Opinion
No. CV04 041 25 21S, CV05 400 87S.
December 5, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
These two consolidated cases involve a one-vehicle accident which occurred on February 3, 2003, on Interstate 95, near Exit 21 in Fairfield.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff, Kiamesha Rogers, was a front seat passenger in a Brinks armored truck which was being operated by the defendant, Brenton Reid, eastbound on I-95. Shannon Angerome, the decedent of the plaintiff Ellen Angerome, Administratrix, was also a passenger in the armored truck.
Brenton Reid was operating the vehicle in the center lane, when it drifted off the travel portion of the highway, striking a guardrail. The vehicle proceeded over the guardrail, and down a steep embankment, before striking a light pole and two trees. The armored truck rolled over, before coming to a stop.
Kiamesha Rogers was taken from the scene of the accident to the hospital, having sustained a broken right arm, a dislocated right shoulder, and related injuries.
The decedent, Shannon Angerome, was trapped in the rear portion of the vehicle, and was extricated by the emergency personnel who responded to the accident. She was transported to Bridgeport Hospital, where she died later that day.
On February 3, 2003, Kiamesha Rogers, Shannon Angerome, and the defendant, Brenton Reid, were all residents of the State of New York. All three were employed by Brinks, Inc., and were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident. Shannon Angerome had been a Brinks employee since 2000. She worked as an ATM technician at the Brooklyn office, 652 Kent Avenue.
She was normally assigned to work in the dispatch facility. However, she was in the armored truck on February 3 because a co-worker had called in sick.
Kiamesha Rogers was employed as an unarmed guard. She worked with Brenton Reid for two or three months prior to the accident, and came to Connecticut with the defendant one or two times per week to service Connecticut customers.
At the time of the accident, the armored truck was traveling toward a scheduled stop in New Haven.
Kiamesha Rogers applied for and obtained workers' compensation benefits in the state of New York. Brinks, Inc., her employer, has intervened in this action, to recover monies paid to Kiamesha Rogers pursuant to the New York Workers' Compensation statute.
Although apparently eligible to apply for and receive death benefits under the New York statute, the plaintiff Administratrix has made no workers' compensation claim. However, Brinks, Inc. paid the Bridgeport Hospital bill for services concerning the decedent.
In both of these cases, the defendant, Brenton Reid moves for summary judgment. He claims that the law of New York applies to both claims and that the "exclusivity provision" of the Workers' Compensation Statute, § 29(6), precludes recovery because both Kiamesha Rogers and the decedent were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident.
"The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee . . . when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ." New York Workers' Compensation Law, § 29(6) (McKinney, 1997).
The plaintiffs contend that Connecticut law should be applied to their claims, and that any conflicts of law analysis favors the application of Connecticut law, rather than the law of New York.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court may appropriately render summary judgment when documentary evidence, including pleadings, affidavits and depositions, demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains between the parties, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co., 190 Conn. 8, 11 (1983); Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578 (1999). A material fact has been defined as one which will make a difference in the case. United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379 (1969).
Connecticut Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Because all parties agree as to the material facts which may be considered, but differ only as to the conclusions to be drawn from those facts, these motions for summary judgment are somewhat akin to a common-law motion for judgment on the pleadings. Miller's Pond, LLC v. City of New London, 273 Conn. 786, 790 (2005). Although the purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to test for the presence of contested factual issues, the use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate where the complaint fails to set forth a viable cause of action, and the defect cannot be cured by repleading. Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 392, 401 (2005).
The test to be applied is whether the party seeking summary judgment would be entitled to a directed verdict. United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, supra, 380.
NEW YORK WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW APPLIES
The plaintiff, Kiamesha Rogers, has applied for and obtained benefits under New York's Workers' Compensation laws. A motion to intervene was filed, and was granted, thus permitting her employer to recover monies paid, if she is successful in her claim against Brenton Reid.
New York does not permit suit by one injured or killed by the act of a co-employee, when injury or death occurs in the course of employment. Workers' Compensation is the exclusive remedy. New York Workers' Compensation Law, § 29(6) (McKinney 1997).
This is contrary to Connecticut law, § 31-393a of the General Statutes, which contains a "motor vehicle exception," allowing an action against a co-employee if injury is caused by the operation of a motor vehicle. The statute reads:
If an employee, or, in the case of his death, his dependent, has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter, on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence . . . of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependant . . . unless . . . the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle . . .
However, this exception regarding injury or death resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle will not avail either plaintiff. Neither Kiamesha Rogers or the decedent, Shannon Angerome, is an "employee" for purposes of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation scheme.
Section 31-275(G)(9) of the General Statutes, based upon the facts of this case, bars receipt of benefits by either plaintiff.
The statute reads:
(B) `Employee' shall not be construed to include:
(VI) Any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment unless such person (I) works for an employer who has a place of employment or business facility located in this state at which such person spends at least fifty percent of his employment time, or (II) works for an employer pursuant to an employment contract to be performed primarily in the state . . .
While Brinks, Inc. maintains its corporate headquarters in Darien, neither of the exceptions are applicable to Kiamesha Rogers or the decedent, Shannon Argerome. These facts do not present a situation in which an employee may elect to pursue Workers' Compensation benefits in more than one jurisdiction. See Clevelend v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181 (1991); and Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24 (1980).
The questions presented by the motions for summary judgment, is whether the plaintiff Administratrix may maintain her statutory claim for the wrongful death of her decedent, and whether the plaintiff Kiamesha Rogers may maintain her action to recover for injuries and damages sustained on February 3, 2003 consistent with Connecticut law.
Section 52-555a, C.G.S. "(a) In any action . . . brought by an . . . administrator for injuries resulting in death . . . such . . . administrator may recover from the party legally at fault . . ."
The employer, Brinks, Inc. has successfully intervened in the action involving Kiamesha Rogers, and an answer to the intervening complaint was filed on July 19, 2005. The intervening complaint makes reference to § 31-293 of the General Statutes, which provides for intervention, and provides for a lien upon any recovery, when ". . . Any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than the employer . . . a legal liability to pay damages for the injury . . ." (emphasis added). No motion to strike the intervening complaint has been filed, and no objection was raised by the plaintiff. Therefore, whether an employer paying benefits in New York may intervene in a Connecticut action, need not be addressed.
This determination will not be reached based upon the Workers' Compensation remedies available in New York and Connecticut, although the applicability of New York's Workers' Compensation law is a factor to consider in any conflicts of law analysis.
CONNECTICUT LAW APPLIES TO THE CAUSES OF ACTIONS OF BOTH PLAINTIFFS
Under traditional concepts of "lex loci delicti" the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort action are governed by the law of the place where injury occurred. Gibson v. Fulling, 172 Conn. 407, 411 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65 (1971).
If the rights and obligations of these parties were to be analyzed under traditional "lex loci" principles, the plaintiffs would automatically prevail, and the motions for summary judgment would be denied.
However, because Connecticut has abandoned its ritualistic observance of "lex loci," and has opted to incorporate the guidelines contained in the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 637 (1986); the plaintiffs do not necessarily prevail, if a rigid application of "lex loci" would produce a result which is arbitrary or unreasonable.
O'Connor involved an action to recover for personal injuries arising out of a one-car accident which occurred in the Province of Quebec, while the parties, both of whom were Connecticut residents, were pursuing a one-day pleasure trip. They planned to return to Vermont at the end of the day.
The law of Quebec did not permit a cause of action for personal injuries, and a motion to strike the complaint was granted by the trial court.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in determining that the law of Connecticut should apply to the controversy, analyzed the facts presented, using the criteria found in the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, § 6 and § 145(2) of the Restatement (Second).
Seven factors germane to the choice of law analysis are listed in § 6 of the Restatement: 1) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 2) the relevant policies of the forum, 3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in determining the particular issue, 4) the protection of justified expectations, 5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 7) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Section 145(2) of the Restatement establishes black letter rules to facilitate the application of the principles outlined in § 6 to tort cases. These four factors are: 1) the place where the injury occurred, 2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, 3) the domicile, residence, nationality place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and 4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 652.
The O'Connor court determined that Connecticut law should apply to the controversy, notwithstanding the fact that Quebec was both the place where the injury occurred, and the place where the conduct causing the injury took place.
The court emphasized that the parties were merely "passing through" Quebec at the time of the accident, and that Quebec had no connection to the parties other than its status as the location of the accident. O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 655-56.
In noting that two of the § 145 factors mitigated in favor of Quebec, and two favored Connecticut, the court noted that the significance of the § 145(2) factors, not the number, determined the outcome of the choice of law analysis. O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 652-53.
These cases, which also involve a one-vehicle accident, present some parallels with O'Connor, and some significant differences.
In O'Connor, both of the parties were residents of Connecticut, while in the cases at bar, Kiamesha Rogers, Shannon Angerome and Brenton Reid were all New York Residents. The accident, and the conduct causing the accident, in O'Connor occurred in Quebec, while in these cases the accident and the negligent conduct occurred in Connecticut.
In O'Connor, Quebec law supplied no remedy for the plaintiff. Here, New York law denies both Kiamesha Rogers and the plaintiff Administratrix any remedy, based upon the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation laws of New York.
A Connecticut worker, on the other hand, would have a remedy independent of the Workers' Compensation laws for both wrongful death, and personal injuries.
As in O'Connor, a "standoff" exists here, concerning the number of § 145(2) factors which mitigate in favor of each jurisdiction. Two factors, the place of the accident and the place of the conduct causing injury occurred in Connecticut, while the relationship of the parties, as well as their domicile and place of business, are in New York.
However, although a numerical standoff exists, Connecticut is not without any interest concerning the two factors which preponderate in favor of New York. Resolving this deadlock, therefore, requires resort to the "searching" case-by-case analysis mandated by O'Connor. O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 658.
The driver and both passengers were New York residents, and were primarily employed at the Brinks location in Brooklyn.
However, Brinks maintained active operations in Connecticut, and its corporate headquarters are located in Darien, Connecticut. Brinks was required to service its Connecticut customers at their locations in Connecticut. These customers include Costco, Citibank, and Main's Landing.
Brinks holds a license from the Connecticut Department of Public Safety, and armed guards employed by Brinks were required to obtain a Connecticut gun permit as a condition of operating within Connecticut. The posting of a bond was also required.
Section 29-161g, C.G.S.
The presence of Brinks employees in an armored vehicle on a Connecticut highway was not "fortuitous," but arose directly from the employment relationship between Brinks and its employees. Kiamesha Rogers had come to Connecticut two or three times per week, according to her deposition testimony. According to the defendant, Brenton Reid, he and Kiamesha Rogers had worked together for a couple of months prior to the accident of February 3, 2003.
The plaintiff's decedent, Shannon Angerome, was filling in for another employee on the date of the accident. Part of her duties and responsibilities with Brinks involved servicing ATM customer by going to off-site locations.
In addition to the provisions of Connecticut law, Brinks is also subject to federal regulation in its use of interstate highways. Connecticut also maintains an interest concerning the use of its highways by private passenger motor vehicles, and by those vehicles engaged in interstate commerce.
See 49 USCA, § 31-339(b).
Kiamesha Rogers applied for and obtained benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation law of the State of New York. Reimbursement for benefits paid is being sought by the intervenor in her Connecticut action.
The plaintiff's decedent, Shannon Angerome, did not apply for benefits, and her Administratrix has not sought death benefits under the New York statute, recognizing that any such payments would not be significant.
New York, therefore, has little interest in denying the plaintiff Administratrix standing to pursue a statutory claim for wrongful death in a Connecticut court.
The unique facts of these cases must be viewed in light of the Restatement's presumption that the law of the state where the injury occurs and the acts causing injury occurred, in a personal injury action or a wrongful death claim are the most significant factors, when determining which state's tort law should apply. Williams v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 359, 373 (1994).
"In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied." Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, § 146.
"In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles state will be applied . . ." Restatement (Second) Conflict of laws, § 175.
The defendant argues that this case is controlled by the Appellate Court decision in Snyder v. Selden, 81 Conn.App. 718 (2004), which, like O'Connor, has factual similarities to the cases at bar.
In Snyder, the plaintiff, an employee of Casual Corners, Inc., a clothing retailer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred on Interstate 95 in Connecticut, as the plaintiff was traveling from New York to the corporate headquarters in Enfield.
The injured plaintiff applied for and received Workers' Compensation benefits under the laws of New York, and sought to pursue a personal injury action in Connecticut.
The court held that the presence of the corporate headquarters in Connecticut, without more, was not sufficient to give Connecticut the greater interest based upon the facts presented. Snyder v. Selden, supra, 724.
The plaintiff had been employed by Casual Corners in New York since 1994, but had only traveled to Connecticut twice between her date of hire, and the November 13, 1997 accident, The plaintiff conducted no business on behalf of Casual Corners in Connecticut, and her only connection with Connecticut involved the two trips to the corporate headquarters.
The facts here are distinguishable from Snyder, when subjected to the case-by-case analysis mandated by O'Connor.
The plaintiff in Snyder could point to only a single meeting in Connecticut, while the presence of the armored car in this case was the result of servicing customers in a highly regulated industry engaged in interstate commerce, on a regular basis.
It is found that the law of the State of Connecticut applies to both the claim of Kiamesha Rogers and that of Ellen Angerome, Administratrix of the estate of Shannon Angerome.
The defendant's motions for summary judgment are therefore DENIED.