Opinion
No. H12-CP10-013506-A
September 16, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This child protection case involves the interests of Angelina P., a child who was born on October 14, 2010. Lee P. is the biological mother of the child. Angelina's biological father is unknown.
DCF invoked a 96-hour hold on the child's custody on October 16, 2010. On October 20, 2010, the Honorable William Wollenberg, Judge Trial Referee, signed an ex parte order vesting Angelina's temporary custody with the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families. Judge Wollenberg found that the child was in immediate physical danger from the surroundings in the parental home. The order of temporary custody was sustained by the court (Keller, J.) on October 29, 2010. Angelina has continuously remained in DCF's temporary custody since October 15, 2010, and is now placed in foster care with a maternal aunt.
On October 20, 2010, DCF filed coterminous neglect and termination of parental rights petitions concerning Angelina. Lee P. has an extensive child protection history with DCF, and the neglect allegations were based on the legal doctrine of predictive neglect. In the neglect petition, DCF alleged that Angelina was being denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and that she was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well-being. In the termination of parental rights petition, DCF alleged pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) that the child had been abandoned by her biological father. With respect to Lee P., the petitioner alleged the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate by the parent of a neglected child under the age of seven years whose parental rights to another child were previously terminated, per C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).
Lee P. was properly served with the order of temporary custody application, order and notice for hearing and the neglect and termination petitions. Service upon her was previously confirmed and a finding of notice and jurisdiction made.
At some point around the time that Angelina was born, Lee P. told DCF that an individual named Arnoldo D. was the putative father of the child. The petitioner named both Arnoldo D. and "John Doe" as possible biological fathers in the OTC motion and neglect petition. (Only "John Doe" was named as the putative father in the termination of parental rights petition.) Arnoldo D. received service of the OTC motion and neglect petition on October 22, 2010. Notice to "John Doe" was made by newspaper publication. Arnoldo D. subsequently appeared in court with court-appointed counsel and requested DNA testing to determine whether or not he was Angelina's biological father. On December 10, 2010, a report indicating the results of the DNA testing was filed with court. That report of scientific testing conducted by the Laboratory Corporation of America indicated that Arnoldo D. was genetically excluded as the biological father of the child. Based on the test results, the court (Frazzini, J.) found that Arnoldo D. was not the child's parent, removed him as a party to the case, and dismissed his counsel and him from further participation in these proceedings.
A court memorandum from a February 10, 2011 hearing indicates that the court confirmed that notice upon "John Doe" was properly made by publication in the Hartford Courant. At the hearing on February 10, 2011, the court also issued a default judgment against "John Doe" in this matter for failure to appear. This court takes judicial notice of both of those earlier findings.
Trial on the coterminous neglect and termination petitions began before the undersigned on July 25, 2011. DCF was represented by an assistant attorney general. Angelina's interests were represented by her court-appointed attorney/guardian ad litem. Lee P., despite notice, did not appear in court on July 25th. However, her court-appointed counsel was present and participated in the proceeding. The trial proceeded in the respondent mother's absence. Although the parties rested on July 25th, the court, on its own motion, subsequently scheduled further proceedings for September 2, 2011. The court took this action because it believed that further evidence was necessary concerning the respondent's competency, and the nature of reunification services that the petitioner had offered to Lee P. The court re-opened the trial on September 2, 2011, and the petitioner offered additional evidence on those issues. Lee P. also failed to appear in court on that date.
A review of court records indicates that the mother appeared in court in connection with this case on October 29, 2010 and December 16, 2010.
The court has carefully considered all of the evidence presented at trial. The court finds that the facts set forth below were proven at trial.
FACTUAL FINDINGS (ADJUDICATION)
This is an exceptionally sad case. Lee P. was neglected and abused as a child. She is developmentally delayed and has a verbal IQ of 46, a performance IQ of 75, and a full-scale IQ of 58. (Petitioner's Exhibit D, page 21.) She has been diagnosed with mild mental retardation, and emotional problems that include Impulse Control Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder ( Id., page 3). Lee P. has undergone psychiatric hospitalization in the past for suicidal and aggressive behaviors, and, approximately 11 years ago, there were concerns that she was experiencing auditory hallucinations, and might possibly be psychotic. ( Id.). The respondent was evaluated at the Institute of Living sometime during 1999, when she was 14 or 15 years old. In addition to noting her cognitive limitations, the evaluation also delineated other problems that Lee P. was experiencing at the time. "Behaviors of concern in the 1999 evaluation included [Lee P.] being unable to cook as she felt it would be "too dangerous" as she would burn herself carelessly, her inability to anticipate weather changes or look after her own health, as well as she had the tendency to be aggressive as well as play with fire." ( Id., pages 2, 3.) The respondent suffers from a life-threatening disease for which she is supposed to receive medication on a regular basis. The respondent does not work and supports herself with Supplemental Social Security (SSI) payments that she receives as a result of her developmental disability. (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 1.)
Lee P. has a history of substance abuse. She tested positive for marijuana and barbiturates during an earlier pregnancy in 2006. During May, 2010, while she was pregnant with Angelina, Lee P. tested positive for marijuana. (Petitioner's Exhibit D, pages 3, 5.) The respondent was incarcerated from July 9, 2009 until an unknown date in October 2009 at the York Correctional Institution in Niantic on possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia charges that were nolled in court on October 23, 2009 (Petitioner's Exhibit A, page 2). She was arrested for illegal possession of narcotics on March 31, 2006 and failure to appear first degree on May 15, 2007. The failure to appear charge was nolled on December 10, 2009. ( Id.). Her criminal history does not reflect a court disposition on the possession of narcotics charge. ( Id.).
The respondent had four older children prior to giving birth to Angelina. Those children were born in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009. ( Id., page 3.) Her parental rights to each of the four older children were previously terminated by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. The memorandum of decision from the last termination of parental rights proceeding was introduced into evidence during this trial. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Like the present case, that matter involved coterminous neglect and termination of parental rights petitions that had been filed against Lee P. by DCF when her last child was born. In his decision dated May 25, 2010, Judge Wollenberg found predictive neglect, noting that Lee P.'s home "would have lacked the stability, structure, safety, financial security and parental judgment necessary to assure adequate and competent care for this child." ( Id., page 11). In also finding both adjudicatory and dispositional grounds for the termination of Lee P.'s parental rights to that child, Judge Wollenberg wrote: "Mother has had her parental rights to three of her children terminated due to her ongoing mental health issues, her cognitive limitations, substance abuse and transient living. Mother was recently incarcerated due to possession of marijuana. She has not made any significant life changes which would demonstrate her ability to provide for or meet the needs of an infant." ( Id., p 17.)
The social study prepared by DCF in the present case notes:" . . . [Lee P.] has had four children, not including Angelina, which have all been terminated from her care due to ongoing mental health issues, cognitive limitations, substance abuse and transience. [Lee P.] has engaged in the Ryan White program and they have assisted her with establishing her own housing, but her cognitive limitations and unmet mental health issues remain. She requires supervision and frequent repetition of information in order to provide the most basic of child care. This is required despite the fact that this is her fifth child. She requires a visiting nurse's aide to dispense her medication as she cannot do so herself." (Petitioner's Exhibit D, page 8.)
At the order of temporary custody hearing on October 29, 2010, the court (Keller, J.) issued specific steps orders to the petitioner and the respondent in order to facilitate reunification between Angelina and her mother. The specific steps orders included, inter alia, requirements that Lee P.: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; let DCF know about her whereabouts at all times; participate in parenting and individual counseling; submit to a substance abuse evaluation and cooperate with recommended treatment; abstain from the use of illegal drugs and the abuse of alcohol and medicine; cooperate with various treatment providers, including but not limited to the Ryan White program for medical care management, ADRC for substance abuse treatment, and a parenting program; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations and treatment; sign releases allowing the petitioner to communicate with service providers; maintain adequate housing and legal income; inform DCF about any changes in the make-up of her household; avoid involvement with the criminal justice system; and visit the children as often as permitted by DCF. The court takes judicial notice of the specific steps orders issued by Judge Keller on October 29, 2010.
As noted above, the mother does not work and is supported by the monthly benefit payments that she receives from SSI. In conjunction with the present case, DCF offered to assist mother by enrolling her in a program operated by the Connecticut Department of Developmental Services (DDS). Under the program, DDS would receive and manage Lee P.'s monthly SSI payment for her benefit. The agency would ensure that she had an appropriate rental unit, and use the SSI money to pay her rent, utility, and grocery bills. (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 1.) Lee P. refused to participate in the program and declined to sign an authorization permitting DCF to communicate with DDS about her. ( Id.).
In October 2010, DCF learned that the respondent was receiving services from an agency known as Ryan White Case Management (Petitioner's Exhibit E, page 5). At that time, Lee P. authorized a DCF investigative social worker to speak with her worker at Ryan White. ( Id.). The agency indicated that it would assist the mother to manage her illness, and monitor the baby for two years, even if the child went into foster care. ( Id.). The agency also reported to DCF then that it would attempt to assist the mother to secure housing, that it had referred the mother to a program known as the Chrysalis Center, and that the respondent had successfully completed a skills building program intended to help her make healthy life choices. ( Id.). However, DCF's August 5, 2011 status report notes that: "Mother refused to sign a release for information for the Department to speak with [Ryan White Case Management], so no information was able to be obtained. Mother was provided bus passes in order that she could get back and forth to services, as well as visits." (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 2.) As a result of the respondent's refusal to sign the authorization, DCF was unable to introduce evidence at trial about the nature of the services that Lee P. has received through the Ryan White program during the past year, or about the level of the respondent's cooperation with that agency during that time period.
The evidence also established that after Angelina's birth, the petitioner attempted to refer Lee P. to a one-on-one parenting education program. The DCF social worker set up an intake meeting for the respondent with a service provider that was scheduled to occur immediately following one of the mother's scheduled visits with the child. (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 2.) Lee P. missed the visit, the intake meeting did not take place, and the respondent never participated in the program ( Id.).
DCF also attempted to refer the respondent for substance abuse evaluation, and possible treatment, with an agency known as ADRC. Lee P. declined to sign an authorization permitting the petitioner to contact ADRC. As a result, the department was unable to make the referral ( Id.).
The petitioner offered Lee P. weekly supervised visits with Angelina. The respondent consistently visited the child on a weekly basis from October 2010 until January 11, 2011. (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 2.) Lee P. stopped attending the supervised visits on January 11th, and has not participated in DCF-supervised visits with the child since then. Additionally, DCF did not know where Lee P. was for approximately the next six months. ( Id.). On April 13, 2011, the DCF social worker met with Juana F., who is Angelina's foster mother and Lee P.'s sister. The worker asked the foster mother for information about the respondent's whereabouts. Juana F. told the worker then that she had not had any contact with the respondent, although the respondent had stopped by at their mother's home. "[Foster mother] indicated that mother is still believed to be living with an unidentified male in Hartford somewhere, and also informed this worker that the SSI money is actually directly debited to a card that mother has in her possession." (Petitioner's Exhibit C, page 2.)
A DCF status report dated August 5, 2011 contains the following notation: "In June of 2011, mother came to the DCF office unannounced. This worker went to speak to her and obtain information about her present situation. Mother stated that she was there as she wanted to speak to this worker about her oldest daughter. This worker explained to mother that her daughter had been adopted, and that this worker did not have any information about the child. This worker then asked mother where she was living, and she stated that she was living "up the street." When this worker asked mother for a physical address, she refused to provide this information. This worker talked to mother about the fact that she is on medication for a life-threatening illness and that she needs to be taking this medication every day. This worker went on to explain that without knowing where mother lives, there is no way the nurse can come to give her the medication. Mother informed this worker that she was not going to take the medication anymore, as it "gave her diarrhea." This worker stressed how important it was for mother to take her medication and stated that if she was having medical issues with respect to it, that she needed to speak to her doctor about this. Mother continued to refuse to take her medication." (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 2.)
On June 28, 2011, the respondent mother was involved in a domestic violence incident that attracted the attention of a Hartford Police Department lieutenant. The lieutenant observed a male chasing Lee P. near the area of Retreat Avenue and Washington Street in Hartford. (Petitioner's Exhibit F.) The officer witnessed the male, later identified as Alexander G., grab Lee P. by the arms, press her against a fence, and slap her. His report notes that: "The victim and accused have been involved in a relationship for several years and have a history of domestic violence." ( Id., page 2.) Alexander G. was arrested on breach of peace charges. ( Id., page 1.) Lee P. was not charged, and was treated at Hartford Hospital for "the anxiety she suffered from the fear of the attack by the accused." ( Id.). When she was interviewed about this incident by police, the respondent gave her address as 44 Brownell Avenue in Hartford.
DCF social worker Heather Czerwinski subsequently learned about the incident and requested a copy of the police report in an attempt to obtain Lee P.'s current address. After she obtained the report, she sent a letter to the respondent at 44 Brownell Avenue in Hartford. Thereafter, Elsa F., who is the owner of the premises at 44 Brownell Avenue and the grandmother of Alexander G., contacted Ms. Czerwinski. Elsa F. informed the worker that although Lee P. had been representing that her address was 44 Brownell Avenue, she was not living there. "[Elsa F.] stated that mother had been sneaking into her basement and spending the night there, and that she had told mother that she couldn't stay there. [Elsa F.] also reported that she had spoken with police who have told her to contact them should mother present to the home again." (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 2.)
There was also evidence presented during this trial that in November 2010 Angelina was prescribed medicine to prevent the occurrence of the life-threatening disease that afflicts her mother. The child was exposed to the disease at birth. (Petitioner's Exhibit D, page 5.) A DCF social study dated November 3, 2010 noted that the medication had to be administered to the child every six hours "for at least six weeks." ( Id.). It is unknown if Angelina continues to receive that medicine at the present time. The court notes the evidence about Lee P.'s recent refusal to take that medication herself, and the evidence that it was administered to her in the past by a nurse's aide. The court concludes that the mother would not be able to competently administer any medication to Angelina if the child were in her care, and would need to cooperate with, and rely upon, others to dispense medications to the child.
The respondent did not appear in court for trial on either July 25, 2011 or September 2, 2011. No competency evaluation was requested or ordered in conjunction with this proceeding, and a guardian ad litem was not requested or appointed for the respondent mother. It is doubtful, given her unavailability to DCF, general lack of cooperation with most offered services, and failure to attend the trial, that Lee P. would have cooperated with such an evaluation if one had been ordered by the court. However, a court-ordered competency evaluation of Lee. P. was conducted during an earlier termination proceeding in 2008. The report of that evaluation was introduced into evidence during this trial (Petitioner's Exhibit J). The evaluator, Edward Rabe, M.D., holds board certifications in forensic psychiatry, child and adolescent psychiatry and general psychiatry ( Id., page 14). As reflected in his January 24, 2008 report, Dr. Rabe was aware then that Lee P. had a full-scale IQ score of 58 and the other mental health and substance abuse problems that are referred to above. Dr. Rabe found the respondent competent to participate in the 2008 TPR trial. He wrote in his report then: "The question of competency to stand trial requires demonstration of the respondent's ability to understand and participate in the proceedings against him. [Respondent] understands that she is involved in a court proceeding which could result in loss of custody of her child. She understands the concept of TPR as she has lost her parental rights to her first child . . . She understands that the court will make a decision regarding custody of her child. In my opinion she understands the proceedings against her." ( Id., page 13.) Dr. Rabe also noted in his report: "An assessment of [respondent's] ability to assist in her defense requires sufficient capacity to make choices, to understand information, to think rationally about alternative courses of action, and to appreciate one's situation as a defendant. [Respondent] demonstrates the capacity to make choices and to provide reasons for these choices, as evidenced by her choice to seek an apartment to provide a home for [her child]. Her factual understanding of information is limited but she is able to understand abstract concepts if broken down into simple elements. For example, she understands that she needs identification and a down payment to obtain an apartment. She appreciates her situation as a defendant in that she is aware that she is required to prove her fitness as a mother and that she has to take specific steps to do so. Her capacity to think rationally about alternative courses of action is limited. She does not demonstrate a capacity to independently think ahead about the consequences of her actions. She also does not appreciate inconsistencies in her statements, although she is able to revise her position when inconsistencies are pointed out. Because of these limitations, she has an unrealistic appreciation of the likely outcome of the proceedings. In the opinion of this examiner, her limitations do not render her incompetent to participate in the proceedings. She is able to provide a narrative in support of her position, and she does appreciate the potential outcome of the proceedings. In my opinion, she is competent to participate in the proceedings against her." ( Id., page 13, 14.)
The court found Dr. Rabe's opinion to be credible and accepts it as fact. Although this evaluation took place in 2008, there was no significant evidence presented during the current trial about intervening facts and circumstances that would render Dr. Rabe's opinion inaccurate at present. In this regard, the court also takes judicial notice of the prior judgments including the most recent one in May 2010 — terminating Lee P.'s parental rights to her four older children. Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the respondent mother was competent to stand trial in this matter, and could have come to court and cooperated with her counsel, had she chosen to do so. The court also finds that the appointment of a guardian ad litem to assist Lee P. in this matter was not required.
In making this finding, the court is aware of a notation in a DCF status report dated August 5, 2011 which states: "Maternal grandmother and maternal aunt have filed with the Hartford Probate Court to have a conservator appointed for mother and there is a hearing scheduled for the end of this month." (Petitioner's Exhibit K, p. 3.) The court is unaware of whether the proposed conservatorship was for the respondent's estate, or person, or both.
Respondent's counsel, who had spoken with his client during the pendency of this case, informed the court on September 2, 2001 that he did not believe that his client was incompetent to stand trial. In light of the respondent's failure to attend trial, it is doubtful that a GAL's participation in the trial would have significantly aided the respondent, or altered the outcome of the trial.
No one claiming to be Angelina's male biological parent has contacted DCF or the court during the pendency of this case to express interest in the child. The court finds that the child has been abandoned by her unknown putative father, "John Doe."
CT Page 19962
NEGLECT ADJUDICATION
The application of predictive neglect analysis in child protection cases is authorized by both statute and Connecticut case law. "Our statutes clearly permit an adjudication of neglect based on potential for harm or abuse to occur in the future. General Statutes § 17a-101(a) provides: The public policy of this state is: To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury or neglect . . . By its terms, § 17a-101(a) connotes a responsibility on the state's behalf to act before the actual occurrence of injury or neglect has taken place." In Re Michael D., 58 Conn.App. 119, 123 (2000). As the Connecticut Appellate Court has noted: "The department, pursuant to the statute, need not wait until a child is actually harmed before intervening to protect a child." ( Id.). "No court is required to leave a child in the custody of a parent who is clearly incapable of providing even basic care for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he will suffer actual harm." In Re Kelly S., 29 Conn.App. 600, 615 (1992).The court finds that DCF has correctly invoked the doctrine of predictive neglect with respect to Angelina. The evidence presented during this trial proved that Lee P. continues to have unmet mental health, medical, and substance abuse treatment needs that render her largely unable to properly care for herself. She also continues to lack the insight, judgment and basic competencies required to adequately protect and raise any child, and especially an infant. In making these findings, the court is well-aware that significant physical and emotional disabilities, and developmental delays, by themselves, do not render individuals unfit to parent their children. By accepting treatment, and with the assistance of services from family members, public and private organizations, and other support networks, many individuals have been able to overcome such challenges, and to successfully function as loving and nurturing parents to their children.
Regretably, that is not the case here. With the possible exception of her cooperation with the Ryan White program, Lee P. consistently continues to refuse the offers of service and treatment made by DCF and DDS that could assist her, and possibly enable her to acquire the skills necessary to appropriately care for a child. Her lifestyle continues to be unstable, transient and fraught with risks to her physical and emotional safety, and to the well-being of any child born to her. Lee P.'s developmental delays, untreated physical and mental health issues, and ongoing substance abuse problems, appear to be approximately the same now as they were in May 2010 when her parental rights were terminated for the fourth time. Unfortunately, Lee P. continues to engage in the cyclical pattern of conceiving children, whose custody must of necessity be assumed by the state at birth, in order to protect them from the real risk of grave harm.
The court finds that the petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Angelina is a neglected child, as alleged in the petition. The evidence proved that she has been abandoned by her biological father, whose identity is unknown. The evidence also proved that if left in her biological mother's care, Angelina would be denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally and morally, and would be permitted to live under conditions, circumstances and associations injurious to her well-being.
TPR ADJUDICATION
The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings that it has previously made in this memorandum of decision.
As defined by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A), a child has been abandoned by a parent when the parent fails ". . . to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child." Since Angelina's birth on October 14, 2010, her biological father has not come forward to acknowledge her paternity or to express any interest or concern for her welfare. The court finds that DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that "John Doe" abandoned Angelina. The court also finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the biological father, who, as a result of his absence, has failed, or is unwilling or unable, to benefit from reunification services.
With respect to Lee P., DCF has alleged the adjudicatory ground for termination of parental rights that is set forth in C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). In order to prove that ground for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that:" . . . the parent of a child under the age of seven who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."
Angelina will celebrate her first birthday in approximately one month, on October 14, 2011. She has continuously been in DCF's custody since she was two days old, and this court has adjudicated her as a neglected child. Lee P. gave birth to four older children before Angelina was born. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families filed termination petitions with respect to each of those children, and the court has previously terminated her parental rights to each of those children. The most recent termination judgment entered in May 2010.
On October 29, 2010, the court set specific steps for Lee P. to take in order to facilitate reunification with her daughter. Clear and convincing evidence at trial proved that the respondent subsequently disobeyed those orders by failing to keep DCF appraised of her whereabouts, and by failing to cooperate with DCF attempts to refer her to a one-on-one parenting education program, and substance abuse evaluation and treatment. Clear and convincing evidence also proved that Lee P. rebuffed DCF's attempts to engage the mother in a DDS program that would have assisted her to obtain a rental unit, and to properly manage the money she receives from SSI. Clear and convincing evidence proved that Lee P. has not engaged in supervised visits with Angelina since January 2011, and that her whereabouts have been generally unknown to the petitioner since then. The Hartford Police Department Incident Report (Petitioner's Exhibit F), and the statements of Elsa F., proved that Lee P. continues to engage in a transient and chaotic lifestyle that places her at imminent risk of both physical and emotional harm. Clear and convincing evidence proved that the mother's unresolved developmental, mental health, physical, substance abuse and housing issues prevent her from functioning as a competent parent, and from providing appropriate care for Angelina. Considering the child's age, needs, and the length of time that she has already spent in the state's care, and the mother's four prior termination cases, the court finds that Lee P. has failed to achieve any degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that she could parent the child within a reasonable period of time. Sadly, a DCF status report dated August 5, 2011 notes that the mother may be "currently pregnant" (Petitioner's Exhibit K, page 2). The court finds that it would be detrimental to Angelina's welfare to permit the respondent mother further time to pursue rehabilitative efforts. The court finds from the clear and convincing evidence presented that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Lee P., and that the biological mother has failed, or is unable or unwilling, to benefit from reunification services. The court also finds that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground alleged for termination of Lee P.'s parental rights to the subject child.
FACTUAL FINDINGS (DISPOSITION)
The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings that it has previously made in this memorandum of decision.
Juana F., Angelina's foster mother and maternal aunt, was present in court on both trial dates. She was called as witness by DCF and testified on the first day of this proceeding. The child has resided with Juana F. for approximately the past seven months. Juana F., who is 24, testified that she holds several jobs, but would find daycare for Angelina when she is unavailable due to her employment. She wishes to adopt Angelina. The court found the foster mother's testimony to be both credible and sincere, and finds from her testimony and other evidence that she is deeply concerned about Angelina's well-being. Ms. Czerwinski testified credibly that Juana F. has cared for other nieces and nephews, and that DCF has no concerns about her ability to care for Angelina. Ms Czerwinski also testified credibly that the child, who was then just beginning to walk, appears to be bonded with Juana F. and looks to her for comfort. The court finds that Juana F. could offer an appropriate home to the child, and that Angelina, who will turn one on October 14, 2011, regards her aunt as a parental figure.
During her testimony, Juana F. appeared to testify that she would rely on her sister and her mother to occasionally provide day care for Angelina. Evidence presented at trial indicated that the maternal grandmother has a DCF record for neglecting Lee P. and Juana F., and previously assaulted neighbor with a razor. (Petitioner's Exhibit D, page 2.) This court urges DCF to speak with Juana F. about this issue, and to make recommendations to the foster mother about the selection of appropriate caretakers for the child in her absence.
Pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. 17a-112(k), this court is required to make and consider the following written findings in this matter:
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent. DCF offered Lee P. weekly supervised visits with the child. The mother visited regularly until January 11, 2011, but thereafter ceased attending the visits. Lee P. has not attended any supervised visits with the child through DCF for approximately the past nine months. DCF attempted to refer Lee P. to substance abuse screening and treatment, and a one-on-one parenting program. The respondent refused to cooperate with either referral. DCF also attempted to involve Lee P. in a DDS program that would have assisted her to rent an apartment and pay her monthly rent, utilities and grocery bills from her SSI benefits. The respondent refused to cooperate with this program. Lee P. has subsequently refused to sign an authorization for DCF to communicate with the Ryan White program about the assistance that the mother receives from that agency. DCF provides foster care and case work services for Angelina, and supervised the parent-child visits when they occurred. DCF was unable to provide services to the child's biological father, because his identity is unknown. The court finds, given the totality of the circumstances of this case, that the reunification services offered and provided by DCF were timely and appropriate.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended. The court incorporates by reference here the factual determinations made in the foregoing finding. The court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family as required by federal law.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order. The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings that it made earlier in this decision with respect to the specific steps orders issued by Judge Keller on October 29, 2010. The court finds that the petitioner complied with said orders. The court finds that Lee P. disobeyed significant specific steps orders by failing to visit Angelina as often as DCF permitted; by refusing to cooperate with programs and services offered by DCF and DDS; by failing to sign necessary release of information authorizations; and by failing to keep DCF advised of her whereabouts for an extended period of time. No court orders were issued for the child's biological father, because his identity was unknown to the petitioner.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care custody and control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties. Although the child has resided with Juana F. for less than a year, the child has developed an appropriate bond with her aunt, and appears to regard her as a psychological parent. The child, who will celebrate her first birthday next month, has not had any significant regular visitation with Lee P. since January 2011. The court infers from that evidence that Angelina would not now recognize Lee P. as her mother, or have any parent-child bond with her. The child has never had any contact with her biological father.
5. The age of the child. Angelina was born on October 14, 2010. She is 11 months old.
6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future . . . The child's biological father has not identified himself to the petitioner or the court, and he has never expressed any interest or concern for Angelina. Lee P. has not made any significant effort to change her circumstances, conduct, or conditions, as demonstrated by all of the evidence, including the fact that this is now the fifth termination of parental rights proceeding in which she has been named as a respondent. Lee P.'s parental rights to four older children were previously terminated by the court, and the evidence in this case proved that she continues to lack the basic skills and essential judgment that are necessary to parent any child.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent. This court is not aware of any unreasonable act or conduct, or adverse economic circumstance, that prevented either biological parent from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Angelina P.
The court has carefully considered all of the evidence and findings recounted above. The court finds from the foregoing that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of Angelina P. that the parental rights of Lee P. and "John Doe" be terminated.
ORDERS
Having found that the petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Angelina is a neglected child, and that commitment is in her best interests, the court hereby orders that her care and custody be committed to the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families.
Having found that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence an adjudicatory ground for the termination of each respondent's parental rights, and having further found that termination of parental rights would be in the subject child's best interests, the court hereby orders that the parental rights of Lee P. and "John Doe" to Angelina P. be, and hereby are, terminated.
The court orders that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent of Angelina P., for the purpose of facilitating her adoption as expeditiously as possible.
The court further orders said Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families to regularly file with the Clerk of this court, on a timely basis, all permanency plans, motions for review of permanency plan, and quarterly reports concerning Angelina P. as required by statute and regulation.
The court also orders said Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, and any Probate Court processing the adoption of Angelina P., to immediately notify the Clerk of this Court when the adoption of said child is finalized. SO ORDERED.