Opinion
No. 2024-51208
07-16-2024
Anonymous, Plaintiff, v. Anonymous, Defendant.
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff: Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C. By: Johnathan W. Wolfe, Esq. Co-Counsel for Plaintiff: Mosberg Sharma Stambleck Gross, LLP By: Michael Aaron Mosberg, Esq & Heidi Ellen Harris, Esq. Co-Counsel for Defendant: Cohen Clair Lans Greifer & Simpson, LLP By: Benjamin Aaron Lilien, Esq. Co-Counsel for Defendant: Blank Rome, LLP By: Marilyn B. Chinitz, Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff:
Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C.
By: Johnathan W. Wolfe, Esq.
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff:
Mosberg Sharma Stambleck Gross, LLP
By: Michael Aaron Mosberg, Esq & Heidi Ellen Harris, Esq.
Co-Counsel for Defendant:
Cohen Clair Lans Greifer & Simpson, LLP
By: Benjamin Aaron Lilien, Esq.
Co-Counsel for Defendant:
Blank Rome, LLP
By: Marilyn B. Chinitz, Esq.
Ariel D. Chesler, J.
INTRODUCTION
In this motion sequence, Plaintiff Wife seeks renewal of this Court's February 2023, order directing a schedule for the parties to utilize their East Hampton properties, and an award of exclusive use of certain properties. Plaintiff also seeks an advance against equitable distribution in the amount of $29,600,000, and an award of sanctions. Defendant cross-moves for sanctions.
The case at bar concerns the husband's deceitful conduct of acquiring multiple neighboring residences surrounding a property shared by the parties. This conduct contravened the automatic orders that apply to this action and this Court's order providing for an alternating use schedule. The Husband's conduct involved unlawfully transferring and spending millions from the marital estate during this litigation. These unique circumstances which constitute blatant violations of the automatic orders and the Husband's purposeful misrepresentations and material omissions to this Court now require, in law and equity, this Court to act.
BACKGROUND
This action for divorce commenced in January of 2022 with Plaintiff-Wife's, Anonymous (hereinafter: the Wife), filing of a summons, verified complaint, notice of guideline maintenance, notice concerning continuation of healthcare coverage, and importantly notice of automatic orders pursuant to DRL § 236(B)(2) and 22 NYCRR 202.16-a. Defendant-Husband, Anonymous (hereinafter: the Husband), was served in January 2022. Under the Domestic Relations Law and Uniform Rules for the Supreme Court, the Husband was bound by the automatic orders as of the date of his service, and the Wife upon her filing of the summons. (See DRL § 236[B][2][b]; 22 NYCRR 202.16-a[b]).
The estate of these litigants is of the largest variety that any contemporary court could face. To put it simply, the parties are billionaires. Their extensive and complex marital estate encompasses, inter alia, renowned artwork, marvelous real estate in some of the most affluent areas, and extensive financial holdings. The unwinding of this marital estate has been ongoing and extremely litigious - this being the eighth (8th) motion sequence with an ultimate trial still far away.
After extensive litigation surrounding the issue of use and occupancy of the parties' real properties under motion sequence 002, this Court entered an order in February 2023, which, inter alia, awarded the Wife exclusive use and occupancy of the parties' New York City Townhouse, awarded the Husband exclusive use and occupancy of the parties' Fifth Avenue New York City apartment and directed the parties to alternate each week the use and occupancy of the parties' properties located in East Hampton, New York (Property 1 and Property 2, respectively).
In addition to Property 1 and Property 2, the parties own an adjacent property (Property 3). Property 3 was known and considered when the Court issued the February 2023, order. Although no particular use of Property 3 was directed by this Court, at oral argument on this motion all counsel agreed that the parties had been utilizing that home when the other has alternate use of Property 1 and Property 2.
The ownership or imminent purchase of any other adjacent properties was not disclosed or mentioned as a possibility to the Court. In fact, at the time of motion sequence 2, regarding the property at [REDACTED](namely, Property 4), the Husband represented to this Court the following: "I rented this home a few months ago (I do not own it), using my post-commencement funds, not for personal use but for possible investment, for guests to stay at and other business purposes, and for our children's use; I have never slept there; and it is irrelevant."
However, unbeknownst to the Court, but known to the Husband, at the time this Court heard the argument and entered the Exclusive Use Order, the Husband had surreptitiously purchased the neighboring real property, Property 5. In addition, at the time of the argument on the properties, the Husband represented that he held a leasehold for "non-residential purposes" for Property 4. This material "non-residential" purpose evaporated when, after the Husband's sale of Property 4, the Husband purchased Property 4 in April of 2024 for $29,600,000.00. Concerningly, this crucial information was never brought to this Court until this motion sequence.
Also concerning is that the post-commencement account which allegedly paid for these properties was funded with millions of dollars from marital accounts and investments that existed prior to the date of commencement. Although the Husband may have also deposited post commencement earnings into this account and taken loans, there are serious questions raised about commingling and no question that he violated the automatic orders.
This outrageous conduct defeated and impeded the Wife's rights under the Exclusive Use Order because the properties are neighboring and showed material evidence of the husband establishing a separate residence. Now, based on the Husband's conduct, the final division of the parties' East Hamptons real properties will be a convoluted issue this Court must unravel because the Husband maliciously created a scenario where he will be his ex-wife's neighbor.
Both sides conceded at oral argument these properties are extremely close to one another.
DISCUSSION
The Wife moved by order to show cause seeking this Court enter an order granting, inter alia, (i) renewal of argument on the Exclusive Use Order; (ii) the Wife exclusive use of the Property 1, or in the alternative, exclusive use of the primary bedroom; (iii) an advance on equitable distribution in the sum of $29,600,000.00; and (iv) sanctions.
The Husband vigorously opposes this application and moved by Notice of Cross-Motion seeking sanctions.
The Court held extensive oral argument on this order to show cause. After the oral argument, the Court announced its ruling on the record and advised the parties a written decision would be issued forthwith.
I. Exclusive Use of the Primary Bedroom at Property 1
The Husband in this case used his immense wealth to deprive the Wife of the ability to live separate and apart by purchasing neighboring properties such that she was unable to actually live separate and apart. This power play was made possible because of the Husband's current and historical financial superiority over the Wife. Thus, by the use of financial coercive control, the Husband not only obviated the law but further compromised the possessory rights afforded to the Wife in the Exclusive Use Order. In taking action that prejudiced the Wife's possessory rights and the marital estate this Court is empowered by statute, case law, and equity to act pendente lite to remedy this harm.
Domestic Relations Law section 234 empowers this matrimonial court to, inter alia,
[M]ake such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and the respective parties. Such direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment. (Internal emphasis supplied).
This Court need not reach the question of renewal as it is authorized to act independently from the CPLR by the DRL based on the impact the Husband's conduct's had on the Wife's possessory rights. The Court of Appeals has made clear that DRL § 234 provides "a court is authorized to issue an order to preserve marital property, both in advance of and upon, a determination of equitable distribution." (El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 31 [2015]). Here, section 234 is made applicable due to the Husband's conduct implicating the Wife's possessory rights under the Exclusive Use Order.
Were the Court to reach the issue of renewal, it is clear that the Wife has presented new facts on this motion and a reasonable justification for the failure to present them earlier in that the Husband did not disclose the facts to her or this Court (see CPLR 2221[e]).
The interference of this exclusive and possessory use right comes from the inherent privacy that is afforded under an award of exclusive use and occupancy of one's home. When the court awards exclusive use and occupancy to a spouse it does so with the intent of removing the other spouse from the space. This removal of the other spouse creates privacy for the spouse in the property for which they have exclusive use and occupancy. (See Mallin v Mallin, 471 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 [1st Dept 1984]["With five houses, we see no reason why both parties cannot find a way to enjoy the country without infringing on each other's privacy."]; 48A NY Jur Domestic Relations § 2706 [2d ed 2007]["[T]here is no reason why both parties could not use it simultaneously without infringing on the other's privacy."]). The Wife here, as well as the Husband, should be able to enjoy their exclusive use and occupancy without fear of surveillance or that the other spouse is encroaching on their enjoyment and use. By purchasing neighboring properties, he eroded the Wife's ability to have reasonable privacy and exclusive use and enjoyment because her use and enjoyment are now limited by the concern caused by her neighboring ex-husband being so close by. This perverts this Court's Exclusive Use Order, the legislative intent behind DRL § 234, and the principle of living separate and apart in divorces.
Here, at a minimum, justice requires an award of the primary bedroom to the Wife because of the Husband's conduct in willfully misleading the Court and purposefully purchasing the neighboring properties to Property 1. As articulated by the Husband's counsel, his desire to maintain possession and use of Property 1 is related to its unique access to an Olympic lap pool, his office, and the sentimental value of the residence based on the family's history there. Under this order, none of these interests of the Husband are prejudiced; unlike the Wife's interests which he brazenly prejudiced.
Illustrative of the legal support for this order is the reasoning and determination in Weiner v Weiner. (2007 NY Misc. LEXIS 5849 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty July 18, 2007][Visitacion-Lewis, J.]). Weiner modified the parties' Stipulation so as to award exclusive use of their vacation home to the wife based on the husband's violations of the Stipulation and his "abuse" of his possessory rights to interfere with the wife's life. (Id.). Similarly, the Husband's conduct in this matter violated the automatic orders and was calculated to interfere with the Wife's possessory rights.
The Husband's purchase of real property to purposefully interfere with the Wife's possessory rights and inappropriate misuse of the primary bedroom demonstrate sufficient strife and the establishment of a separate residence to warrant this limited exclusive use award. (See Goldman v Goldman, 185 A.D.3d 1012, 1012 [2d Dept 2020]; see generally, Kerner v Kerner, 13 A.D.3d 52 [1st Dept 2004]; Fleming v Fleming, 154 A.D.2d 250 [1st Dept 1989]; Delli Venneri v Delli Venneri, 120 A.D.2d 238 [1st Dept 1986]). Notably, DRL § 234 grants this Court a broad and flexible power to make directions about the possession of property during the pendency of this action (see E.R. v. L.S., 74 Misc.3d 1227 [A] [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2022][Chesler, J.]).
The Husband's counsel argued at oral argument that the case law on vacation homes rather than marital residences shows that exclusive use of the vacation home is inappropriate; rather, sharing is the correct route. This Court notes in the first instance that this Order is consistent with that line of authority as the residences are still being alternated - just not the primary bedroom. The Court also notes the property has approximately four to five bedrooms in total.
Accordingly, the Wife's request for exclusive use and possession of the primary bedroom is GRANTED.
Because of the deceitful, misleading conduct by the Husband which violated the Court's Exclusive Use Order and the automatic orders, it is ORDERED that neither party may buy, sell, encumber, or transfer any real estate during the pendency of case. Indeed, it is well within the purview of this Court to enjoin and restrain Defendant "from transferring or otherwise converting funds from the parties' accounts or other marital property, except for basic living necessities, attorney's fees, or other court-approved expenditures, until the conclusion of this action" as was done to an equally defiant litigant in Sykes v. Sykes. (35 Misc.3d 591, 600 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2012]).
II. Advance on Equitable Distribution
Statute, case law, and equity support a de minimis pendente lite advance on equitable distribution to the Wife.
At oral argument, the Husband advanced two arguments: first, that this Court does not have authority to award an advance on equitable distribution; and second, that if it does, the seminal holding in Havell as to advances on equitable distribution should be interpreted narrowly based upon the unique facts of domestic violence in Havell. (Havell v Islam, 288 A.D.2d 160, 160 [1st Dept 2001]; see also, Havell v Islam, 273 A.D.2d 164, 164-165 [1st Dept 2000][Affirming "[t]he motion court's pretrial distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence[...]"]).
A. This Court Has the Authority to Award an Advance on Equitable Distribution
As to the first argument, this Court, in law and equity, has the authority to advance a non-prejudicial de minimis share of equitable distribution. This is thoroughly supported by case law. (See Havell, 734 N.Y.S.2d at 842.; Simon M. Lorne v Ludmila Peresvetova Lorne, NYLJ, June 5, 2023 at 3, col 4 [1st Dept 2023]["[T]he trial court properly awarded the wife a credit for what was effectively an advance on equitable distribution"]; Mallary v Mallary, 8 A.D.3d 20, 20-21 [1st Dept 2004]; Feldman v Feldman, 280 A.D.2d 276 [1st Dept 2001]; Balkin v Balkin, 43 A.D.3d 967 [2d Dept 2007]; see generally, Sykes v Sykes, 43 Misc.3d 1220 [A][Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2014][Cooper, J.]).
Further illustrative of this authority is that the Legislature did not confine the definition of "distributive award" to a determination after trial. DRL § 236 defines "distributive award" as,
Payments provided for in a valid agreement between the parties or awarded by the court, in lieu of or to supplement, facilitate or effectuate the division or distribution of property where authorized in a matrimonial action, and payable either in a lump sum or over a period in fixed amounts. (DRL § 236[B][1][b][internal emphasis supplied]).
The specific use of the term "distributive award" in DRL § 236(B)(8)(b) lends further statutory support that these awards can be made pre-trial. (See also, 48A NY Jur Domestic Relations § 2762 [2d ed 2007] ["It is also proper to utilize a distributive award as a means to effect adjustments made necessary by the allocation of individual marital assets to the respective spouses."]). Subsection (8)(b) directly contemplates pendente lite relief as it discusses "insurance, tax, repairs, or other carrying charges." On the other hand, the post-trial equitable distribution determination discussed in DRL § 236(B)(5)(a) does not use the term "distributive award" and instead clearly refers to a "disposition thereof in the final judgment." (Id.). Thus, the first argument is without merit.
Similarly, the Husband's second argument is misguided. Such a narrow reading of Havell is not consistent with the First Department's reasoning or the facts of the case.
As pointed out by the Husband's counsel, Havell at the trial court level concerned facts of domestic violence that had been perpetrated at the hands of the defendant. (Havell v Islam, 186 Misc.2d 726 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2000]; see also, Havell v Islam, 301 A.D.2d 339 [1st Dept 2002]). However, these acts of domestic abuse were not given significant weight by the court in advancing equitable distribution because the advanced distribution was made to the defendant-abuser - not the plaintiff-victim. (Havell, 734 N.Y.S.2d at 841). To illustrate further how the Court's authority to award an advance on equitable is independent of fault or harm is the fact that the Havell advance was made from marital funds to pay for the "necessary expenses" the defendant-abuser incurred in connection with being criminally prosecuted for his violence against the plaintiff-victim. (Id.). Indeed, the act of affirming costs incurred with being prosecuted for domestic violence as fair game for an advance on equitable distribution strongly supports this necessary and restorative award. The decision makes clear the consideration of fault due to domestic violence was minimal - if at all. (Id. ["While fault may be considered for purposes of equitable distribution when conduct is so egregious as to shock the conscience (surely the case here), even then, such conduct is only a factor to be considered and does not necessarily preclude an award of equitable distribution."]).Thus, the argument that the case at bar lacks the level of harm necessary to award a de minimis advance on equitable distribution is unavailing.
Even accepting, en arguendo, the Husband's narrow interpretation that harm akin to domestic violence is a pre-requisite to the award of an advance - that standard is met in this case. The Husband's conduct in purchasing the neighboring properties surrounding the shared vacation home deceitfully designed to interfere and annoy the Wife was an act of domestic violence as it was a clear example of financial coercive control. (See S.L. v D.E., 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 2618, at *10 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty June 26, 2024][Chesler, J.]["Financial abuse of a spouse is domestic violence; even without a bruise the harm is still potent, and this Court must not turn a blind eye to such conduct."]; Estate of Aisha R., 2023 NYLJ LEXIS 1389, at *9-10 [Fam Ct, Kings Cnty June 5, 2023]["Courts have begun to recognize the non-physical aspects of domestic violence and to provide relief for survivors of coercive and controlling relationships just as if they had experienced physical injury."]). This tactic is made more concerning because of the immense power imbalance between the Wife and the Husband. Whereas the Wife is dependent on the Husband's compliance with court orders (which he has shown to be lacking), the Husband has, in effect, unlimited resources. He used these resources to essentially confine and control the Wife even when she is supposed to be afforded separate use and occupancy. The Husband's superior position with regards to the resources of the marital estate was the means for his abuse and "this Court must not turn a blind eye to such conduct" and "provide relief [...] as if [the Wife] had experienced physical injury." Thus, the Husband's erroneous interpretation of Havell equally commands this conclusion.
In making an order awarding an advance on equitable distribution, the First Department has instructed that the motion court must balance "the parties' respective needs and resources" and ensure such award represents a "very small percentage of the estimated marital estate." (Havell v 734 N.Y.S.2d at 842). Likewise, the appellate court's first impression on Havell made clear consideration and reference to the DRL's equitable distribution factors was also required. (Havell, 273 A.D.2d at 165 ["We reject defendant's argument that the distribution was based on criteria not specified in Domestic Relations Law."]).
Under the Havell balancing test, this Court notes first that the parties' respective resources are vastly in contrast. The Husband has access to immense wealth which he solely controls although much of it is marital property. He has purchased millions in artwork and real estate and disgorged millions from marital accounts. The Wife only has access to funds made available to her by the Husband and a $40,000.00 monthly support payment. Likewise, in considering the percentage of the marital estate the award represents, it is both admitted and beyond dispute that the requested sum is de minimis to the billionaire estate at-bar. Indeed, it would represent 0.1 - 3.6% of the marital estate (under the most favorable light to the Husband). Furthermore, such an award does not prejudice the Husband's ultimate equitable distribution award as it was admitted during the oral argument by both parties' counsel that the Wife would be entitled to far more than the sum and such award is subject to reallocation after trial.
An advance of these funds to the Wife is in line with the reasonable needs of the parties given their extravagant lifestyle and is thus supported by controlling authority. The Husband, with no regard for this legal proceeding or the marital estate, has spent literally millions of marital dollars on art, real estate, and a plethora of other expenses. Likewise, his conduct in clogging the Wife's possessory rights has now created a situation where her "reasonable needs" require a sum that will permit her to live in privacy and now obtain, inter alia, new household maintenance staff.
In addition to his a front to any sense of privacy for the Wife, the Husband has alienated the parties' shared housekeeper (contrary to the well-established marital status quo) and caused her to not work for the Wife. While the Husband argues that this was on the housekeeper's own volition, logic and the circumstances make clear it is the Husband who pulls the purse strings that was the cause. This household maintenance staff is both reasonable and necessary to ensure the maintenance of the marital luxurious property and to protect the preserve the parties' equity in the property. Accordingly, the Wife's request related to household maintenance staff is GRANTED to the extent that the Wife is now enabled with this sum to find new household maintenance staff during her time in possession of the property. After the Wife has retained new maintenance staff of her choosing, the Husband, pursuant to the status quo, shall bare the sole expense for this help.
Under the DRL's rubric, the following factors support this de minimis advance: (1) the immense income and assets of the parties; (2) the long-term nature of the marriage; (3) the active contributions of the wife to enhance the husband's earning capacity during the marriage; (4) the liquidity of the marital estate; (5) the extremely favorable future financial circumstances of the party after the divorce; (6) the Husband's disgorgement of millions from the marital estate and his concealed real estate purchases; (7) the prejudicial impact of the Husband's purchasing of neighboring properties on the Wife's current exclusive use rights and after final resolution; and (8) the weight of the equities discussed infra. (See DRL § 236[B][5][d][1], [2], [7], [8], [9], [12], [13], [16]).
Accordingly, under the authority under DRL § 236, Havell, and its kindred case law, this Court finds an award to the Wife of the sum of $29,600,000.00 as an advance on equitable distribution is necessary and appropriate.
B. This De Minimis Advance on Equitable Distribution is a Necessary Equitable Remedy For the Husband's Violation of the Automatic Orders and Unclean Hands
The Legislature made clear that upon being bound to the automatic orders, "neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber, conceal, remove or in any way dispose of, without consent of the other party in writing, or by order of the court, any property (including, but not limited to, real estate[...]) individually or jointly held by the parties, except in the usual course of business, for customary household expenses or attorney's fees in connection with this action." (DRL § 236[B][2][b][internal emphasis supplied]; 22 NYCRR 202.16-a). The Husband violated the automatic orders with his multiple concealed real estate deals. (See Sykes v Sykes, 35 Misc.3d 591, 596-598 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2012][Cooper, J.]). Additionally, he violated them as well with his post-commencement disgorgement of millions from the marital estate.
The Husband argued at oral argument and throughout his papers argues that these real estate transactions were within the "usual course of business" exception in the automatic orders. The Husband argues this is because these are investment properties related to business. This Court cannot accept such an illogical position as the Husband's business does not involve the acquisitions of residential real estate. Further, the proximity of these properties to the Wife further illustrates the frailty of this position. Thus, it is clear that the Husband violated the automatic orders.
In remedying these violations, "[t]here can be no real dispute that the legislature intended the violation of the automatic orders 'would be redressed by the same remedies available for violations of any order signed by a judge.'" (Spencer v Spencer, 159 A.D.3d 174, 179 [2d Dept 2018] citing, P.S. v R.O., 31 Misc.3d 373, 376 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2011][Gesmer, J.]). While Spencer and P.S. dealt specifically with the remedy of contempt, the pluralistic language in both decisions makes clear that this Court can remedy this wrong with both legal and equitable relief. (See N.F. v J.D., 2022 NYLJ LEXIS 2645, at *27 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 2022][Waterman-Marshall, J.][Remedying violation of automatic orders with the equitable remedy of an injunction]). Thus, outside of the law, equity compels this advance on equitable distribution.
The Constitution of the State of New York vests this matrimonial court with jurisdiction "in law and equity." (NY Const, art VI, §7[a]; see e.g., Dickerson v Thompson, 88 A.D.3d 121 [3d Dept 2011]). It is well-established that "the power of equity is as broad as equity and justice require." (Kaminsky v Kahn, 23 A.D.2d 231, 237 [1st Dept 1965] citing, London v Joslovitz, 279 AD 280, 282 [3d Dept 1952]). In wielding this equitable authority, "[t]he court [...] should render such relief as is appropriate to the wrongs of the defendant." (Id.). Here, this Court exercises its equitable authority to do just that - render relief that is appropriate to remedy the wrongs perpetuated on this Court and the Wife by the Husband. As noted, the Husband's conduct not only patently violated the automatic orders but also prejudiced the Wife's possessory rights under the Exclusive Use Order. To accomplish this, the Husband expended - on just one of the purchases of real estate -- the entire sum sought by the Wife. This was done to ensure the Wife's possessory rights were inferior to the Husband's; equity requires an evenhanded response to remedy this calculated wrong. Indeed, proportionally, the Husband's immense spending and disgorgement during this litigation far surpasses the sum sought by the Wife.
In arriving at this result, the Court is acutely aware of the extremely unique circumstances here. The almost unimaginable wealth at the Husband's disposal permits him to engage in conduct that the mass of litigants could not do. Indeed, the act of purchasing multiple pieces of real estate surrounding a property accorded to the Wife is simply not something many litigants can do based on their financial constraints. Here, there are little to no financial constraints given the enormity of the wealth. The Husband was uniquely equipped to engage in this deceitful prejudicial conduct because of his unique position of wealth and the dependency of the Wife on his wealth to survive. This award works to un-tip the scales that are weighing far too heavily in the Husband's favor.
The Court also stresses the minute fraction that this award represents of the overwhelming marital estate. This sum, beyond any doubt, would be awarded to the Wife. There is no actual dispute that these funds would be awarded to the Wife after the trial; thus, the fact-finding function of a trial is unnecessary in relation to the Wife's entitlement to these funds. This is because - as admitted on the record - there is no question of fact for this court to determine whether this sum of funds from the marital estate will be awarded to the Wife. Simply put, there is no prejudice at all to the Husband's ultimate award after trial there is no utility in waiting for the "final judgment" as it is not disputed the final judgment will award the Wife not only this sum but much more.
Accordingly, the Wife's request for the de minimis advance on equitable distribution of $29,600,000.00 is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
The Domestic Relations Law and Constitution of this State imbue this Court with equitable and legal authority to do what is necessary to ensure the proper unwinding of a marital union. The Husband both in defiance of the Exclusive Use order and the automatic orders made multiple real estate purchases calculated to clog the Wife's rights afforded under the Exclusive Use Order and mislead the Court as to material information related to the Exclusive Use Order. The Court cannot ignore this conduct as it would amount to the Court's acquiescence to a self-evident pattern of financial coercive control demonstrated by the Husband, and which prejudiced the Wife and violated the spirit of the Court's orders and the authority of this Court.