Opinion
No. 1987 C.D. 2014
07-24-2015
Keith Andrews, Petitioner v. Philadelphia Clerk of Courts, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Petitioner Keith Andrews (Petitioner) petitions, pro se, for a review of a final determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR), dated October 7, 2014, dismissing his appeal with prejudice. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On August 28, 2014, Petitioner submitted a Right to Know Law (RTKL) request to the Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County (Clerk), seeking a certified copy of the Sentencing Order for case #CP 680/0499 2/2. (Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the Clerk responded by providing him with what he refers to as a copy of a bill of information. (Id.) On October 6, 2014, Petitioner filed an appeal to the OOR, asserting a deemed denial. (Id.) On October 7, 2014, the OOR dismissed the appeal with prejudice, holding that the Clerk is a judicial agency and not subject to OOR's jurisdiction. (C.R., Item No. 2.) Petitioner then petitioned this Court for review.
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-.3104.
Counsel did not enter an appearance on behalf of the Clerk, and the Clerk did not file a brief in this matter. By order dated April 2, 2015, the Court precluded the Clerk from filing a brief.
On appeal, Petitioner argues that (1) the OOR erred as a matter of law in concluding that it lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal; (2) Petitioner has a liberty interest in the Sentencing Order; (3) the Clerk's response to the RTKL request was improper because the Clerk provided a bill of information and not the requested sentencing order; and (4) the OOR erred in not requiring the Clerk to provide an attestation stating why the Clerk "denied" the request.
We review OOR's statutory jurisdiction as a matter of law. Hearst Television, Inc. d/b/a WGAL-TV v. Norris, 54 A.3d 23, 29 (Pa. 2012). Accordingly, our standard of review is plenary. Dep't of Labor & Indus, v. Heltzel, 90 A.3d 823, 828 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
We agree with the OOR that it lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of a RTKL request made to the Clerk. Our Court recently explained the OOR's jurisdiction over judicial agencies in Faulk v. Philadelphia Clerk of Courts, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1904 C.D. 2014, filed May 28, 2015), as follows:
The RTKL explicitly confers jurisdiction on appeals officers within OOR to render determinations regarding records disputes involving Commonwealth and local agencies. Section 503(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.503(a). By contrast, appeals of disputes involving a judicial agency are appealed to an appeals officer so designated by that judicial agency. Sections 503(b) and 1101(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §§ 67.503(b), 67.1101(a).
"Judicial agency" is defined by the RTKL as, "[a] court of the Commonwealth or any other entity or office of the unified judicial system." Section 102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.102. "[C]lerks of court . . . are personnel of the unified judicial system." League of Women Voters of Greater Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Cnty., 819 A.2d 155, 158 n. 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citing Section 102 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 102). Based on the express terms of the RTKL, judicial agencies, including Clerk, are not subject to OOR's jurisdiction. 65 P.S. § 67.503(b); see Frazier v. Phila. Cnty. Office of Prothonotary, 58 A.3d 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Antidormi v. Lackawanna Cnty. Clerk of Courts (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 274 C.D. 2011, filed September 14, 2011) (unreported) . . . . Because OOR lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, OOR's dismissal with prejudice was proper. Frazier.Faulk, slip op. at 1-2 (alterations in original). Thus, because the OOR does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a judicial agency's denial of a RTKL request, the OOR properly dismissed Petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
As we explained in Faulk, pursuant to Section 1301(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1301(a), Petitioner should have appealed within 15 days to the appeals officer designated by the Clerk, not to the OOR. Faulk, slip op. at 2.
Even if the OOR had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we would conclude that the appeal does not have merit. First, the "RTKL limits the records that judicial agencies must disclose to financial records." Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna Cnty. v. Pa. Office of Open Records, 2 A.3d 810, 813 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). A Sentencing Order is not a financial record, and, therefore, it is not considered a "public record" of the judicial agency under the RTKL. Thus, the Clerk is not required under the RTKL to grant the request.
We note that the RTKL is not the sole mechanism for obtaining records from judicial agencies. See Faulk, slip op. at 3. The fact that a sentencing order does not qualify as a "public record" under the RTKL does not prevent Petitioner from receiving his request through another means. "[T]he courts are always open under our Constitution, and court records remain accessible to members of the public outside the RTKL." Id. The RTKL simply is not the appropriate vehicle and the OOR is not the appropriate venue through which to obtain a copy of a sentencing order from the Clerk.,
For instance, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 113(A) provides, in part, that "[t]he clerk of courts shall maintain the criminal case file for the court of common pleas," including "orders," and "[u]pon request, the clerk shall provide copies at a reasonable cost."
In order to bolster his argument that the Clerk is in possession of the Sentencing Order and is required to provide it to Petitioner, Petitioner references Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 114, which provides, in part, that "all orders . . . shall be transmitted to the clerk of court's office for filing . . . [, and] copy of any order . . . promptly shall be served on each party's attorney, or the party if unrepresented." Pa. R. Crim. P. 114. This rule, however, relates to the original filing and service of court orders, not subsequent requests for copies of orders.
It appears that the Clerk, as part of its response to Petitioner's RTKL request, provided Petitioner with the following explanation regarding the Clerk's production of responsive documents that are not entitled "sentencing order." The letter provides that:
The [s]entencing order that you have requested is a valid order. It is written, dated and signed as required. The reason your order looks different from those that are more recent is because of the format which was used during the time period of your sentencing.
Previously, the sentencing information was written directly on the bill which would have included the final disposition of the court as well as the Judge's signature. At that time, separate sentence orders were not generated.
Thus, because we have ruled that the OOR properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we need not address Petitioner's remaining arguments.
As to Petitioner's argument that he has a liberty interest in receiving his Sentencing Order, this Court rejected such an argument based on similar facts in Faulk. See Faulk, slip. op. at 4. --------
Accordingly, the final determination of the OOR is affirmed.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of July, 2015, the final determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR), dated October 7, 2014, is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
(Petitioner's Petition for Review, Ex. "A" at p. 13.) Thus, it is possible that the Clerk fully responded to Petitioner's request.