Opinion
Civil No. 02-2340 (GAG).
October 27, 2006
ORDER
On October 11, 2006, the court issued an Order to Show Cause (Docket No. 89) in response to the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Answer to Complaint (Docket No. 88) filed by defendants Ileana Echegoyen-Santaella, Carlos G. Laboy-Diaz, and Sila Maria Calderon. The court commanded defendants Echegoyen, Laboy, and Calderon to show cause as to why the motion to strike should not be granted and why default should not be entered against them. Alternatively, the court requested that the defendants discuss the appropriate remedy, if not default, for the filing of a belated and post-discovery answer. The defendants responded on October 20, 2006 (Docket No. 92). On the same day, the plaintiff also filed a memorandum of law discussing the same issues (Docket No. 117). After reviewing the relevant facts and applicable law, the court DENIES the motion to strike and for entry of default as to defendants Echegoyen and Laboy. The court, however, GRANTS the plaintiff's motion to strike and for entry of default as to defendant Calderón.
I. Procedural Background
The plaintiffs in this case filed their Complaint on September 4, 2002. See Docket No. 1. On January 17, 2003, defendants Calderón and Echegoyen each filed a motion to dismiss. See Docket Nos. 8, 9. Before the court ruled on the motions, the plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint in which they added additional defendants. See Docket No. 16. On April 9, 2003, defendants Echegoyen, Laboy, and Sandra Hernández filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint. See Docket No. 25. This answer was not filed on behalf of Calderón. Id.
The court eventually denied Calderón and Echegoyen's motions to dismiss. See Docket No. 27. Calderón appealed the denial to the First Circuit. See Docket No. 28. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision and returned the case on February 9, 2005. See Docket Nos. 31, 32. As of that date, Calderón had not filed an answer to the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. In fact, at no time did she do so.
After the First Circuit dismissed Calderón's appeal, the court rescheduled the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. On April 18, 2005, the court set the case on a fast-track case management order. See Docket No. 33. The court extended the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines on numerous occasions, each time on joint motion of the parties. See, e.g. Docket Nos. 38, 50, 56. After several extensions, the court finally set September 8, 2006 as the discovery deadline. See Docket No. 67. When the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking an extension to conduct certain depositions, the court strictly enforced the September 8, 2006 deadline and refused to grant the plaintiffs motion. See Docket Nos. 75 (denying motion), 84 (denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration regarding denial of request for extension).
On October 18, 2005, with leave from the court, the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in which they added additional defendants. See Docket No. 53. Almost one year later, defendants Echegoyen, Laboy, and Calderón jointly filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on October 11, 2006.See Docket No. 87. Thus, over four years after the case began and after the close of discovery, Calderón filed her first answer. Id. Also on October 11, 2006, the plaintiffs moved to strike the answer and requested that the court enter default.See Docket No. 88.
II. Discussion
A. Echegoyen and Laboy
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") states that the clerk shall enter default against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend . Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). In support of their motion to strike and for default, the plaintiffs allege that Echegoyen, Laboy, and Calderón never answered the Complaint or Amended Complaint. Rather, plaintiffs allege, these defendants waited four years from the start of the case and until after the close of discovery to file a responsive pleading, namely the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. As explained above, this allegation is untrue with respect to two of the defendants: Echegoyen and Laboy. They filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint on April 9, 2003. See Docket No. 25. Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint did not add to or alter the allegations against Echegoyen and Laboy. Thus, Echegoyen and Laboy's delay in responding to the Second Amended Complaint did not prejudice the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs knew, throughout discovery, which of their allegations Echegoyen and Laboy admitted and denied and about which the they lacked sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the statement. For these reasons, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion to strike and for default as to Echegoyen and Laboy.
B. Calderón
The court's decision with respect to Calderón, however, differs significantly. Calderón did not file an answer to the Complaint or Amended Complaint. She responded to the Complaint with a motion to dismiss which the court eventually denied. The filing of the motion to dismiss (and the subsequent appeal) altered the timing for her answer but did not dispense with the requirement that she file an answer. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4). Certainly, after the First Circuit returned the case to the district court, the Federal Rules required her to submit an answer. See id. She did not do so until one year and eight months after the case returned to district court, almost one year after the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, and one month after discovery closed. Additionally, she requested no extensions from the court and provided no explanation for her failures to file an answer. See Docket No. 92 (arguing delay did not prejudice plaintiffs but offering no explanation for delay). Moreover, in the Response to Order to Cause, the defendants' counsel misleadingly states that the Answer to the Amended Complaint filed on April 9, 2003 was submitted on behalf Calderón. See Docket Nos. 25 (Answer to Amended Complaint), 92, ¶ 3 (Response to Order to Show Cause). In light of her failure to plead and disregard of the Federal Rules, the court concludes that Calderón's Answer to the Second Amended Complaint should be stricken and default should be entered.
In her Response to Order to Show Cause, Calderón argues she carries her burden to show why default should not be entered because, in the event the court actually enters default, she can demonstrate "good cause" to remove the default. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c) (permitting court to set aside default for good cause shown). If the court had already entered default, Calderón, not the plaintiffs, would carry the burden to demonstrate circumstances warranting a set-aside. See McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 503 (1st Cir. 1996). Calderón contends that good cause exists because any delay in answering caused no prejudice to the plaintiffs. She argues that the plaintiffs had sufficient notice, through discovery and her motion to dismiss, of her positions regarding the challenged personnel action. The First Circuit has identified a number of factors a court may consider when evaluating whether good cause exists, one of which is prejudice to the plaintiff. Specifically, the seven factors thus far identified by the First Circuit are: (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary; (3) whether a meritorious defense is presented; (4) the nature of the defendant's explanation for the default; (5) the good faith of the parties; (6) the amount of money involved; and (7) the timing of the motion to set aside entry of default. See KPS Assocs., Inc. v. Designy by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003). None of the factors is dispositive. Rather, it is within the district court's discretion to treat a certain factor as dispositive, not to consider a certain factor, or to consider other relevant factors. See id. at 12 (discussing flexible approach to conducting good cause analysis); see also id. at 14-15 (giving substantial weight to good faith and nature of explanation factors and concluding no good cause shown even where plaintiff would suffer no prejudice).
The evidence Calderón has presented could not support a finding of good cause. The court notes that Calderón did timely respond to the court's Order to Show Cause and this case potentially involves a considerable amount of money. Assuming, arguendo, that Calderón's failure to answer did not prejudice the plaintiffs, consideration of the other factors supports the conclusion that Calderón could not satisfy her burden to show good cause. In fact, she fails to address the majority of the good cause factors. Instead, she simply states that her delay in answering caused no prejudice against the plaintiffs. She offers no explanation for her delay and offers no factual support for the conclusion that her default was not willful. She does not identify the meritorious defenses available to her. Finally, the extreme delay in answering and her failure to offer an explanation is not tantamount to good faith participation in the litigation.
Calderón asks the court to refrain from entering default because, through the course of discovery and through her motion to dismiss, she gave notice to the plaintiffs of her positions on the relevant issues. Under the defendant's rationale, the Federal Rules' answer requirement is a mere procedural technicality that a party can freely ignore. The court is not willing to accept such a rationale. Moreover, the court can find no case law, statute, legislative history, or other legal authority that supports the defendant's contention that the court may dispense with Federal Rules' answer requirement because a defendant's positions on issues may already be known. But see Am. Metals Serv. Export Co. v. Ahrens Aircraft, Inc., 666 F.2d 718, 719 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to treat letter from corporation's president as de facto answer).
While the court seeks to resolve cases on the merits and avoid harsh results, procedural rules authorize the entry of default because default allows the court to maintain the orderly and efficient administration of justice and to encourage parties to comply with court orders and rules of procedure. KPS Assocs., 318 F.3d at 12-13. As part of its effort to maintain the orderly and efficient administration of justice, the court strictly enforced the discovery deadline against the plaintiffs. Given the importance of this overarching goal and Calderón's disregard for the clear rule requiring an answer within a certain time period, the court concludes that entry of default is appropriate.
For these reasons, the court GRANTS the plaintiffs' motion to strike the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint as to Calderón. Accordingly, given Calderón's failure to plead or otherwise defend as required by the Federal Rule, the court will enter default as to Calderón.
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the court DENIES the plaintiffs' motion to strike (Docket No. 88) as to Echegoyen and Laboy. The court GRANTS the motion to strike (Docket No. 88) as to Calderón. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 55(a), default is hereby entered as to defendant Calderón.
SO ORDERED.