Opinion
Case Number: 02-21862-CIV-MARTINEZ
April 20, 2004
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration ( D.E. No. 122-1) and Alternative Motion for Permission to File Interlocutory Appeal ( D.E. No. 122-2), filed on December 9, 2003 . The Court has carefully considered the motions and is otherwise duly advised.
I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida ("School Board") employed the Plaintiffs pursuant to annual employment contracts for the 2001-2002 school year, which incorporated the School Board's rules and its Manual of Procedures for Managerial Exempt Personnel ("MEP Manual"). In October 2001, the School Board hired anew Superintendent of Schools, Merrett R. Stierheim. At that time, the School Board was facing a shortage of funds, as well as dissatisfaction among the public and within the School District itself with the administration's ethics and performance of its duties. Mr. Stierheim was directed to address these concerns.
Subsequently on February 13, 2002, Mr. Stierheim recommended to the School Board that it undertake a reorganization of the administration. The School Board accepted and approved Mr. Stierheim's recommendation. As a result of the reorganization, Plaintiff Dr. Joyce Annunziata was reassigned from the position of Assistant Superintendent, Office of Professional Standards, to the position of Region Director, Region IV, which had been Plaintiff George Suarez's position. Mr. Suarez was reassigned to the position of school principal.
Based on their reassignments, Plaintiffs filed suit against the School Board. In their respective complaints, the Plaintiffs each make two claims: one, a § 1983 claim for violation of procedural due process; and two, a claim for breach of contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim against Dr. Annunziata based on her alleged breach of duty to maintain files and records.
Originally these cases were assigned to separate United States District Court Judges. Subsequently, they were transferred to the undersigned and have been treated as though they were consolidated by Order of the Court. However, the cases were not consolidated until the Court's Order (D.E. No. 118), dated November 26, 2003.
Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaints for failure to state a claim. In part, Defendant argued the State of Florida has provided an adequate means of post-deprivation redress, which, under McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), precludes Plaintiffs from pursuing § 1983 actions. The Court denied the motion. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, D.E. No. 8, entered on September 30, 2002. In so doing, the Court followed Fetner v. City of Roanoke, in which the Eleventh Circuit held that "[p]ost deprivation remedies do not provide due process if pre-deprivation remedies are practicable." 813 F.2d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 1987). The Court also followed Peacock v. City of Elba, 1997 WL 1068632 (M.D. Ala. 1997), in which that court held McKinney did not apply where the plaintiff received no pre-deprivation notice or hearing.
Defendant also moved to dismiss the breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim, which the Court denied.
The Order Denying Motion to Dismiss was entered in Dr. Annunziata's case by the Honorable Adalberto Jordan prior to the transfer of Dr. Annunziata's case to the undersigned. The Order was subsequently adopted in Mr. Suarez's case. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 117), dated November 26, 2003, at n. 9.
On September 2, 2003, the School Board timely moved for summary judgment as to both counts of each Plaintiff's complaint, as well as to its counterclaim against Dr. Annunziata. In denying the motions for summary judgment, the Court began by stating that it reaffirmed its prior ruling that McKinney is not dispositive of Plaintiffs' case, because Defendant had failed to demonstrate how the Court's prior ruling was clearly erroneous or that new developments had rendered the ruling erroneous. The Court also held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims and breach of contract claims and as to the School Board's counterclaim against Dr. Annunziata.
In responding to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs also made a Cross-Motion for Final Summary Judgment by which they sought summary judgment as to both counts of their complaints, as well as to Defendant's counterclaim against Dr. Annunziata. The Cross-Motion was stricken as untimely. See D.E. No. 117.
As for Plaintiffs' § 1983 and breach of contract claims, the Court stated:
The most significant issue of material fact is whether Plaintiffs' reassignments, although occurring during a legitimate reorganization, were, in fact demotions or adverse employment actions that entitled the Plaintiffs to additional due process procedures. . . . as set forth in the [MEP Manual] and in the just cause provisions of their annual employment contracts.
Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 117), dated November 26, 2003, at 9-10 (footnotes and citations omitted).
As to Defendant's counterclaim against Dr. Annunziata, the Court stated:
Dr. Annunziata has admitted that she had disposed of some of the documents on her computer at the Office of Professional Standards (OPS). However, [Victoria] Bradford, who filled Dr. Annunziata's position after her reassignment, stated that when she first attempted to use the computer she found it inoperable. . . . Subsequent investigation revealed that the computer had been stripped of all documents and software. . . . However, despite Dr. Annunziata's admissions, Defendant has not established that she is responsible for rendering the computer inoperable and purging it of all files and software. Defendant has not established that it has been permanently deprived of documents and files. In addition, Defendant has not established that Dr. Annunziata should be liable for removing documents at the instructions of her superior, Dr. Nelson.Id. at 10-11 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Subsequently, continuance of the case (D.E. No. 123) re-opened the period for filing dispositive motions, and Dr. Annunziata moved for partial summary judgment against Defendant as to the Counterclaim against her. The motion was denied by Order (D.E. No. 145), dated March 8, 2004.
On December 9, 2003, Defendant moved for reconsideration of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, to permit an interlocutory appeal. On December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs' filed their response (D.E. No. 127) in opposition to reconsideration or interlocutory appeal. Defendant filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (D.E. No 125, December 22, 2003) and Exhibits (D.E. No. 131, January 6, 2004) regarding Mathos v. School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, 861 So.2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Defendant also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (D.E. No. 149) on March 15, 2004, regarding Foxy Lady v. City of Atlanta, GA, 347 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). In addition, on March 31, 2004, Defendant filed a Request for Judicial Notice (D.E. No. 152) regarding Judge James Lawrence King's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in Gilliard v. School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, Case No. 02-23236-KING. Defendant has not filed a reply in support of the motion for reconsideration or interlocutory appeal. The Court heard Oral Argument on April 2, 2004 (D.E. No. 155). Accordingly, the motion is ripe for consideration.
II. Legal Standard
The Supreme Court described the law-of-the-case doctrine as follows:
A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own court or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loath to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice."Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that "Courts must rarely invoke the `clear error' exception, less the exception swallow the rule." Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1370 (11th Cir. 2003). However, if new developments convince a court that it erred in an earlier ruling, it would be "wasteful and unjust to require the court to adhere to its earlier ruling." Robinson v. Parrish, 720 F.2d 1548, 1550 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, in order to prevail upon a motion for reconsideration, a defendant must demonstrate how the Court's prior ruling was clearly erroneous or that new developments have rendered the ruling erroneous.
III. Analysis
A. Due Process Under § 1983
In its motion, Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims because: 1) Plaintiffs failed to utilize the state procedures available to them to redress the alleged deprivation of procedural due process and, thus, cannot state a § 1983 claim; 2) Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in their former job positions or salaries and thus, are not entitled to due process; and 3) Plaintiffs received all the due process due to them under the Defendant's reorganization.
To establish a procedural due process clause violation under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: 1) deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; 2) state action; and 3) constitutionally inadequate process. Foxy Lady, 347 F.3d at 1236 (citing Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)). The Court will only address the Defendant's second argument regarding property interest, because this issue is dispositive. To determine whether a property interest has been created, the Court must look to state law. See Morely `s Auto Body, Inc. v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Eleventh Circuit precedents and holding that in the context of due process deprivation claims, property interests must derive from state law).
As a result of Defendant's reorganization, Dr. Annunziata and Mr. Suarez were reassigned to different positions. Neither Plaintiff's employment was terminated. As illustrated by the recent cases of Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2003) and Mathos v. School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, 861 So.2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in their specific employment positions.
In Silva, plaintiffs, deputy sheriffs, filed suit after they were transferred from their probationary lieutenancies back to their previous positions by Defendant, the newly elected Sheriff. Recognizing that "[p]roperty interests protected by the Constitution are `created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law,'" the Eleventh Circuit looked to the applicable section of the Palm Beach County Code to determine whether Plaintiffs had a property interest in their positions as lieutenants. Silva, 351 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The applicable section of the Palm Beach County Code, § 16-93(a), states: "Any employee who is required to serve a probationary period attendant to a promotion shall retain permanent status in the office of the sheriff, but may be returned to his prior rank during such probationary period without the right of appeal." 351 F.3d at 1047, n. 2. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that "[i]t is clear under Florida law and under the applicable Palm Beach County Code that deputy sheriffs serving a probationary period can be transferred back to their previous position with no right to appeal." Id. at 1047-48. Therefore, the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims failed as a matter of law because they did not have a property interest in their rank as lieutenants.
In this case, Dr. Annunziata and Mr. Suarez were employed by the School Board pursuant to annual employment contracts for the 2001-2002 school year. Their employment contracts incorporate the School Board's MEP Manual. Section B-6(E) of the MEP Manual provides that:
An employee may have his/her position adjusted downward with or without a reduction in pay subject to the following provisions:. . . . When a shortage of funds or reorganization results in a reduction-in-force, a change in staffing patterns, or reclassifications of positions initiated by the Superintendent in the course of reorganization, it shall be accomplished by placing an administrator in a position based upon the procedures specified in B-10(A) and (B).
Thus, the employment contracts provide that Plaintiffs may be reassigned from one position to another during a reorganization, such as that which occurred in February 2002. As a result, Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims fail as a matter of law because they do not have a property interest in their specific employment positions.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the procedures set forth in Section B-10 were followed. Assuming there were dispute, this could create a claim for breach of contract rights, but it would not create a property interest in specific employment positions.
This same conclusion was reached by Florida's Third District Court of Appeal ("Third DCA") in Mathos. Mathos, a managerial exempt School Board employee, was reassigned by the School Board during a reorganization in March 2003. Mathos filed a petition for hearing by the School Board pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Fla. Stat. See D.E. No. 131, at Ex. A. The School Board concluded Mathos did not have a property interest under Florida law in his particular job position and therefore, was not entitled to a due process hearing. See D.E. No. 131, at Ex. B. Pursuant to the Florida Rules of Appellant Procedure, Mathos and three other appellants appealed the School Board's final orders denying hearings to the Third DCA. See D.E. No. 131, at Ex. C. The Third DCA affirmed the School Board's decision to deny hearings and held that the appellants had "no cognizable, substantial rights in the particular positions in which they were employed by the School Board." Thus, the Third DCA held that the appellants' requests for a hearing challenging their reassignments were properly denied. As the Third DCA has held that managerial exempt employees of the School Board do not have a property interest in their specific positions, this Court must follow. See KMS Restaurant Corp. V. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 361 F.3d 1321, 1325 (holding that where Florida substantive law governs, the Eleventh Circuit must either follow the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, or follow the decisions of Florida's intermediate appellate courts, absent a compelling indication the Florida Supreme Court would rule otherwise).
Mathos did not appeal the Third DCA's decision to the Florida Supreme Court.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims fail as a matter of law, and the Court's prior ruling as to these claims was erroneous. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that summary judgment shall be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial). The Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No 117) shall be modified accordingly.
B. Breach of Contract
In its motion, Defendant also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims and Defendant's counterclaim. As this Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs' federal claims, this Court declines to retain jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over Plaintiffs' state law-based breach of contract claims or Defendant's state law-based counterclaim against Dr. Annunziata. Accordingly, this case shall be remanded to the state court for further consideration, and the Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 117) shall be vacated with respect to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims and Defendant's counterclaim. ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration ( D.E. No. 122-1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
1. The § 1983 claims alleged by Dr. Annunziata and Mr. Suarez fail as a matter of law. Summary judgment on the § 1983 claims is granted in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs. The Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 117) is hereby superceded as to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. A separate judgment shall be entered accordingly.
2. The Court declines to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims and Defendant's counterclaim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 117) is vacated as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims and Defendant's counterclaim,
3. This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to take all necessary steps and procedures to effect the expeditious remand of the above-styled action.
4. This case is CLOSED. The Clerk is directed to deny all pending motions as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED.