Opinion
01 Civ. 4051 (GWG)
November 14, 2002
Miguel Arreaga, Pro Se, Bronx, New York, For Plaintiff.
James B. Comey, Jr., United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, By: Lorraine Novinski, Assistant United States Attorney, New York, New York, For Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Miguel Arreaga brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying him disability benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner has moved for judgment on the pleadings affirming her decision that Arreaga is not disabled. The parties have consented to this matter being determined by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion is granted.
Because Jo Anne B. Barnhart became the Commissioner of Social Security on November 9, 2001, she is substituted as the defendant in this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Arreaga's Claim for Benefits
Arreaga applied for disability benefits on July 15, 1999. R. 46-49. His application was denied initially and again on reconsideration. R. 24-27, 31-33. Arreaga requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), R. 34, which was held on July 6, 2000. R. 141. Arreaga appeared at the hearing without legal representation and testified through an interpreter. R. 141-52. Following the hearing, on January 25, 2001, the ALJ ruled that Arreaga was not disabled and not entitled to benefits. R. 10-21. Arreaga sought review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration, R. 9, which denied his request on April 12, 2001. R. 5-8.
"R." refers to the administrative record relating to Arreaga's application.
On May 14, 2001, Arreaga filed the instant complaint seeking review of the denial of his claim. Barnhart moved for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss the case on April 11, 2002. Arreaga did not respond to this motion. On June 6, 2002, the Court issued an order directing him to respond to the Commissioner's motion, warning him that if he failed to do so his case might be dismissed. To date, Arreaga still has not responded to the Commissioner's motion.
B. Evidence Presented at the Hearing Before the ALJ 1. Arreaga's Testimony
Arreaga was born on July 13, 1946, in Ecuador. R. 144-45. He testified that he completed nine years of school while in Ecuador. R. 145. Arreaga is able to speak very little English. Id. Arreaga currently resides with his wife, his mother in law and her husband in the Bronx. R. 144.
Up until November or December 1998, Arreaga worked as a fabric cutter. R. 146. He testified that he worked in this position for 20 years. R. 146. His job entailed cutting fabric that was delivered to him and then putting the cut product into a box that another person took away. R. 146-47. Arreaga left his job in 1998 after he developed a cough that, eventually, led to an operation. R. 147. Arreaga claims that he is currently unable to work due to pain in his lower back, an inability to breathe well, and various other ailments. R. 147-50. Arreaga testified that he has pain from holding items and is unable to walk more than four to five blocks at a time. R. 149. He is able to travel by subway and bus, although his lower back hurts when he gets on a bus. R. 145.
On his application for disability benefits Arreaga indicated that he became unable to work on July 9, 1999. See R. 46.
Arreaga wrote on his Disability Report, however, that he worked in this position for nine years. See R. 55.
2. Medical Evidence
Arreaga's medical records showed that he was admitted to Lincoln Hospital on July 12, 1999, due to complaints of a repeated productive cough. R. 120. A CT scan of Arreaga's chest revealed that he had a mass in his chest abutting his left pericardium. R. 122. In addition, a CT scan of his pelvis revealed that he had a nodule in his right inguinal hernia. Id. Arreaga was discharged on July 16, 1999. R. 121.
On July 19, 1999, Arreaga was re-admitted to Lincoln Hospital for surgery to remove the mass in his chest. R. 103. After the surgery, Arreaga developed a pneumonia that was treated through intravenous antibiotics. Id. Arreaga was discharged on August 1, 1999, and directed to follow a regular diet and resume all pre-hospital activities. Id. Arreaga was readmitted for surgery to repair his hernia on August 19, 1999. R. 123-24.
Dr. Roberto, a physician at Lincoln Hospital, examined Arreaga after the surgeries. R. 88-92. Dr. Roberto's report indicates that the chest and pelvic conditions were well healed and Arreaga's only remaining condition was herpes lesions on his lip. R. 88. No information was recorded at this time regarding Arreaga's ability to conduct physical actions such as standing, sitting, lifting or carrying. R. 91. Arreaga was informed that he did not have cancer by Dr. Roberto on November 5, 1999. R. 93.
On November 9, 1999, Arreaga underwent an examination of his physical functional capacity. R. 94-101. The examining physician, Dr. Baum, found that Arreaga had no exertional, postural, manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitations. R. 95-98.
Arreaga underwent a second examination of his physical functional capacity on December 7, 1999. R. 104-11. This time the examining physician, Dr. Ford, found no postural, manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitations. R. 106-08. However, Dr. Ford found that Arreaga did have certain "exertional limitations": specifically, that he could lift 50 pounds "occasionally" and 25 pounds "frequently." R. 105.
At the hearing, the ALJ arranged for a new medical examination of Arreaga, R. 150-51, which was conducted Dr. Michael Polak on October 2, 2000, R. 125-131, and admitted into the record upon re-opening of the hearing. R. 151. Arreaga told Dr. Polak that he was applying for disability because of chronic back pain "of many years duration." R. 125. Dr. Polak characterized Arreaga's description of this pain as "as a mid line lower lumbar pain which is non-radiating." Id. Arreaga also told the doctor that he had undergone multiple x-rays, had an MRI, and had himself been told that he had multiple herniated disks but that surgery was not advised. Id. Dr. Polak reported that Arreaga ambulated without difficultly and that his gait was within normal limits. Id. The doctor also reported that Arreaga had no difficultly rising out of a chair or getting on or off of the examination table. Id. Dr. Polak's examination of Arreaga's back revealed that he had marked paraspinal spasm and tenderness, a range of motion of 50 degrees flexion, 10 degrees extension, and 0-5 degrees lateral flexion. R. 126. Arreaga experienced pain during straight leg raising at 25 degrees and was negative for radiculopathy at 75 degrees. Id. Dr. Polak found that Arreaga had no obvious deformity of the spine or other remaining joints and had a full range of motion. Id. Dr. Polak determined that Arreaga suffered from back pain, but ruled out lumbosacral degenerative disease. Id. The doctor wrote that Arreaga was "mildly impaired" for carrying and lifting, pushing and pulling, bending, sitting, walking, or standing, but would not have difficulty performing tasks requiring dexterity. R. 126-27. Dr. Polak concluded that Arreaga's ability to lift and carry items was limited to 20 pounds of occasional lifting and that Arreaga's ability to sit and push and pull items was limited. R. 129. In addition, Dr. Polak found Arreaga's ability to stand or walk was not affected by his impairment. Id.
A radiculopathy is defined as a "[d]isorder of the spinal nerve roots." Steadman's Medical Dictionary, 1503 (27th ed. 2000)
C. The ALJ's Decision
On January 25, 2001, the ALJ issued his decision on Arreaga's claim for disability benefits and supplemental security income payments. Following the five step evaluation established by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and 416.920, the ALJ first found that Arreaga was not engaged in substantial, gainful work. R. 17. Next, the ALJ found that Arreaga's back pain, fatigue and bowel problems were severe within the meaning of the regulations but not so severe as to meet one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart B, Regulations No. 4. R. 18.
The ALJ then reviewed Arreaga's claimed symptoms and evaluated their credibility in light of the objective medical evidence. The ALJ found that Arreaga's current symptoms included a healed inguinal mass as well as the herpes lesions on his lips. R. 18. His treatment for these symptoms included being given Acylovir and Thiamin, as well as Advil and Motrin for his pain. Id. The ALJ also reviewed Arreaga's testimony from the hearing that he developed lower back pain, shortness of breath and fatigue when walking. R. 19. In addition, the ALJ reviewed Arreaga's claims that sitting for long periods of time caused him back pain; that his operations resulted problems with his bowel movements; that he fatigued easily; and that it was painful for him to bend. Id.
The ALJ noted that Dr. Polak found that Arreaga did not have difficulty walking, getting onto the examination table, and that he had a full range of motion of the remaining joints. R. 18. The ALJ took note of Dr. Polak's finding that Arreaga was mildly impaired for lifting, carrying, sitting, walking, and standing, but would not have difficulty with jobs requiring dexterity. R. 18-19. The ALJ's examination of Arreaga's claims of symptoms, when reviewed in light of the medical evidence, led him to determine that Arreaga's testimony was not credible. R. 19. Specifically, the ALJ determined Arreaga's conditions had been successfully treated and were well healed. Id. In addition, the ALJ noted that the medical evaluations had determined that Arreaga was able to lift and carry up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. Id. The evaluations also found that Arreaga was able to sit, stand, or walk for up to six out of eight hours during the workday. Id.
On the fourth step of the evaluation the ALJ found that Arreaga did not qualify as disabled for the purposes of the Social Security Act. This entailed determining whether Arreaga could "perform any of his past relevant work." Id. The ALJ evaluated all of the symptoms and medical opinions available relating to Arreaga's injuries. R. 18-19. After evaluating the evidence, the ALJ found that Arreaga retained the residual functional capacity to "perform the full range of light work." R. 19. Finally, the ALJ found that Arreaga's functional capacity did not prevent him from performing the requirements of his past relevant work. Id. Arreaga's job as a fabric cutter, the ALJ determined, required him to stand the majority of the day cutting fabric, while lifting no more than twenty pounds, and sitting for around one hour. Id. As none of Arreaga's symptoms would prevent him from undertaking his previous employment, the ALJ ruled that Arreaga was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and not entitled to benefits. Id.
In his ruling, the ALJ specifically found that Arreaga's "allegations regarding his limitations are not totally credible for the reasons set forth in the body of the decision"; that his "past relevant work as a machine operator did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by his residual functional capacity"; and that Arreaga's "medically determinable low back pain, fatigue, and bowel problems secondary to abdominal surgery do not prevent the claimant from performing his past relevant work." R. 20.
Following this ruling, Arreaga presented the Appeals Council with a December 8, 2000 note from a doctor indicating that there was a cyst in Arreaga's abdomen. R. 140. The note requested that further testing be done. Id. No further evidence was adduced on this point.
The ALJ's decision became final on April 12, 2001, when the Appeals Council denied Arreaga's request for review. R. 5-7.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES A. The Law Governing Disability Determinations
An individual is "disabled" under the Social Security Act if he or she cannot "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment suffered by the person must be such that the individual
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether an individual is disabled under the Social Security Act, the Commissioner is required to evaluate the claim by considering "(1) the objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant or others; and (4) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience." Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
The Commissioner is also required to evaluate a claim for disability benefits pursuant to the five-step process outlined in regulations to the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see also Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the evaluation process). In evaluating the claim, the ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in any "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is not, the ALJ must decide if the claimant has a severe impairment, which is an impairment that "significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant's impairment is severe and is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, or is equivalent to one of the listed impairments, a claimant must be found disabled and the inquiry stops there. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
If the claimant's impairment is not listed or is not equal to one of the listed impairments, the Commissioner must review the claimant's residual functional ability to determine if the claimant is able to do work he or she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). If the Claimant is able to do such work, he or she is considered not to be disabled. Id. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform past work, the Commissioner must decide if the claimant's residual functional capacity permits the claimant to do other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If the claimant cannot perform other work, the claimant will be deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f)(1). The claimant bears the burden of proof on all steps except the final one (that is, proving that there is other work the claimant can perform). Curry, 209 F.3d at 122 (citing cases).
Further, where multiple impairments are involved, the "combined effect of a claimant's impairments must be considered in determining disability [and] the SSA must evaluate their combined impact on a claimant's ability to work, regardless of whether every impairment is severe." Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
In making a determination as to a claimant's disability, the Commissioner is also obligated to follow the "treating physician" regulations located at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. These regulations state:
If we find that a treating source's opinion of the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight.20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
B. The Standard of Review by this Court
Review of the Commissioner's final decision by a court is limited to determining whether there is "substantial evidence" to support the Commissioner's determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[t]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive"); accord Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000); Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is "`more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The role of the reviewing court is therefore "quite limited and substantial deference is to be afforded the Commissioner's decision." Burris v. Chater, 1996 WL 148345, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996). This deference extends not only to factual findings but also to all conclusions which can be drawn from those facts. See Levine v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir. 1966). If the reviewing court finds substantial evidence to support the commissioner's final decision, that decision must be upheld, even where substantial evidence supporting the claimant's position also exists. See Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990); Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982). Although the court is not to conduct a de novo review of the underlying claim, Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991), the reviewing court is required to "examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence" in order to "determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence." Brown, 174 F.3d at 62 (citations omitted). A reviewing court must not defer to the Commissioner's decision if the Commissioner failed to apply the correct legal standard in reaching a determination. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Towney v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.") (citation omitted).
C. Claimant Credibility
Under the governing regulations, the Commissioner is required to consider a claimant's subjective complaints of pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 specifically addresses the evaluation of pain by the Commissioner:
In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. . . . These include statements or reports from you, your treating or examining physician or psychologist, and others about your medical history, diagnosis, prescribed treatment, daily activities, efforts to work, and any other evidence showing how your impairment(s) and any related symptoms affect your ability to work. We will consider all of your statements about your symptoms, such as pain, and any description you, your physician, your psychologist, or other persons may provide about how the symptoms affect your activities of daily living and your ability to work. However, statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled. In evaluating the intensity and persistence of your symptoms, including pain, we will consider all of the available evidence, including your medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings and statements about how your symptoms affect you. . . . . We will then determine the extent to which your alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence to decide how your symptoms affect your ability to work.
Case law makes clear that the Commissioner, not the reviewing court, is the appropriate party to make credibility findings concerning the claimant and that such findings must be accepted by the reviewing court unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Aponte v. Sec., Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 728 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Tejada, 167 F.3d at 775-76 (ALJ may make credibility determinations); Pascariello v. Heckler, 621 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (ALJ may discredit claimant's claim of severe and disabling pain after considering all relevant evidence, including medical evidence and claimant's demeanor). Because pain is a "subjective experience," credibility determinations are particularly appropriate where "there is conflicting evidence about a claimant's pain." Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
D. The ALJ's Duty to Develop the Record
An ALJ has an affirmative duty to develop the administrative record in a disability benefits case. Tejada, 167 F.3d at 774. The non-adversarial nature of a Social Security hearing requires the ALJ "to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits." Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (citations omitted). This duty applies even in cases where the claimant is represented by counsel. See Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). When the claimant appears pro se, as was the case here, the ALJ has a heightened duty to develop the administrative record prior to making a determination. See Cullinane v. Sec. of Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 728 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (remand for new hearing appropriate where ALJ failed to assist pro se litigant in securing all relevant medical testimony); see also Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen the claimant appears pro se, suffers ill health and is unable to speak English well . . . [the court has] a duty to make a searching investigation of the record to make certain that the claimant's rights have been adequately protected.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION A. Development of the Record
As an initial matter, it is clear that the ALJ properly developed the medical record for use in his determination. The ALJ obtained on Arreaga's behalf the relevant records from Lincoln Hospital and informed him of his right to submit additional evidence or challenge the obtained evidence. See Letter to Arreaga from ALJ Louis V. Zamora, undated, at 1-2 (reproduced at R. 81-82). He also arranged for a physician, Dr. Michael Polak, to examine Arreaga in order to assess his disability complaints. R. 150, 125-131.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Final Decision of the Commissioner
The ALJ's decision goes through a detailed examination of the factors required by regulation. R. 17-19; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ made his determination to deny benefits after finding that Arreaga was able to resume his previous work — the fourth step of the five step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). During this step of the evaluation the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate that he has an impairment so severe that he is unable to perform his past work. See Curry, 209 F.3d at 122; Perez, 77 F.3d at 46. The regulation states
Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing past relevant work. If we cannot make a decision based on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impairment(s), we then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ examined this factor by evaluating Arreaga's testimony regarding his symptoms and job requirements as well as the available medical evidence.
At the hearing, Arreaga testified that he suffered from back pain that would prevent him from working. R. 147-48. Specifically, Arreaga claimed that his back pain would occur when he boarded a bus, when seated for a long period of time, and in putting on his pants and shoes. R. 145, 148, 150. He also testified that his back pain prevented him from being able to mop. R. 150. He also testified that he had problems holding items with his hands and that his fingernails fall out. R. 148-49. Finally, Arreaga indicated that he was unable to breathe well and that while walking he would get so tired after four to five blocks that he needed rest stops. R. 147, 149. Arreaga did not present any testimony at the hearing regarding his claims that he had developed bowel problems in response to his surgeries. Arreaga also noted on his applications that he was concerned that the mass removed from his chest was cancerous. R. 57. However, he did not provide any testimony at the hearing regarding any possibility of cancer.
Dr. Polak conducted an examination of Arreaga on October 5, 2000, and made detailed findings regarding Arreaga's back problems and other ailments. Dr. Polak noted that Arreaga had told him that he had a long history of chronic back pain, including herniated discs. R. 125. However, while noting that Arreaga suffered back pain, Dr. Polak found that Arreaga did not suffer from a degenerative condition in the lumbar area of the back. R. 126. Dr. Polak found that Arreaga's back did affect his ability to lift or carry items twenty pounds or more occasionally. R. 129.
The earlier examinations of Arreaga were either consistent with Dr. Polak's finding or showed Arreaga to have even fewer limitations. On November 5, 1999, Dr. Baum had found no limitations on the amount that Arreaga could lift or carry. R. 95. On December 7, 1999, Dr. Ford, had found that Arreaga was able to lift 50 pounds occasionally or 25 pounds frequently. R. 105.
As for claims of bowel problems, Dr. Polak found no problems with the functioning of Arreaga's bowels. R. 126. Dr. Polak stated that there were no limitations in Arreaga's ability to stand or walk. R. 129. As to any claims of cancer, the record before the ALJ reflected that Arreaga did not have cancer. R. 93. Dr. Polak found that Arreaga suffered from no impairment of dextrous movements in his hands. R. 126. None of the other doctors who examined Arreaga made any finding that would indicate any ailments relating to Arreaga's hands. The medical evidence indicated that Arreaga had been fully healed by the operations. R. 88.
To determine whether Arreaga was able to return to his previous job, the ALJ examined Arreaga's testimony and the medical findings in light of the requirements of Arreaga's previous job as a fabric cutter. The ALJ found, based on the hearing testimony, that Arreaga's job as a fabric cutter required him to stand nearly all day cutting fabric. R. 19. The ALJ found that Arreaga's job required him to lift and carry no more than 20 pounds. R. 19. This conclusion was supported by Arreaga's own description of his job responsibilities, which describes a job principally cutting fabric and with some lifting of bundles from under a table. R. 146-147. In fact, Arreaga described his job not as involving frequent lifting but rather as "standing all the time, all day." R. 146. While there was some inconsistent evidence on this point, see R. 55 (Arreaga indicates by a check mark that his job required him to lift weights up to 25 pounds "frequently"), the Court cannot say that the ALJ's finding that Arreaga's required lifting was only "occasional" was without some evidentiary support.
An ALJ's determination of the claimant's credibility concerning subjective complaints of pain must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. See Aponte, 728 F.2d at 591; Centano v. Apfel, 73 F. Supp.2d 333, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The ALJ, while noting that "special consideration" was given to Arreaga's testimony, found that it was not credible in light of the medical evidence and the opinions of the examining doctors. R. 19. Arreaga's claim of back pain was established by the medical evidence. However, the evidence did not support his claim that his back pain would prevent him from working at his previous job. While Arreaga testified that his job required him to stand all day, R. 146, the evidence showed that Arreaga's back pain was not so severe as to preclude him from standing with normal breaks during a work day. R. 95, 105, 129. Arreaga's claim that he would become too fatigued to perform his work was belied by Dr. Polak's findings that he had no limitations on walking or standing. R. 129. In fact, the doctors even told Arreaga to walk as part of his treatment. See R. 149. In addition, none of the medical evidence supported Arreaga's claims of bowel problems, pain in his hands from grasping or the possibility of cancer.
In light of the substantial medical evidence supporting the ALJ's determination, his determination must be upheld.
Conclusion
The Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The Clerk is requested to enter judgment dismissing the complaint.