Opinion
No. 1D20-2469
04-09-2021
Patrick J. ARAGUEL, III, Appellant, v. Leslie Ladon BRYAN, Darrin Francis, as Emergency Temporary Guardian of Jane Kaigler Araguel, and Jane Kaigler Araguel, the Ward (now deceased), Appellees.
John H. Adams and Cecily M. Parker, Beggs & Lane RLLP, Pensacola, for Appellant. Charles F. Beall Jr., Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola; Lois B. Lepp, Lois B. Lepp, P.A., Pensacola; Tracy O. Strom, Tracy O. Strom, P.A., Fort Walton Beach; Tara A. Hagan, Chesser & Barr, P.A., Shalimar; and Lisa Jo Spencer, Lisa Jo Spencer, P.A., Mary Esther, for Appellees.
John H. Adams and Cecily M. Parker, Beggs & Lane RLLP, Pensacola, for Appellant.
Charles F. Beall Jr., Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola; Lois B. Lepp, Lois B. Lepp, P.A., Pensacola; Tracy O. Strom, Tracy O. Strom, P.A., Fort Walton Beach; Tara A. Hagan, Chesser & Barr, P.A., Shalimar; and Lisa Jo Spencer, Lisa Jo Spencer, P.A., Mary Esther, for Appellees.
Nordby, J.
Appellant's mother suffered a stroke and subsequently became the ward of a court-appointed emergency temporary guardian, Appellee Darrin Francis. During the guardianship, photos of the ward in the hospital were published on social media, non-party family members sent frequent and lengthy correspondence to counsel and the court, and the personal information of counsel and the judge were published with critical assessments of their performance in the case. Based on the ward's right to privacy, the guardian sought and obtained a protective order prohibiting Appellant and Appellee Leslie Ladon Bryan, the ward's other son, from engaging in certain actions. The proscribed activities included taking pictures, videos, or other recordings of the ward that would depict her medical condition and discussing or disseminating her medical condition or financial information with anyone except their counsel and each other. The protective order was entered on July 23, 2020 (following a hearing on July 14), and contained no expiration date.
The ward passed away on July 20, 2020, mere days before the trial court issued its protective order. On August 14, 2020, Appellant moved to dissolve the order, noting it had been issued three days after the ward's death. Appellant also argued the order was an injunction that: 1) fails to comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610, 2) is unsupported by sufficient evidence, 3) impermissibly restrains his right to free speech, and 4) prohibits him from discussing important matters with the personal representative identified in his mother's will. In response, the trial court amended the injunction to expire on August 31, 2020, but generally denied the motion.
Appellant now asks this Court to reverse and dissolve the underlying order. We consider mootness as a threshold issue because the order has expired by its own terms. Molina v. Valenzuela , 252 So. 3d 772, 772 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (dismissing as moot the appeal of an expired injunction against stalking); Bevan v. Wolfson , 638 So. 2d 527, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (dismissing as moot the appeal of two expired injunctions against repeat violence). Otherwise moot cases may be decided on their merits when they raise questions of great public importance, the issues are likely to recur, or when collateral legal consequences flow from the issues raised. Godwin v. State , 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992). Appellant argues that the possibility of being held in contempt for his conduct that occurred while the order was in effect is a collateral legal consequence that triggers the third exception. We disagree and conclude that potential consequence is too speculative to justify an exception in this case. It is undisputed that there is no pending motion seeking to hold Appellant in contempt of the now-expired order. Cf. Soud v. Kendale, Inc. , 788 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (finding the collateral legal consequence exception applied to defeat mootness where a motion seeking attorney's fees was pending in the trial court).
Because the order on appeal has expired by its own terms, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
DISMISSED .
Bilbrey and Long, JJ., concur.