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Apparel Group v. Camuto Cons. Group

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
May 31, 2007
40 A.D.3d 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)

Summary

In Tarrant Apparel Group, we affirmed Supreme Court's denial of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), because the language in a license agreement "arguably" reflected that performance was to be rendered directly to the plaintiff (40 A.D.3d at 557, 838 N.Y.S.2d 498).

Summary of this case from Comm'r of the Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp.

Opinion

No. 735.

May 31, 2007.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.H.O.), entered October 20, 2006, which, to the extent appealed from, denied the motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) by defendants With You and Simpson to dismiss the eighth cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Grimes Battersby, LLP, New York (Edmund J. Ferdinand, III of counsel), for appellants.

Kent, Beatty Gordon, LLP, New York (Jack A. Gordon of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Tom, J.P., Marlow, Nardelli, Gonzalez and Kavanagh, JJ.


Performance rendered directly to plaintiff would indicate that plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary ( see e.g. Internationale Nederlanden [U.S.] Capital Corp. v Bankers Trust Co., 261 AD2d 117, 123). Drawing all inferences in plaintiff's favor, as one must on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), Simpson's obligation under section 6.6 of the Master License Agreement to "be actively involved in promoting the . . . Sub-Licensed Products" and to "publicly wear or use the . . . Sub-Licensed Products" is arguably performance that is rendered directly to plaintiff, the sublicensee. Neither New York Pepsi-Cola Distribs. Assn. v Pepsico, Inc. ( 240 AD2d 315) nor Artwear, Inc. v Hughes ( 202 AD2d 76) involved an obligation by the licensor akin to section 6.6 of the Master License Agreement. Appellants' argument that section 6.6 does not apply because plaintiff failed to satisfy a condition precedent is without merit; the condition precedent applies to section 7.1 as amended, not section 6.6.

In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not reach plaintiff's argument under CPLR 3211 (d) that appellants' motion was properly denied because of the need for further discovery.


Summaries of

Apparel Group v. Camuto Cons. Group

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
May 31, 2007
40 A.D.3d 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)

In Tarrant Apparel Group, we affirmed Supreme Court's denial of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), because the language in a license agreement "arguably" reflected that performance was to be rendered directly to the plaintiff (40 A.D.3d at 557, 838 N.Y.S.2d 498).

Summary of this case from Comm'r of the Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp.
Case details for

Apparel Group v. Camuto Cons. Group

Case Details

Full title:TARRANT APPAREL GROUP, Respondent, v. CAMUTO CONSULTING GROUP, INC., et…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: May 31, 2007

Citations

40 A.D.3d 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 4582
838 N.Y.S.2d 498

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