Opinion
6:20-CV-06676 EAW
2022-09-27
ANGELA H.-M., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Benjamin Lankenau Sachs, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff. Kathryn L. Smith, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, Oona Marie Peterson, Office of Program Litigation, Office 2 Office of General Counsel Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
Benjamin Lankenau Sachs, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff. Kathryn L. Smith, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, Oona Marie Peterson, Office of Program Litigation, Office 2 Office of General Counsel Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Angela H.-M. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 17; Dkt. 18), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 19). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 18) is granted, and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 17) is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on May 9, 2017. (Dkt. 15 at 16, 187-88). In her applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning October 1, 2015, due to depression, anxiety, PTSD, arthritis in her back, diabetes type II, migraines, lupus, anemia, and fibromyalgia. (Id. at 16, 107). Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on February 19, 2018. (Id. at 16, 194-204). At Plaintiff's request, a hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Paula Wordsworth in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, on July 18, 2019. (Id. at 16, 46-76). On August 28, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 13-30). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on July 14, 2020, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 7-12). This action followed.
When referencing the page number(s) of docket citations in this Decision and Order, the Court will cite to the CM/ECF-generated page numbers that appear in the upper right-hand corner of each document.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review
"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)).
II. Disability Determination
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ's Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on March 31, 2020. (Dkt. 15 at 19). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since December 5, 2015, the alleged onset date. (Id.).
At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date from October 1, 2015, to December 5, 2015, the day after a prior unfavorable decision was issued. (Dkt. 15 at 16).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "lumbar strain, hip bursitis, varicose veins, fibromyalgia, major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, remote history of traumatic brain injury (TBI), arthritis, [and] intellectual disability (ID)." (Id.).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id.). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 1.02, 1.04, 11.18, 12.02, 12.04, 12.05, 12.06, 12.15, and 14.09 in reaching her conclusion, as well as considering the effect of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia, consistent with Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 12-2p. (Id. at 19-22).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except:
occasional climbing ropes, ladders and scaffolds, frequent balancing, crouching, stooping, kneeling, and crawling; frequent handling with the right upper extremity; avoid concentrated exposure to work place hazards; with simple routine, repetitive task involving no more than simple, short instructions and simple work-related decisions with few work place changes with reasoning levels of 1 or 2; no work at a fixed production rate or pace; occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; no requirement to read instructions or write reports or perform math calculations above a 5th grade level.(Id. at 22). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a "Cleaner, housekeeping," as that work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff's RFC. (Id. at 28).
As an alternative to her finding at step four, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of merchandise marker, mail sorter, and routing clerk. (Id. at 28-29). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 29-30).
II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error
Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or, in the alternative, to remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that (1) the ALJ failed to reconcile her RFC with the opinion of Richard Bing, Ph.D., the consultative examiner; (2) the ALJ erroneously granted more weight to the opinions of the state agency review psychologist than to the opinion offered by Dr. Bing; (3) the ALJ impermissibly relied on her lay interpretation of medical evidence and provided factually flawed analysis; and (4) the ALJ failed to apply the requisite regulatory factors. (Dkt. 17-1 at 1, 14). The Court has considered each of these arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, finds them to be without merit.
A. Assessment of Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff's first two arguments, as well as her fourth argument, address the ALJ's evaluation of opinion evidence in the record relating to her mental functional limitations.
1. New Regulations Regarding Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence
"Previously, the SSA followed the 'treating physician rule,' which required the agency to give controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, so long as it was 'well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques' and not 'inconsistent with the other substantial evidence' in the record." Soto v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-4631 (PKC), 2020 WL 5820566, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)). However, the regulations relating to the evaluation of medical evidence were amended for disability claims filed after March 27, 2017. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at *5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). Because Plaintiff's claims were filed on May 9, 2017, the new regulations, codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c, apply.
Pursuant to the new regulations, the Commissioner "will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant's] medical sources." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Further, when a medical source provides one or more medical opinions, the Commissioner will consider those medical opinions from that medical source together using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section. Id. Those factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, purpose and extent of the treatment relationship, and the examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5) any other factors that "tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding." Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c).
When evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion, the most important factors are supportability and consistency. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). With respect to "supportability," the new regulations provide that "[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). With respect to "consistency," the new regulations prove that "[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be." Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
The ALJ must articulate her consideration of the medical opinion evidence, including how persuasive she finds the medical opinions in the case record. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). "Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning 'weight' to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions and how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions." Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (quotations and citation omitted). Specifically, the ALJ must explain how she considered the "supportability" and "consistency" factors for a medical source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ may—but is not required to—explain how she considered the remaining factors. Id. However, when the opinions offered by two or more medical sources about the same issue are "both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same," the ALJ will articulate how she considered the remaining factors in evaluating the opinions. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3). "Even though ALJs are no longer directed to afford controlling weight to treating source opinions—no matter how well supported and consistent with the record they may be—the regulations still recognize the 'foundational nature' of the observations of treating sources, and 'consistency with those observations is a factor in determining the value of any [treating source's] opinion.' " Shawn H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-CV-113, 2020 WL 3969879, at *6 (D. Vt. July 14, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Barrett v. Berryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2018)).
2. The ALJ Properly Assessed the Opinion Evidence Offered by Dr. Bing and Dr. Sayers
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's assessment of the opinion offered by the consultative examiner, Dr. Bing. Dr. Bing examined Plaintiff on January 9, 2018. (Dkt. 15 at 860). Following a mental status examination (id. at 862-63), Dr. Bing opined as follows:
In this evaluation session the claimant demonstrated the ability to generally understand, retain, and follow instructions as well as the ability to sustain attention to perform simple and repetitive types of task[s] although I think she would have difficulties if she had to remember and/or analyze incoming information particularly in a quick fashion. She appears to have intact interpersonal skills and I do not see where that would be a problem. It is possible she may have some difficulties tolerating stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity, may feel easily overwhelmed. If awarded benefits I believe she could manage such in her own best interest.Id. at 863. The ALJ discussed Dr. Bing's opinion (id. at 25, 26-27), and found it to be "not very persuasive" (id. at 27). Specifically, the ALJ explained that Dr. Bing examined Plaintiff on only one occasion, and therefore his opinion was based on a "one-time snapshot." (Id.). Further, the ALJ noted that Dr. Bing "was not able to consider evidence of [Plaintiff's] intellectual deficits or her history of ID." (Id.). Therefore, the ALJ found Dr. Bing's report was an "overestimation of [Plaintiff's] functioning," and explained that she gave "more credit to reports from [Plaintiff's] treating mental health sources, as well as the historical record, which show more limitations." (Id.). In other words, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had more mental restrictions beyond those opined by Dr. Bing.
Turning to Plaintiff's first argument—that the ALJ failed to reconcile her RFC with Dr. Bing's opinion—the Court finds that it is clear from the record how Dr. Bing's opinion informed the RFC. The ALJ specifically found that Dr. Bing's opinion was an "overestimation of the claimant's functioning." (Id. at 27). For example, Dr. Bing found that Plaintiff had intact interpersonal skills, but the ALJ assessed an RFC that requires Plaintiff to only occasionally interact with others which, as explained in the written determination, the ALJ found to be supported by the historical record and the opinions of Plaintiff's treating mental health sources. Otherwise, the RFC requires that Plaintiff engage in simple, unskilled work, and this is consistent with the other limitations opined by Dr. Bing, including his opinion that Plaintiff demonstrated the ability to generally understand, retain, and follow instructions, and to sustain attention to perform simple and repetitive types of tasks. Further, Dr. Bing noted that Plaintiff may have some difficulty tolerating stress. These limitations are consistent with those included in the RFC, which limits Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, with simple instructions and decisions, few workplace changes, and no work at a fixed production rate or pace. See, e.g., Lori M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-cv-00570 (JJM), 2020 WL 7382128, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020) ("Limitations to simple, unskilled work at a non-production pace adequately account for up to moderate limitations in an ability to deal with stress."); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2014) (limitation to "simple, routine, low stress tasks" accounted for the plaintiff's moderate limitations in maintaining "concentration, persistence, and pace"). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this basis.
The Court finds Plaintiff's second argument—that the ALJ erred by giving more weight to the state agency review psychologists than to Dr. Bing—is likewise unpersuasive. "An ALJ is entitled to rely on the opinions of both examining and non-examining State agency medical consultants, because those consultants are deemed to be qualified experts in the field of social security disability." Bump v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:15-CV-1077 (GTS), 2016 WL 6311872, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2016) (emphasis added). "Although an examining source is 'generally' afforded more weight than a non-examining source, an ALJ is allowed to afford a non-examining source more weight than an examining one." Christy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:13-CV-1552 (GTS/WBC), 2015 WL 6160165, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 6160165 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2015). For example, an ALJ may assign greater weight to the opinion of a non-examining source when it is better supported by the record. See Ridosh v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-6466L, 2018 WL 6171713, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) ("a non-examining physician opinion may be entitled to more weight than the opinion of an examining physician . . . such as where the opinion of a treating or examining physician is contradicted by substantial evidence in the record" (citation omitted)); Florez v. Apfel, No. CV 97-3052, 1998 WL 760334, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1998) ("Given that [the medical expert's] opinions are supported by the record, and [the treating physician's] opinion that the [claimant] was disabled is not, the ALJ was free to find the non-examining expert's testimony persuasive."). Similarly, an ALJ may rely on the opinion of a non-examining medical source in formulating the RFC, because they "are deemed to be qualified experts in the field of social security disability." See Bump, 2016 WL 6311872, at *4.
Further, to the extent it is premised on the ALJ "weighing" these opinions, any such argument is misplaced. As explained above, the new regulations do not require the ALJ to give specific weight to any particular medical opinion; rather, they require that the ALJ articulate how she considered the medical opinions and how persuasive she finds the opinions. See Andrew G., 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (explaining that the new regulations eliminate assigning "weight" to a medical opinion, but rather require the ALJ to evaluate their persuasiveness).
Here, the ALJ explained that he found the opinion offered by the DDS psychological consultant, Sean Sayers, Ph.D., to be "persuasive." (Dkt. 15 at 27). Dr. Sayers found that Plaintiff had "moderate" limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, maintain concentration, persistence, or pace, and have limited contact with the public. (Id.; see also id. at 153-55). Dr. Sayers concluded that, based on the totality of the evidence in the file, Plaintiff had severe mental impairments that imposed functional limitations on day-to-day activities, but none great enough to preclude all work. (Id. at 154). Dr. Sayers also opined that Plaintiff was "able to perform [simple, routine, repetitive tasks] in low social settings." (Id.). The ALJ explained this opinion was "persuasive and consistent with the evidence of record showing a significant work history but some memory problems." (Id. at 27). Other than her blanket statement that an ALJ should always credit the opinion of an examining physician over the opinion of a non-examining physician—which, as explained above, is not required in all circumstances—Plaintiff offers no meaningful argument as to why the ALJ erred in crediting the opinion offered by Dr. Sayers over that offered by Dr. Bing. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this basis.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not apply the requisite "regulatory factors" when assessing the opinion evidence in the record. Although she states that the ALJ "failed to consider the required supportability and consistency factors with respect to the bulk of the opinion evidence," she points specifically only to the ALJ's assessment of the opinions offered by Dr. Bing and Dr. Sayers. (See Dkt. 17-1 at 26).
As explained above, the Court finds that the ALJ's evaluation of these opinions was proper, and it is clear from the record that the ALJ considered the required regulatory factors. For example, the ALJ specifically considered that Dr. Bing examined Plaintiff on only one occasion and did not have the benefit of her entire mental health record, including her history of intellectual disorder. Although the ALJ did not specifically use the words "supportability" and "consistency" in discussing Dr. Bing's opinion, it is clear from the record that the ALJ found his opinion to be inconsistent and not supported by other evidence in the record, including the historical record and records from Plaintiff's treating sources. Likewise, the ALJ explained that Dr. Sayers' opinion was consistent with evidence in the record showing a significant work history but some memory problems. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff's mental impairments and treatment at length in the written determination. (See, e.g., Dkt. 15 at 23 (discussing Plaintiff's testimony that she has difficulty being around a lot of people, as well as with comprehension and memory); id. at 24 (discussing Plaintiff's history of intellectual disorder); id. at 24-25 (discussing Plaintiff's mental health treatment between January 2014 and December 2016, for anxiety, compulsive behaviors, mood instability, stressors, and trauma history, and that she was actively looking for work with the help of vocational rehabilitation)). In other words, it is clear from the record to what degree the opinions offered by Drs. Bing and Sayers are consistent with and/or supported by other evidence in the record. Accordingly, remand is not required on this basis.
B. ALJ's Reliance on Lay Opinion
The Court turns last to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ relied on lay opinion evidence in assessing the RFC. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ "relied on her own lay interpretation of medical evidence before even considering any of the opinion evidence," and "[h]ad the ALJ filtered the medical evidence through the medical opinions instead, she might have noticed the problems with stress that Dr. Bing and Dr. Sayers wrote about." (See Dkt. 17-1 at 22).
In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with "weigh[ing] all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). An ALJ's conclusion need not "perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision." Id. However, an ALJ is not a medical professional, and "is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings." Ortiz v. Colvin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). In other words, "[a]n ALJ is prohibited from 'playing doctor' in the sense that an ALJ may not substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion . . . ." Quinto v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv-00024 (JCH), 2017 WL 6017931, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff's argument suggests that the ALJ did not properly consider evidence relating to Plaintiff's ability to deal with stress, but any such argument is belied by the record, which demonstrates that the ALJ was cognizant of and discussed evidence relevant to Plaintiff's experience with and ability to cope with stress. (See, e.g., Dkt. 15 at 24 (discussing Plaintiff's complaints of "family stressors"); id. at 25 (noting Plaintiff's report that she was trying to decrease life stressors in August 2018); id. at 26-27 (discussing Dr. Bing's opinion that Plaintiff would have some difficulties tolerating the stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity)). Further, as explained above, the RFC on its face accounts for any stress-related limitations. See Lori M., 2020 WL 7382128, at *5; see also Denise T. o/b/o M.P.S. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-6605L, 2022 WL 446548, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022) ("in some cases, even without explicitly referencing a stress limitation, an RFC determination may adequately account for one. For example, courts have found RFC determinations to be sufficient, on their face, to account for moderate stress-related limitations where they limited claimants to simple, unskilled work along with additional limitations, such as avoidance of production pace work, limitations on social interaction, and few or no occasional changes to workplace settings and procedures" (quotations, citations, and alteration omitted)). Here, the RFC limits Plaintiff to simple work with few workplace changes, no production rate or pace, and only occasional interaction with others. Accordingly, the RFC accounts for any stress-related limitations supported by the record, and Plaintiff is not entitled to remand on this basis.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ misconstrued facts in the record and relied on lay opinion evidence in addressing limitations relating to her fibromyalgia diagnosis and in assessing her credibility. (Dkt. 17-1 at 22-25). Specifically, Plaintiff points to the ALJ's statement that the record contains no mention of multiple trigger points, which Plaintiff contends is inaccurate, and also the ALJ's consideration of the fact that Plaintiff's pain has not been so severe that Plaintiff is unable to crochet, that she can ambulate slowly and has avoided muscle atrophy, as well as that Plaintiff was looking for work and is able to fill out and complete medical forms.
Plaintiff's arguments are misplaced. While and ALJ is not permitted to interpret raw medical data in assessing the RFC, it is well-settled that an ALJ may consider Plaintiff's activities of daily living when evaluating her credibility. See, e.g., Coger v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 335 F. Supp. 3d 427, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2018). In considering activities of daily living, "[t]he issue is not whether the clinical and objective findings are consistent with an inability to perform all substantial activity, but whether plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of his symptoms are consistent with the objective medical and other evidence." Morris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:12-CV-1795 MAD/CFH, 2014 WL 1451996, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2014). This is so because "[o]ne strong indication of credibility of an individual's statements is their consistency, both internally and with other information in the record." Id.
Here, the ALJ concluded that "the objective and subjective evidence and the claimant's testimony do not support the degree of limitation alleged." (Dkt. 15 at 26). In support of that conclusion, the ALJ provided a lengthy explanation as to why she found Plaintiff's allegations of disability not credible. (See Dkt. 15 at 25-26). For example, the ALJ noted that despite Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain during physical examinations, objective imaging was unremarkable or showed only mild findings, and exams failed to reveal motor, reflex, or sensory deficits. Plaintiff also was able to crochet, walk, remain active enough to avoid muscle atrophy, clean, and go to church. Contrary to Plaintiff's implication, the ALJ did not rely solely on this evidence to assess the RFC. Rather, the ALJ considered this evidence in evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff's subjective complaints, which was proper. See Rusin v. Berryhill, 726 F. App'x 837, 840 (2d Cir. 2018) (severe limitations claimed by the plaintiff were inconsistent with his report that he "cooked simple meals daily, left the house daily, can drive, and shopped for groceries every two weeks"); Herrington v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-cv-0315(WIG), 2019 WL 1091385, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2019) ("it is beyond cavil that activities of daily living are an appropriate factor for an ALJ to consider when assessing a claimant's credibility") (collecting cases). This is not a case where the ALJ disregarded well-supported medical opinions, or obtained no medical opinions, and fashioned an RFC from whole cloth. As explained above, the limitations included in the RFC are well-supported by the evidence, including the opinion evidence, in the record. Accordingly, remand is not required on this basis.
Even if the ALJ's statement that the record contained "no mention of multiple trigger points" with respect to Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was inaccurate, the RFC—which limits Plaintiff to light work with several additional limitations for climbing, balancing, crouching, stooping, kneeling, crawling, and handling—accounts for Plaintiff's physical limitations caused by fibromyalgia. (See, e.g., Dkt. 15 at 20 (ALJ explaining that she evaluated Plaintiff's fibromyalgia consistent with SSR 12-2p); id. at 25 (noting that Plaintiff's physical impairments, including her fibromyalgia, limit her to a range of light exertional work with significant postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations)). Plaintiff has made no meaningful argument that she is entitled to physical limitations beyond those already included in the RFC.
As explained in the written determination, the physical RFC is supported by the opinion offered by Diana Gliga, M.D., who found that Plaintiff could be expected to sit normally for an eight-hour workday with normal breaks, and has mild limitations for standing, walking, lifting, and carrying weight, due to fibromyalgia and lower back pain. Dr. Gliga also opined that Plaintiff was limited in her ability to bend, stoop, crouch, and squat, and that she could perform these activities frequently. (See Dkt. 15 at 26, 853). The ALJ ultimately assessed an RFC containing more restrictive limitations than those assessed by Dr. Gliga, which did not fully account for Plaintiff's varicose veins and arthritis that resulted in manipulative and environmental limitations. (Id. at 26).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 18) is granted, and Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 17) is denied.
SO ORDERED.