners Assn. v. Super. Ct. of Yolo County (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1225 (River's Side).)
The facts on the issue of standing are not in dispute here. Pursuant to the 2003 order, Defendant paid $110,300 to Ashton to construct a wall. In 2006, Defendant executed the Assignment, transferring to Clarke all "rights, claim, title, and interest to the debris wall" that was ordered by the court to be built by Ashton on Defendant's property, inclusive of all rights to maintain or prosecute all legal causes of action to enforce this obligation against Ashton. The Assignment is Clarke's only basis for standing to seek restitution. In 2022, at Clarke's request, the trial court set aside the 2003 order and ordered Ashton to repay the amount of $110,300 paid by Defendant, with interest, to Clarke. The question before us is whether Clarke had standing to request restitution of the monies paid by Defendant. As the facts are not in dispute, we decide the issue of standing as a matter of law. (See, e.g., San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. Cal. Horse Racing Board (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 74; Babbitt v. Super. Ct. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1143.)
We requested, received, and reviewed supplemental briefing on this issue from the parties.
B. The Assignment Did Not Include the Right to Restitution
Clarke contends that as Defendant's assignee, he stands in Defendant's shoes and is entitled to receive the monies paid by Defendant pursuant to the 2003 order now set aside. Ashton argues Clarke did not have standing in the underlying action because (1) the Assignment is invalid as it was not recorded and contains untrue allegations, (2) the Assignment is void as it is based on the void 2003 order, and because (3) Clarke has no ownership interest in the monies paid by Defendant under the 2003 order.
We first reject Ashton's argument that the Assignment is invalid because it was not recorded. "A thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner." (Civ. Code, § 954.) "An assignment requires very little by way of formalities and is essentially free from substantive restrictions. '[I]n the absence of [a] statute or a contract provision to the contrary, there are no prescribed formalities that must be observed to make an effective assignment. It is sufficient if the assignor has, in some fashion, manifested an intention to make a present transfer of his rights to the assignee.' [Citations.]" (Amalgamated Transit Union, Loc. 1756, AFL-CIO v. Super. Ct. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1002 (Amalgamated).) "[T]he assignment [of judgment rights] is enforceable against third parties regardless of whether the assignment has been recorded or filed." (Fjaeran v. Bd. of Supervisors of San Bernardino County (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 434, 440, italics omitted.) There is no requirement that the Assignment here be recorded to be valid.
We also find unpersuasive Ashton's contention that the Assignment is invalid because it contains false statements in the introductory provisions of the document (i.e., that Ashton had no intention to build the wall, that he spent the money elsewhere, etc.). Ashton has not provided any authority to support this contention. Based on the authorities above that recognize enforcement of assignments regardless of the absence of formalities, we conclude the Assignment is valid because it contains language manifesting Defendant's intent to transfer rights to Clarke; the inclusion of introductory language disputed by the parties does not render it invalid. (Amalgamated, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1002.)
Ashton's citations to legal authorities affecting real property are inapplicable here because the Assignment concerns personal property. Further, the cases cited do not consider the validity of assignments. (See Devereaux v. Frazier Mountain Park &Fisheries Co. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 323 [evidentiary issues involving old, missing and lost documents in quiet title action]; Evarts v. Jones (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 623 [res judicata effect of a judgment quieting title].)" 'An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.' [Citation.]" (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 680.)
The remainder of the parties' arguments require that we determine what rights, if any, Clarke possessed under the Assignment. To resolve that threshold issue, we turn to the language of the Assignment.
We interpret an assignment using the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. (Kennecott Corp. v. Union Oil Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1179, 1189.)" 'The burden of proving an assignment falls upon the party asserting rights thereunder [citations].' [Citation.]" (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 988 (Heritage).) "Although the general rule in California is that choses in action or other personal rights to claim money are freely assignable, . . . the assignment must describe the subject matter of the assignment with sufficient particularity to identify the rights assigned." (Mission Valley East, Inc. v. County of Kern (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 89, 96-97.) "As with contracts generally, the nature of an assignment is determined by ascertaining the intent of the parties." (Heritage, supra, at pp. 988-989.) The goal of contractual interpretation is "to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Civ. Code, § 1636.) "The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity." (Id. § 1638.) "When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible...." (Id. § 1639.)
Clarke's position is that the Assignment gave him all rights that Defendant would have been entitled to in the action, including the right to receive restitution after the 2003 order was set aside. (See Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 616, 619 ["A person whose property has been taken under a judgment 'is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless restitution would be inequitable.' [Citation.]"]; Code Civ. Proc., § 908.) We conclude that Clarke's argument is not supported by the language of the Assignment.
The Assignment did not assign to Clarke all rights in the lawsuit as between Defendant and Ashton, nor all rights arising under the 2003 order. Instead, the document expressly limits Defendant's assignment to all rights and interests "to the debris wall that was order[ed] by the Monterey Court to be built by Jason Ashton," and all rights to maintain or prosecute "all legal causes of action to enforce this obligation against Jason Ashton." (Italics added.) Therefore, the plain and unambiguous language of the Assignment shows the parties' intent to assign to Clarke only Defendant's rights to the debris wall that was to be built by Ashton and to enforce Ashton's construction of that wall under the 2003 order. Such intent is likewise shown in the introductory paragraphs in the Assignment wherein Defendant asserts that the sums he paid to Ashton "should stay with the land and be spent on the intended debris wall."
In support of his argument, Clarke relies on Searles Valley Minerals Operations Inc. v. Ralph M. Parsons Service Co. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402 (Searles). In that case, the assignor and defendant entered a contract for defendant to build a processing plant, and defendant agreed to indemnify assignor for death or injury arising out of work performed under the contract. (Id. at p. 1397.) Assignor then sold the processing plant to assignee and assigned its rights to assignee, including assignor's rights under its contract with defendant. (Id. at pp. 1397-1398.) One of assignee's employees was killed while working at the plant and a wrongful death action commenced against assignor and defendant. (Id. at p. 1398.) Assignor tendered the defense to assignee, and, after the conclusion of the wrongful death action, the assignee sought indemnification from defendant for its attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuit. (Ibid.) The question on appeal was whether the assignee was entitled, under the indemnity provision of the contract between assignor and defendant, to recover its defense costs from the defendant. (Id. at p. 1397.) The Court of Appeal held the assignee of contract indemnification rights stands in the shoes of the indemnitee. (Id. at p. 1396.)
We are not persuaded that Searles is applicable here, and find it distinguishable from the case before us. Unlike the assignee in Searles, Clarke was not assigned any indemnification rights or contractual rights belonging to Defendant. While Clarke stands in the shoes of Defendant as his assignee, the Assignment defines the scope of Clarke's standing which, as explained above, is limited to enforcement of Ashton's obligation to build the debris wall pursuant to the 2003 order, and whatever rights to the debris wall conferred by the 2003 order.
We do not have authority to extend rights to Clarke that are not stated in the Assignment." '[A] basic tenet of California contract law dictates that when a particular right or set of rights is defined in an assignment, additional rights not similarly defined or named cannot be considered part of the rights transferred.' [Citation.]" (Heritage, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 991 [lender's assignment of promissory note to assignee did not authorize assignee to sue borrower for fraud where the assignment did not show intent to also assign fraud claim]; Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 949, 956-957 [divorce agreement awarding" 'the exclusive right, title and possession'" of a diamond ring purchased by husband to wife did not automatically assign husband's claim against the seller of the ring for fraud].)
For example, in Mayer v. C.W. Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 58, the Court of Appeal concluded that an assignment for all" 'right, title and interest in and to the Lawsuit'" and all" 'successor and replacement [] suits'" did not entail an assignment of claims not yet discovered at the time of the assignment where the assignment did not include language indicating the assignment would be for all known and unknown claims. Similarly, here, the Assignment did not include language to show Defendant intended to also transfer to Clarke his right to be returned the monies he previously paid to Ashton if the court later set aside the 2003 order. Stated simply, the Assignment did not transfer to Clarke all known and unknown claims arising under the 2003 order.
Considering our conclusion, we need not address Ashton's argument on whether the Assignment is void because the 2003 order was set aside and the other arguments raised in his opening brief.
While not addressed by either party in this appeal, we are aware that an assignment of a right generally carries with it an assignment of other rights incidental to it. (Civ. Code, § 1084.) Appellate courts have held incidental rights to include the right to attorney fees and costs to pursue an assigned claim (Vons Cos., Inc. v. Lyle Parks Jr., Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 823, 833), and the right to defend assigned interests. (Cal. Bank &Trust v. Piedmont Operating Partnership, L.P. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1348.) The restitution right in this case, however, is not incidental to the rights assigned to Clarke (i.e., the right under the 2003 order that Ashton construct the debris wall, and the right to enforce its construction). The right to restitution cannot be an incidental right because it is antithetical to the rights of construction and enforcement assigned to Clarke. A restitution award is premised on the 2003 order being set aside or, in other words, it is premised on the 2003 order not being enforced. Thus, to construe the Assignment as also providing an incidental right for Clarke to receive restitution after the 2003 order was set aside would be contrary to the expressed intent of the Assignment for Clarke to enforce the 2003 order on Defendant's behalf.
In conclusion, because the Assignment did not include a transfer of Defendant's right to restitution for the now set aside 2003 order, Clarke lacks standing to request and receive restitution of the funds paid by Defendant to Ashton. On this basis, the order awarding restitution to Clarke is reversed.
We are not unsympathetic to Clarke's position that Ashton, having received the money from Defendant in 2004 to build the debris wall, never built the wall. We are also aware that Ashton and Clarke each fault the other for interfering with construction of the wall. However, the sum of $110,300 paid to Ashton in 2004 came out of Defendant's pocket, not Clarke's pocket, and, based on the record, the right to recover that sum was never assigned or transferred to Clarke. Thus, there was nothing for the trial court to "return" to Clarke following reversal of the 2003 order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 908 [following reversal, courts have the discretion to return the parties "so far as possible to the positions they occupied before the enforcement of or execution on the judgment or order."].)
Ashton claims that, of the amount Defendant was ordered to pay pursuant to the 2003 order, $75,000 of said sum originated from monies that Eringer (Ashton's assignor) paid to Defendant pursuant to the Ashton/Eringer settlement agreement with Defendant.
That said, our opinion is limited to only the facts presented by the parties on this appeal, with the result that Clarke, under the Assignment, lacks standing to seek restitution on Defendant's behalf. We express no opinion as to whether a claim for restitution lies with Defendant's estate, heirs, personal representative, or successor in interest, as neither party has argued that point and Clarke concedes his only purported right to seek restitution was based on the Assignment. (See River's Side, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [" 'A party who is not the real party in interest lacks standing to sue because the claim belongs to someone else.' [Citation.]"].)
III. Disposition
The trial court's order entered on July 2, 2021, modified July 6, 2021, is reversed. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, J. Wilson, J.