Opinion
No. CV 02 039 55 59 S
July 20, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action brought by The Annual Conference of the Unison Free Will Baptist Church, Inc. ("Annual Conference"), its presiding bishop and various current and former members of St. Luke's Unison Freewill Baptist Church (St. Luke). The plaintiffs brought this action to remove the St. Luke pastor and to gain control of the church property.
This matter first came before the court as a request for a preliminary injunction. After a multi-day hearing, that request was denied. Thim, J.
Before the instant hearing, the defendants filed a motion in limine. The defendants believed that the litigants had stipulated that they would use the same evidence at both the preliminary and permanent injunction hearings. The plaintiffs countered that they had a right to supplement the earlier record. Although this court recognized the equities inherent in the defendant's argument, because the "agreement" by the parties was ambiguous, this court denied the motion in limine.
The plaintiffs have alleged first that the Annual Conference is a general church that has a hierarchical relationship with member churches. They further allege that Reverend Jesse Polite has no authority, other than that given by the Annual Conference, to serve as the pastor for St. Luke. In the second count, the plaintiffs allege St. Luke has refused to accept and recognize the authority of the Annual Conference. In the third count, the plaintiffs allege that Reverend Polite discharged plaintiff Wells from his positions at St. Luke in violation of the rules, customs, usages, and traditions of the Annual Conference. In the fourth count, they allege defendant Eagles is the senior deacon and head officer of St. Luke and that he has allowed Reverend Polite to continue as pastor. In the final count, the plaintiffs allege that the St. Luke congregation is divided.
The plaintiffs ask this court to enjoin Reverend Polite's ministry at St. Luke, to reinstate Deacon Wells and to transfer see the church property and assets to the Annual Conference.
I. Facts of the Case
The plaintiff Annual Conference was formed in 1972. This group of Freewill Baptist Churches had at one time in its history been affiliated with the Unified Freewill Baptist Conference and earlier the United American Freewill Baptist Annual Convention.
St. Luke, once a member of the Annual Conference, is an independent, incorporated Freewill Baptist Church. It has approximately 300 members. The local congregation owns the church property and assets. Some of the property is mortgaged. St. Luke's congregation, not the Annual Conference, is responsible for that mortgage.
At the time of this controversy, the defendant Reverend Polite was the pastor at St. Luke. He was ordained in 1986 under the auspices of the Annual Conference. St. Luke hired Reverend Polite, paid his salary and set his benefits. He serves at the pleasure of the local church.
At the ordination ceremony Reverend Polite took several oaths, one of which was to obey the Freewill Baptist Church's First Discipline. He also swore to uphold The Holy Bible. He agreed to recognize the rules and regulations of the Annual Conference and to honor all the power the annual conference had over him.
Bishop Robert Gay was the presiding Bishop for the Annual Conference. Among his assignments were the licensure, installation and investigation of pastors at various churches within the conference. In July 2000 Bishop Gay received a complaint concerning Reverend Polite. Bishop Gay wrote to Reverend Polite concerning the complaint. There was a series of correspondence. Bishop Gay eventually scheduled a meeting. Reverend Polite did not participate in this process. Subsequently the Annual Conference suspended Reverend Polite. Reverend Polite challenged the investigatory procedure and refused to recognize the suspension.
The complaint was from a member of the St. Luke congregation. It concerned personal conduct that, if true, could have compromised Reverend Polite's effectiveness as a pastor.
The St. Luke congregation was aware of the controversy involving Reverend Polite and the Annual Conference. It was not united in its reaction to the suspension. Some of the members supported the Annual Conference. The vast majority of the congregation supported Reverend Polite. At a meeting held on March 21, 2001, a regular meeting that had been announced at prior church services, the congregation agreed that they were no longer in fellowship with the Annual Conference. Among those present was the plaintiff, Deacon Wells, a member of the Board of Deacons and the church trustee board and the church finance board.
St. Luke's was not the first church to leave the conference. There is no established procedure for such a withdrawal. The Annual Conference did not seek control of the assets of those other congregations. Reverend Gay acknowledged that the First Discipline does not contain an explicit procedure for withdrawals.
There was no formal announcement or mailing. There is no indication that the agenda of this meeting was published in advance. There is a partial tape recording of this meeting. Unfortunately portions of the proceedings were erased during the recording process. It is clear that the meeting concerned the status of the church and its affiliation with the Annual Conference.
The decision to withdraw from fellowship was made in the regular course of the congregation's meeting, in manner that conformed with prior practice and procedure throughout the Annual Conference. St. Luke ceased paying dues to the Annual Conference. There has never been a vote to return to the conference.
Reverend Polite continued to serve as minister. He did not require a license from the Annual Conference. He, and all members of St. Luke, individually had a right to remain a part of the Annual Conference fellowship. They also had the right to withdraw. The church itself could remain in fellowship or withdraw. Nevertheless, some of the members of St. Luke felt uncomfortable attending church services. They began meeting at a local YMCA.
Only ministers affiliated with the Annual Conference require a license from that organization.
Some of these individuals, plaintiffs in this action, were not aware that they brought a civil action against the church or the congregation.
II. Relevant Law
In his earlier decision, Judge Thim summarized this controversy.
The crux of this case is a dispute over control of church property. The majority of those who are members of St. Luke want to use the church property to practice their faith, and they want Reverend Polite to be their pastor. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, want Reverend Polite barred from the church. They claim that Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have the right to determine how the church property can be used; they claim that Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have issued an ecclesiastical decision that is binding on this court.
What is not at stake is the right of Reverend Polite to preach at other churches that are members of the Annual Conference. He is no longer a member of the Annual Conference and does not seek to preach at churches that are part of the conference.
Bishop Gay has a strong bond with the plaintiffs in this action. They include founding members of St. Luke, individuals who sacrificed for decades in order that the church thrive. That commendable loyalty does not, however, end this inquiry.
The ties between the Annual Conference and St. Luke were spiritual. Their relation was congregational in nature. The Annual Conference does not control the property of the local church. There is no hierarchical association. One does not have to be a member of the Annual Conference to be a Freewill Baptist.
As noted in the original court decision:
The Baptists comprise one of the largest and most diverse groupings of Christians in the United States. Technically, there are no such things as Baptist denominations, because Baptists are strongly congregational in polity: Each local congregation is independent of the others. However, Baptist churches are commonly grouped into larger associations for purposes of fellowship. National conventions have been established to carry on education and missionary work and to administer pension plans . . . "Most state and regional conventions meet annually with delegates from all Baptist churches in a given area. These conventions receive reports, make recommendations, and help to raise national mission budgets: but they have no authority to enforce their decisions. Baptists have insisted on freedom of thought and expression in pulpit and pew. They have insisted, too, on the absolute autonomy of the local congregation; each church arranges its own worship and examines and baptizes its own members . . ." Frank S. Mead, Samuel S. Hill, Handbook of Denominations in the United States (Abington Press 11th Edition) p. 42.
Baptist churches comprise self-governing congregations, and although these congregations join in denominational bodies for such purposes as the promotion of missionary programs, the bodies exercise no control over the member congregations. But the matter is not always so simple. The courts have a great difficulty in classifying certain churches. Note, "Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property," 75 Harvard L. Rev. 1142, 1159 (1962). "It may be reasonably clear — although courts have not always thought so — that the affiliation of Baptist congregations in conventions does not create a hierarchical organization, or that the mere outward presbyterial form — i.e., a series of assemblies — does not necessarily import a functional hierarchy even where power to ordain ministers is vested in the assemblies. But in harder cases it might be better for the courts to eschew an analysis of obscure ecclesiastical rules and proceed directly to the next stage of inquiry: whether the local congregation is in fact controlled by a general church." Id. at 1160. [fn 5] "A church may choose to affiliate with a separate hierarchical religious organization for certain purposes, consenting to the latter's `authority' to resolve questions of doctrine and practice for that association, and at the same time retain its autonomy and its right to prescribe the use and control of its property. When a church affiliates on these terms, the members remain free. In the event of a disagreement over doctrine or practice, simply to sever the local church's relationship with the hierarchical organization and withdraw itself and its property from that association, regardless of any purported adjudication of the question by the hierarchy." A.M. Adams and W.R. Hanlon, " Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 128 Univ.Penn.L.Rev. 1291, 1331-32 (1980).
Compare this structure with that of the Roman Catholic Church, a purely hierarchical organization. As a consequence, attempts by local parishes to gain control of parish property and assets have been unsuccessful. See Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, No. 043803B, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court for Suffolk County (September 14, 2004) (18 Mass. L. Rptr. 271) (local Roman Catholic Churches are unincorporated subdivisions of the archdiocese; all property is owned by the archdioceses). See also Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop Of Worcester, 416 Mass. 781, 625 N.E.2d 1352 (1994) (same).
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment promises that government will not prevent or attempt to prevent anyone from practicing his or her religion. Therefore, the civil courts may decide church disputes in some cases, such as in select property and employment discrimination disputes, but are prohibited from "resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine." The Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699 n. 2, (4th Cir. 2002). See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872).
"Civil courts have the general authority to resolve the question of church property ownership. The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes and in providing a civil forum where the ownership [and control] of church property can be determined conclusively. The first amendment to the United States constitution, however, severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It therefore forbids civil courts from resolving church property disputes by inquiring into and resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice." Trinity-St. Michael's Parish v. Episcopal Church, 224 Conn. 797, 800-01, 620 A.2d 1280 (1993). (Internal citations and quotations omitted.)
The plaintiffs in this action do not claim any interest in St. Luke's property. Their action is based upon a desire to preserve that property for the minority members of St. Luke who prefer to remain in fellowship with the Annual Conference. Although the plaintiffs claim that this court is bound by the decision of the Annual Conference, civil courts can address questions involving church property. New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272, 283, 438 A.2d 62 (1980).
As Judge Thim noted in his decision,
Where church property, as in the present case, has not been dedicated by way of express trust to the general religious body or the local church, the court "must decide, without becoming entangled in religious controversy, what is the nature of the relationship between [the Annual Conference] and [St. Luke's Church]." New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, supra at 283. "Whether a civil court may inquire into church property disputes . . . depends entirely on whether the parties committed those questions to the exclusive province of a particular religious society. And this issue is not an exclusively ecclesiastical issue but rather one that properly may be submitted to a civil court for resolution . . . [N]o constitutional considerations bar civil courts from determining for themselves whether the local church, upon its affiliation with a hierarchical organization, meant to confer on the latter body the authority claimed." A.M. Adams and W.R. Hanlon, " Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 128 Univ.Penn.L.Rev. 1291, 1330 (1980).
The case of Guin v. Johnson, 230 Ala. 427, 161 So. 810 (1935), is instructive. In that controversy, the local Freewill Baptist church wished to switch conference affiliation. Noting that the local church was not a pure democracy, the court commented "[w]here a church has adopted a particular faith or form of church government or where its property is held in trust, the constituted authorities or majority of the church who change its doctrines and discipline by abandoning the adopted faith, either becoming independent or uniting with another, cannot take with them the church property; the right thereto remaining with those who adhere to the original doctrine and discipline, no matter how small the number."
Reviewing the initial church incorporation, and the deeds under which the property was held, the Guin court noted that its review of the church dispute was limited. "Unless there is shown a clear diversion of the property from the religious uses to which it was dedicated, the majority must rule in a democratic religious body." Recognizing that the local Freewill Baptist church was independent, the court determined that the majority of the members have the right to control the property, subject to the limitation that the majority not deviate radically from the original doctrine.
The Guin court rejected the argument that the local church was limited by its affiliation with a broader association, at least for purposes of property disputes. Instead the Guin court ruled "By the great weight of the evidence the association comes into being, as the voluntary act of the churches, and continues to exist at their will. The association has articles of faith, but they are such as the constituent churches adopt." The Guin court commented "It appears provision is made for an orderly withdrawal of a church from the association by letter. But it seems beyond question that it is the right of any church to withdraw or drop its affiliation with an association at will, and unite with another, or join in forming another." See also New York Home Missionary Society v. First Freewill Baptist Church, 73 Misc. 128, 130 N.Y.S. 879 (1911).
"[T]he mere fact of some hierarchical connection with a general church does not preclude . . . [an associated] local church from retaining its right as a congregation to use and control church property." A.M. Adams and W.R. Hanlon, " Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 128 Univ.Penn.L.Rev. 1291, 1308 (1980). As the intervening plaintiffs acknowledge in their legal brief, the relationship between an individual church and a church conference may combine elements of both hierarchical and congregational policies. The history of St. Luke's affiliation with the plaintiff conference and the manner in which other churches have both joined and withdrawn from the conference show that member churches have always enjoyed a high degree of independence. All have the ability to leave the conference at will. However one may characterize the relationship between St. Luke and the Annual Conference, it is clear that St. Luke never placed its property under the control of the Annual Conference. See Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 74 A.2d 203 (1950) (local church retained control of its property even when it joined a general church whose polity was episcopal and whose hierarchy was developed in pyramidal pattern with the local church subject to the rule of the higher level).
Annual Conference of the Unison Freewill Baptist Church v. St. Luke Church, No. CV02 39 55 59 S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport (February 19, 2004, Thim, J.)
In Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699 (4th Cir. 2002) the court listed factors for a court to consider when determining whether a church structure is hierarchical in nature. Those are "1) The corporations in question are organized under the state religious corporations act governing the incorporation of religious societies that are subordinate parts of larger church organizations. 2) Resolutions of the subordinate entity acknowledge the superiority of the superior entity. 3) By-laws of the lower authority have been submitted to the higher for approval. 4) The priest takes an oath to be obedient to the higher authority. 5) Provisions in the constitutions and by-laws of both the superior and subordinate levels suggest a hierarchical relationship.
Taking these factors into consideration, courts that have addressed the issue have determined that the Freewill Baptist Church has a congregation rather than a hierarchical structure. They have consequently determined that absent a showing of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, courts have not interfered in disputes between independent churches, including Freewill Baptist churches, and their general conference. See Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 383 Mass. 854, 422 N.E.2d 1337 (1981); Mullins v. Elswick, 438 S.W.2d 283 (Ky, 1969); Montgomery v. Snyder, 320 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1958); Freewill Baptist Church of Blountstown v. Franklin, 148 Fla. 277, 4 So.2d 390 (1941) (majority of membership controls).
In the present case, the St Luke by laws and articles of incorporation do not authorize the actions desired by the Annual Conference. Section 4(b) of the Bylaws of St. Luke authorize the directors of St. Luke to "appoint and remove, employ and discharge . . . all officers, agents and employees of the corporation." The majority of St. Luke has not voted to discharge Reverend Polite. He therefore is still the pastor. Furthermore, the majority of St. Luke's congregation has never voted to return to fellowship with the Annual Conference. Instead, they have withheld dues and, by minutes of a St. Luke meeting held on November 29, 2001, confirmed that "this ministry no longer belongs to the Conference."
While Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have the right to resolve matters of doctrine and practice, they do not have ultimate or complete power to decide disputes about the ownership of church property. The plaintiffs have failed to establish either authority of harm. Their request for relief must be denied.
The plaintiffs are concerned that the majority at St. Luke will not preserve the church's assets. Given their investment in the church's finances, this concern is understandable. This fear is not, however, a basis for present relief.
DEWEY, J.