Opinion
HHDCV186103761S
07-25-2019
A&R ENTERPRISES, LLC v. Irene GREY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
MATTHEW DALLAS GORDON, J.
This is a negligence action in which the plaintiff, A&R Enterprises, LLC, seeks to recover $1, 281.43 from the defendant, Irene Gray, for work the plaintiff performed on a motor vehicle owned by Marcia MacCatherine to repair damage resulting from a collision between the defendant’s vehicle and MacCatherine’s vehicle on July 18, 2018. The defendant has moved to strike the plaintiff’s prayers for relief seeking prejudgment interest and attorneys fees. For the reasons explained in this decision, the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim for prejudgment interest is granted, and the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim for attorneys fees is denied.
Facts and Procedural History
On July 18, 2018, the defendant’s vehicle collided with MacCatherine’s vehicle in a parking lot in Farmington, Connecticut. MacCatherine subsequently brought her vehicle to the plaintiff for repair and filed a claim with the defendant’s insurance company, which acknowledged the defendant’s responsibility for the accident. The plaintiff repaired MacCatherine’s vehicle at a total cost of $4, 457.62, of which the defendant’s insurance company paid $3, 176.19, leaving an unpaid balance of $1, 281.43. The plaintiff subsequently agreed to release the vehicle to MacCatherine in exchange an assignment of her right to bring suit for the damage done to MacCatherine’s vehicle.
On November 6, 2018, the plaintiff initiated this action against the defendant in Small Claims Court for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to transfer the case to the Superior Court on December 4, 2018, which motion was granted on December 12, 2018. On January 9, 2019, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking, inter alia, compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys fees.
Applicable Legal Standard
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Assn. v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006). "The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640, 643 (2011). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading ... and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Thus, we assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so, moreover, we read the allegations broadly ... rather than narrowly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Restaurant Supply, LLC v. Giardi Ltd. Partnership, 330 Conn. 642, 648, 200 A.3d 182, 185 (2019).
Analysis
I
Prejudgment Interest Is Not Recoverable In Negligence Actions
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeking prejudgment interest must be stricken because an award of prejudgment interest is not permitted in negligence actions. The plaintiff disagrees with this broad proposition, and asserts that it is entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a, which provides in pertinent part: "Except as provided in sections 37-3b, 37-3c and 52-192a, interest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909, including actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable." General Statutes § 37-3b provides, in pertinent part: "[I]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date that is twenty days after the date of judgment or the date that is ninety days after the date of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment."
In Muckle v. Pressley, 185 Conn.App. 488, 197 A.3d 437 (2018), the Appellate Court affirmed trial court’s refusal to award the plaintiff prejudgment interest in connection with a diminished value claim because the plaintiff’s claim arose in connection with a negligence action. "§ 37-3a, by its explicit reference to § 37-3b, does not apply to actions to recover damages to property caused by negligence ... Prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a is appropriate only where the essence of the action itself involves the wrongful withholding of money due and payable to the plaintiff. The prejudgment interest statute does not apply when the essence of the action is the recovery of damages to compensate a plaintiff for injury, damage or costs incurred as a result of a defendant’s negligence ... The prejudgment interest statute does not apply to such actions because they do not advance claims based on the wrongful withholding of money, but rather seek damages to compensate for losses incurred as a result of a defendant’s negligence. Moreover, such damages are not considered due and payable until after a judgment in favor of the plaintiff has been rendered." (Emphasis original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 497-98. "Prejudgment interest is only available by statute, and there is no statutory provision for prejudgment interest on a claim of negligence. General Statutes § 37-3a allows prejudgment interest, but does not apply to negligence claims. General Statutes § 37-3b applies to negligence claims, but allows only postjudgment, and not prejudgment interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 497.
Based on Muckle, the plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeking prejudgment interest must be stricken because prejudgment interest is not permissible in negligence actions.
Muckle noted that a plaintiff in a negligence action may recover prejudgment interest by filing an offer of compromise prior to trial pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a and then recovering damages in excess of the offer. Muckle v. Pressley, supra, 185 Conn.App. 497.
II
The Plaintiff May Recover Attorneys Fees
Unlike the plaintiff’s claim for prejudgment interest, the plaintiff may, at the court’s discretion, receive an award of attorneys fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a. That statute provides: "Whenever the plaintiff prevails in a small claims matter which was transferred to the regular docket in the Superior Court on the motion of the defendant, the court may allow to the plaintiff his costs, together with reasonable attorneys fees to be taxed by the court."
"[A] determination as to the applicability of § 52-251a turns upon five essential elements as plainly set forth in the statutory language: (1) that the action originally was commenced in the small claims docket of the Superior Court; (2) that the defendant moved to transfer the action to the regular docket of the Superior Court; (3) that the action was so transferred; (4) that the plaintiff prevailed in the action; and (5) that the trial court deemed an award of attorneys fees and costs appropriate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Computer Reporting Serv., LLC v. Lovejoy & Assocs., LLC, 167 Conn.App. 36, 58-59, 145 A.3d 266, 281 (2016). "By its operation, [§ 52-251a] creates a substantial and effective disincentive for a defendant who might otherwise raise defenses bordering on the frivolous in an effort to gain a tactical advantage over a plaintiff by obtaining a transfer of a case from the Small Claims division ... [T]he very purpose of § 52-251a is to deter ... defendants from transferring a case from the small claims session and turning a relatively clear-cut case into a pitched legal battle." Id., 58.
After considering the above elements, the court concludes that because the plaintiff may recover a discretionary award of attorneys fees, the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s prayer seeking this relief must be denied.
Conclusion
Having carefully considered the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s prayers for relief seeking prejudgment interest and attorneys fees, and having carefully considered the plaintiff’s objection to the defendant’s motions, and having entertained oral argument at which counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant were both present and were both afforded a full opportunity to be heard, the court concludes that there is no legal basis for the plaintiff’s claim for prejudgment interest. The defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeking prejudgment interest is therefore granted. The defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeking attorneys fees is denied because the plaintiff may recover a discretionary award of attorneys fees at the conclusion of the case.