Opinion
1:22-CV-00033-SPB-RAL
06-10-2022
BRYAN ANGLE, II, Plaintiff v. LT. SMITH, LT. FROEHLICH, CO1 GUYTON, CO2 MALUK, CO1 BONCELLA, CO1 HARRISON, CO1 BRIDGES, CO1 MCDANIEL, CO1 MONTINI, CO1 NADAL, CO1 ARCLEY, CO1 HAM, CO1 LUCKOCK, CO1 BLY, CO1 SMITH, CO VANDERHOOF, AND JOHN DOE, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ECF NO. 5
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Defendants have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim. ECF No 5. It is respectfully recommended that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Bryan Angle, II (Angle), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) at its State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-Fayette), originally sued seventeen DOC employees in the Court of Common Pleas for Erie County, Pennsylvania. Defendants removed this action from state court to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over Angle's claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Angle asserts violations of his federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and state law torts. Defendants moved to dismiss Angle's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 5. The motion has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 5, 6, 10.
B. Allegations of the Complaint
Angle's complaint does not state whether he is suing the Defendants in their individual or official capacities. To the extent that a Defendants is sued in his “official capacity,” claims for monetary relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). The Department of Corrections (DOC), which administers SCI-Albion as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and its agents and employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019). The Defendants are DOC employees at SCI-Albion; therefore, Angle's claims for monetary relief against them in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice. To the extent his claims are viable on the merits, Angle may seek injunctive or declaratory relief against the Defendants in their official capacities because Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to claims for such relief. Laskaris, 661 F.2d at 26. His viable claims against Guyton for excessive force and retaliation can proceed against him in his individual capacity for money damages.
The Court accepts the following factual allegations in Angle's Complaint as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). All alleged actions took place at SCI-Albion where Angle was previously incarcerated. On May 15, 2021, an unnamed corrections officer thought Angle was vaping in the housing unit's dayroom. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 3. That officer ordered him to return to his cell and “lock in.” Id. Although Angle initially refused, he then agreed and began returning to his cell. Id., ¶ 4. As he walked back to his cell, an unidentified sergeant stopped him and asked him to explain the situation. Id. While they spoke, a group approached: Defendants Officer Boncella, Officer Harrison, Officer Bridges, Officer McDaniel, Officer Montini, Officer Nadal, Officer Arcley, Officer Ham, and Officer John Doe (an officer at rank one). Id., ¶ 5. In an ensuing altercation, unspecified “Defendants choked, slapped, punched, [and] kicked [Angle] several times.” Id., ¶ 6. An unspecified officer handcuffed him. Id., ¶ 7. He was then led out of the housing unit. Angle told those officers that he was going to file a lawsuit. Id. Then, officer Guyton, who had been walking ahead of Angle, turned around, walked up to him, and “slapped” him in the face while an unidentified officer “pulled” his hair. Id. At that point, Sergeant Harris ordered Guyton and the other officer to stop.
Angle was then searched. Lieutenant Smith ordered an unidentified officer to take his kufi-what Angle described only as “a religious headpiece for Muslims.” Id., ¶ 9. Officers then took Angle to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). Id., ¶ 10. When he entered the RHU, Angle asked Sergeant Maluk and Lieutenant Froelich to get his kufi from Lieutenant Smith. Id., ¶ 11. They did not. Id.
While the complaint identifies him as “Lt. Froelick,” the Court will use the spelling of Froehlich's name provided by the Defendants.
He was then escorted to the Psychological Observation Corridor. Id., ¶ 12. There, a camcorder that had been recording was turned off by someone. Id., ¶ 13. Lieutenant Froehlich then made a derogatory comment about his religion. Id. Three days later, he was transferred to the RHU. Id., ¶ 14. The next day, officer Luckcock told Angle that “he doesn't eat or get anything else until plaintiff sucks his penis.” Id., ¶ 15. Angle does not say if any food or drink were in fact withheld. He added only, “Since then, Plaintiff has been subjected to a campaign of harassment by the RHU” corrections officers. Id., ¶ 16.
Two days later, three corrections officers-Defendants Bly, Smith, and Vanderhoof- inventoried Angle's property. Id., ¶ 17. They confiscated “hundreds of dollars' worth of property and legal work,” saying he had excess property, altered property that constituted contraband, and art supplies without a permit. Id., ¶¶ 18-22. At a misconduct hearing, a John Doe hearing examiner ordered that his art supplies be returned because he had an art permit but found him guilty of possessing contraband and ordered that all other property and legal work be confiscated. Id., ¶¶ 23-25. When Angle asked that the hearing examiner review camera footage and examine his property to determine that he was not over the four-box limit and that items were not altered, the hearing examiner refused. Id., ¶¶ 26-27. Instead, he said that this was a consequence of Angle assaulting his officers. Id.
Angle seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, an injunction for the return of his kufi and other property, an injunction “ordering defendants and associates to cease all adverse and retaliatory actions toward” him, and a declaration that the Defendants violated his rights. Id., ¶¶ 30-36.
C. Standard of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
2. Pro Se Litigants
While the foregoing principles apply to all complaints in federal court, pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read the factual allegations of a pro se complaint to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
D. Discussion
1. Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force by state actors. Angle has alleged two incidents of excessive force. Each will be analyzed separately. First, nine officers allegedly “became hostile towards” him in his housing unit and then unspecified “Defendants choked, slapped, punched, [and] kicked Plaintiff several times.” Id., ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff was then cuffed by an unidentified officer or officers. Id., ¶ 7. Second, while he was being escorted out of his housing unit and after he said that he would file a lawsuit, Guyton “slapped” Angle in the face while another, unnamed officer “pulled Plaintiff's hair.” Id. ¶¶ 7-8. “Plaintiff then was escorted to the unit ‘sally port' by his hair.” Id.
While Angle's brief has invoked the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment has been held to provide the sole proper source of the legal right to be free from excessive force while incarcerated upon conviction. See Skinner v. Gautreaux, 549 F.Supp.3d 493, 501 (M.D. La. 2021).
The Defendants argue that the complaint does not support the personal involvement of any Defendant in either alleged use of excessive force, except Guyton's involvement in the second incident. ECF No. 6, p. 7. Constitutional tort liability arises only upon a showing of “personal involvement” in the alleged wrongful conduct. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Colon v. Anglikowski, 2021 WL 2875477, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2021) (citation omitted). When proceeding under § 1983, as Angle is here, a plaintiff cannot prevail unless he can demonstrate that the defendant played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing Eighth Amendment claims).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
The allegations do not support any Defendants' personal involvement in the first excessive force incident. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “‘showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3). Although the Complaint need not include an exhaustive recitation of the facts, it must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Therefore, a plaintiff “may not rely on vague references to a group of defendants.” Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). See also Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (“lumping all the defendants together in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct” fails to satisfy minimum “fair notice” standard of FRCP Rule 8).
Angle's contention that the entire group of Defendants assaulted him in the first incident [ECF No. 10, p. 4] does not save those claims. The complaint's conclusory allegations do not sufficiently identify any individual Defendant's personal involvement in actionable conduct. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020); Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 Fed.Appx. 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2015) (allegations that broadly implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are legally insufficient.). “Pleadings that do not differentiate which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.” Ying Li v. City of New York, 2017 WL 1208422, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). See also Wright v. Orleans Cty., 2015 WL 5316410, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (in a § 1983 case, “[g]roup pleading is insufficient for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2) which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Angle also argues that any Defendants present at the first incident who were not striking him are liable for failure to intervene under the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 10, p. 5. But Angle did not include a failure to intervene claim in the complaint. And the factual allegations from which the Court could construe one are absent. Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 470 F.3d 422, 431 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting “the proposition that a failure to intervene claim is implicit in an excessive force claim directed at multiple defendants”). Doing so would require too liberal a reading of the complaint because Angle does not allege that any individual Defendant “had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.” Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 479 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating elements of a failure to intervene claim)). If facts exist to state a such a claim, Angle may include them in an amended complaint. As presently alleged, however, the facts do not support the personal involvement of any Defendant, except Guyton, in actionable conduct under any theory of liability.
While conceding Guyton's personal involvement in the second alleged use of force incident, the Defendants argue that the allegations against Guyton do not rise to the level of excessive force. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” on inmates. US. Const. amend. VIII. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive use of force, an inmate must show two components, one subjective and the other objective. See Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is.. .contextual and responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.'” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). It asks whether prison officials unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain in a manner that offends “contemporary standards of decency.” See id. at 8-9. The “core judicial inquiry” of the subjective element is whether “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, (1992). There are several factors to examine when determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force'; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) ‘the extent of injury inflicted'; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them'; and (5) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)). The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
The allegations of the complaint support an inference that Guyton had no need to strike Angle. Officers were leading Angle out of the housing unit after the conclusion of the first alleged use of force. Angle's complaint seems to acknowledge that he was vaping in the dayroom in violation of prison rules. Yet a rule violation “do[es] not provide a blank check justification” for excessive force once an inmate has become compliant. See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir. 2009) (blow that caused a broken rib and collapsed lung would violate Eighth Amendment if done after prisoner was subdued). With no need for Guyton to use force apparent from the complaint, the force alleged here favors Angle's claim. Moreover, the allegation that Guyton struck Angle immediately after he said that he would file a lawsuit goes to Guyton's improper intent.
The Defendants focus their argument on the extent of Angle's alleged injury as a result of Guyton's use of force. While acknowledging that an excessive force claim does not categorically fail for lack of a “discernable injury,” ECF No. 6, p. 9, they nevertheless argue that the claim against Guyton must be dismissed “because any alleged force was de minimis and there is no injury alleged.” Id., p. 7.
For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, the degree of injury is “relevant to the.. .inquiry but does not end it.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Indeed, even small amounts of force, where excessive, may violate the Constitution. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]njury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without injury.” Id. at 38. It is clear, then, that a prisoner can state an excessive force claim without a serious injury. Id. While allegations of injury are absent from Angle's complaint, it is reasonable to infer that a slap across the face caused at least some injury, albeit minor. This factor slightly favors Angle's claim.
The Court next examines the relationship between the force used and the need for it. Actions that appear “designed to frighten and degrade” violate the Eighth Amendment. Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995). The alleged unprovoked nature of Guyton's slap favors Angle's claim. See id. And spontaneous blows to the face, including slaps, have been held to support a claim for excessive force. See Romaine v. Rawson, 140 F.Supp.2d 204, 211-12 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (at conclusion of bench trial, court held that three slaps or strikes to face without justification violated Eighth Amendment); Bee v. Dekalb Cty., 679 F.Supp. 1107, 1109, 1113 (N.D.Ga. 1988) (denying summary judgment on arrestee's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims when factual issues existed concerning whether plaintiff suffered unprovoked blow to face from officer). See also Jones v. Huff, 789 F.Supp. 526, 536-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (kicks to plaintiff's buttocks “were unwarranted and cavalier,” court held after bench trial).
The Rawlinson court added, “In this Court's view, even one slap against a prisoner is objectively unreasonable and ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind' when, as here, the prisoner presents no threat to prison guards or others, poses no security risk, and does not otherwise pose a danger to himself.” Id.
While it is true that numerous courts have held that evidence of a slap or strike to the head amounts to de minimis force that fails to demonstrate a claim, most of those cases were decided on motions for summary judgment, “where evidence presented to the court either undermined the credibility of the plaintiff's allegations or showed the plaintiff's injuries to be minimal.” Benjamin v. Flores, 2012 WL 5289513, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012) (collecting cases). Even though “not.. .every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, examination of actual force used will require a factual record. Compare Brown v. Croce, 967 F.Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1997) (granting summary judgment for defendant on excessive force claim when concluding that two slaps to the face amounted to de minimis force and plaintiff conceded that he had suffered no physical injury). This factor currently favors Angle's claim.
Furthermore, no efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response appear in the complaint. If Angle's statement about filing a lawsuit was instead a disruptive outburst requiring discipline, Guyton could have provided verbal warnings, orders to quiet down, and notice that some force would be used if he did not comply. As alleged, Guyton provided no such admonition. Based on the current record, this factor favors Angle's claim. To the extent, if any, Angle presented a safety threat as reasonably perceived by the officers, Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009), it is not apparent on the face of the complaint.
In sum, based on the allegations of the complaint, the Whitley factors support Angle's excessive force claim against Guyton. However, his claim against the unnamed officer who pulled his hair while Guyton slapped him fail to support a claim against any Defendant. While assisting or participating with another officer in the commission of excessive force may itself violate the Eighth Amendment, the complaint does not identity any Defendant as engaging in such conduct. If discovery discloses the identity of officers who committed the alleged acts of excessive force, he may seek leave to amend to supply the currently omitted facts. Little v. Mun. Corp., 51 F.Supp.3d 473, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (dismissing without prejudice excessive force claims asserted against “members of the ‘Special Search Team' and ‘ESU Officers'” and noting that plaintiff may “include as much identifying information as he has knowledge of,” in an amended complaint).
The same allegations of Angle's complaint that support an excessive force claim against Guyton also state a claim of assault and battery under Pennsylvania law against Guyton. For the reasons stated above, however, the allegations are insufficient to support such a claim against any other Defendant. See Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226, 255 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (“Under Pennsylvania law, an assault occurs when one acts with the intent to place another in reasonable and immediate apprehension of harmful or offensive contact, and that act does cause such apprehension. A battery is an intentional offensive bodily contact.”) (citations omitted).
The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Angle's state law claims for assault and battery because they are so related to his Eighth Amendment claims as to form the same case and controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
2. RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause
Angle has alleged that Lt. Smith violated his religious rights when he ordered an unnamed officer to confiscate his kufi. The complaint next alleges that he asked Sgt. Maluk and Lt. Froelich to return his kufi, but they refused. He also alleged that Lt. Froelich mocked his religion with obscene language. While the Court has already adopted the undersigned's prior Report and Recommendation that Angle failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits on either his RLUIPA or First Amendment claims in his motion for preliminary injunction, that is not conclusive here because a different standard of review applies. Now, the Defendants argue that Angle has failed to state a claim under either RLUIPA or the First Amendment. As explained below, Angle's religious rights' claims should be dismissed.
Angle's complaint does not specify whether he brought his RLUIPA claim (or any other claims) against the Defendants in their individual or official capacities. He requested both money damages and injunctive relief. But RLUIPA does not permit actions against state officials in their individual capacities, see Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153-55 (3d Cir. 2012), and the states have “not consent[ed] to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages” under the statute. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). See also Adams v. Corr. Emergency Response Team, 857 Fed.Appx. 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Instead, against state officials, “[a] RLUIPA cause of action is an official-capacity claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.” Barros v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 5785746, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2015). See also Small v. Wetzel, 528 Fed.Appx. 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2013). So, Angle's RLUIPA claim is potentially viable only as an official capacity claim for injunctive relief.
According to RLUIPA, “no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.. .even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the burden.. .is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that. interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). If the plaintiff “produces prima facie evidence to support a claim.the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). Analysis of “RLUIPA claims in the prisoner context requires a case-specific consideration of the particular circumstances and claims.” Ramirez v. Collier, --- U.S. ---, 142 S.Ct. 1264, 1283 (2022).
“Under RLUIPA, [the plaintiff] bears the ‘initial burden' of showing that (1) he has a sincerely held religious belief., and (2) the prison substantially burdened the exercise of his belief...” Watson v. Christo, 837 Fed.Appx. 877, 880 n.6 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360-61 (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). Similarly, to state a Free Exercise claim, an individual must have a belief that is “both sincerely held and religious in nature.” Heleva v. Kramer, 214 Fed.Appx. 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Absent allegations to support these elements, Angle's complaint fails to support a Free Exercise or RLUIPA claim.
The Court need not elaborate concerning the other requirements of these claims because Angle has failed to plead that has a relevant, sincerely held religious belief. RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause protect only sincerely held religious beliefs, not “[t]he mere assertion” of a religious belief. DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000). There are no allegations whatsoever that illuminate the role a kufi plays in Angle's religious practice or beliefs. His only explanation is that a kufi is “a religious headpiece for Muslims.” ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 9. While the Court might infer from this allegation that Angle is a Muslim, it can only speculate regarding its potential religious significance of the kufi, and the allegations do not support that its temporary removal substantially burdened Angle's free exercise of any religious belief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a court may draw a “reasonable inference” rooted in “more than a sheer possibility”). Courts have dismissed RLUIPA and Free Exercise claims when the plaintiff failed to plead the personal significance of the religious item or practice. See Adams, 857 Fed.Appx. at 60 (affirming dismissal of free exercise claim when plaintiff alleged “only that the missing necklace reflected [his] religious faith, with no description of how losing it affected his religious practice,” an allegation “amounting to nothing more than a ‘mere assertion of a religious belief.'”) (quoting DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51); Hainey v. Carney, 2022 WL 1308510, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2022) (dismissing RLUIPA and Free Exercise claims when plaintiff failed to “identify his religion, describe the lost property with any specificity, or explain how the lost property was required for him to exercise his faith.”); Grohs v. Santiago, 2014 WL 4657116, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2014) (dismissing free exercise claim when plaintiff “never identified his faith nor.. .the sincerely held religious beliefs that required him to retain [certain religious] materials”).
Thus, Angle's Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims should be dismissed, but without prejudice to his opportunity to file an amended complaint to allege additional facts, if he can do so in good faith, to cure the defects in his pleading.
3. Confiscation of Property
The Defendants also argue that claims based on Bly, Vanderhoof, and Smith's alleged confiscation of Angle's property must be dismissed because he has failed to plead facts sufficient to support any such claim or identified a legal basis for such claims. ECF No. 6, p. 5.
Construed as a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, Angle must demonstrate that Defendants confiscated his property and that he was not afforded a postdeprivation administrative remedy. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). “[A]dequate post-deprivation remedies include the ability to file a state tort action or use of the prison's grievance process.” Mearin v. Folino, 2013 WL 5332120, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2013) (citing Tapp v. Proto, 404 Fed.Appx. 563, 567 (3d Cir. 2010)). The availability of either of these post-deprivation remedies “forecloses any due process claim.. .even if [the] inmate is dissatisfied with the result of the process.” Id. (quoting Iseley v. Horn, 1996 WL 510090, at * 6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1996)).
Here, no due process claim is available. Courts in the Third Circuit have routinely held that the DOC's grievance system satisfies the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Spencer v. Bush, 543 Fed.Appx. 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013). State tort law, including an action for conversion, may also provide Angle with a remedy. See Hernandez v. Corrections Emergency Response Team, 771 Fed.Appx. at 145 (“Even if the prison grievance procedures could be considered constitutionally inadequate, Pennsylvania's state tort law would provide an adequate remedy”) (citation omitted). As such, Angle's due process claim must be dismissed, with prejudice. Any attempted amendment would be futile.
The Court has also considered whether Angle has stated a claim for denial of access to the courts due to his allegation that some of his legal papers were confiscated. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Angle has not alleged any “actual injury” or impairment of his legal rights due to the absence of the materials, and so that claim fails. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)). Thus, Angle has failed to state a due process claim or an access to courts claim.
But Angle has stated a state law claim for conversion against certain Defendants. Under Pennsylvania common law, conversion is the “deprivation of another's right of property, or use or possession of a chattel, or other interference therewith, without the owner's consent and without legal justification.” Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. York Bank & Tr. Co., 69 F.3d 695, 704 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Cenna v. United States, 402 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir.1968)). The act must be intentional. See McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 659 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
Angle has stated a conversion claim against Lt. Smith because he ordered that an officer confiscate Angle's kufi. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 9. Angle has also stated a conversion claim against officers Bly, Vanderhoof, and Smith for taking “hundreds of dollars' worth of property and legal work,” from him. Id., ¶¶ 18-22. Deciding whether these Defendants acted with “legal justification” will require a developed factual record beyond the complaint. The complaint's allegations do not support, however, a conversion claim against any other Defendant.
4. Retaliation
The Defendants argue that Angle has not stated a retaliation claim because none of his conduct constituted protected activity, the pleadings do not support causation, and the Defendants lack the personal involvement required to support a section 1983 claim. ECF No. 6, p. 5.
To state a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege facts to support that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) officials took an adverse action against the plaintiff; and (3) “a causal link” exists “between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). This is an objective inquiry. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012). This requirement is not too demanding: “unless the claimed retaliatory action is truly ‘inconsequential,' the plaintiff's claim should go to the jury.” Id. (citing Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)). To show that retaliatory motive caused the adverse action, the plaintiff may rely on direct evidence or an inference of retaliatory motive arising from either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). “‘These are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.'” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Angle has stated a straightforward retaliation claim against officer Guyton. After the first alleged incident of excessive force, as officers were escorting Angle out of his housing unit, he stated that he would file a lawsuit. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 7. This was protected activity. See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530. Then, Guyton turned around and slapped him across the face. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 7. This was an adverse action. See Burbridge v. City of St. Louis, 2 F.4th 774, 781-82 (8th Cir. 2021) (more than de minimis force). Guyton's near-immediate reaction allows for a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent and causation. See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267.
The motion to dismiss should be granted, however, on Angle's retaliation claims against all other Defendants. Angle contends that Bly, Vanderhoof, and Smith confiscated his excess property as retaliation. As the basis of this claim, he has identified as his protected activity his “constitutionally protected liberty interest.. .to possess his property.” ECF No. 10, p. 1. It is true that confiscating an inmate's property can be an adverse action depending on the circumstances. See Jackson v. Carter, 813 Fed.Appx. 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (“discarding an inmate's personal and legal property could be considered an ‘adverse action.'”). But Angle has not pleaded facts to support a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive connecting his possession of excess property with the decision to down-size his property.
Angle's brief includes a statement attributed to Vanderhoof which he attempts to argue supports his retaliatory motive. ECF No. 10, p. 2. But “[i]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal marks and citation omitted); Bracken v. Cty. of Allegheny, 2017 WL 5593451, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017) (“A pleading may not be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).
Angle also alleged that the John Doe hearing examiner found him guilty of the misconducts for possessing excess property and contraband as retaliation, averring that he said, “that's what you get when you assault my officers.” ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 25-27. But this claim fails because Angle has not identified any conduct or activity protected under the First Amendment which motivated the alleged retaliation. See Mitchell, 318 F.3d 523.
5. Verbal Harassment
While in the RHU on May 19, 2021, Angle alleged that officer Luckcock harassed and threatened him. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 15. Angle's brief says that he has decided to drop his claims against Luckcock. ECF No. 10, p. 3 n.1. Accordingly, all claims against Luckcock should be dismissed. See Benedict v. Sw. Pennsylvania Hum. Servs., Inc., 98 F.Supp.3d 809, 814 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing some claims when plaintiff's partial brief in opposition conceded failure to state a claim). In the complaint after his harassment allegation against Luckcock, Angle added only, “since then, Plaintiff has been subjected to a campaign of harassment by the RHU” corrections officers. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 16. That allegation does not allege the personal involvement of any Defendant, so it cannot support a claim. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Furthermore, Defendants correctly argue that a claim against Froelich “based upon verbal harassment” does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Washington v. Rozich, 734 Fed.Appx. 798, 801 (3d Cir. 2018).
6. Leave to Amend
When dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint, “a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). The following claims are deficient for failure to allege sufficient facts: Angle's excessive force, assault, battery, and retaliation claims against Defendants other than Guyton, his Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims, and his possible access to courts claim. Accordingly, those claims should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. His due process claims for confiscation of his property and his stand-alone claims based on verbal harassment should be dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile. Angle should be granted a reasonable time to file an amended complaint, subject to the dismissal of this action with prejudice should he fail to file one.
Given the nature of the errors in his pro se complaint, Angle is reminded that any amended complaint must describe how each defendant violated his rights. He must show personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing by each Defendant. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). His pleading should explain to the Court what happened by specifically describing each Defendant's behavior or action and how that behavior or action-or lack thereof-caused the alleged violations. He should include dates or timeframes, when known.
An amended complaint “must be complete in all respects. It is a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed.” Williams v. Ferdarko, 2018 WL 3653272, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D. Pa. 1992)). In plain terms, this means that Angle should not simply submit the new facts or claims that he wishes to add to this litigation and request that they be added to his prior complaint. Rather, he must draft a full and complete amended complaint containing both his prior facts and claims and those that he wishes to add. This means that an amended complaint must include claims that the Court has here said survived the motion to dismiss. Failure to include those claims (and their supporting facts) means those claims would be treated as abandoned.
Angle must state any actual injury he has suffered. Simply stating that the Defendants violated his civil rights is insufficient. He must also describe for the Court the relief he is seeking in this lawsuit.
7. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss at ECF No. 5 be granted in part and denied in part as detailed above.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, any party may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).