Opinion
C.A. No. 99A-02-008-RSG.
Submitted: June 3, 1999.
Decided: October 6, 1999.
Upon Appeal of a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board — AFFIRMED.
Ronald Anderson, Pro Se.
Jeffrey L. Moyer, Esq., Richards, Layton Finger, Wilmington, Delaware, for Employer.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is the Court's decision on Appellee Roland C. Anderson ("Employee")'s appeal of the Industrial Accident Board ("Board")'s decision on remand that denied Employee compensation on the grounds that the statute of limitations has run. For the following reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
I.
Employee worked for General Motors Corporation ("Employer") for approximately six months in 1982. On September 30, 1997, Claimant filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due with the Board. Employee asserted that he suffered from a painful shoulder condition caused by the repetitive nature of the work he performed at General Motors. Employer filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Board conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss but did not hear medical evidence. On November 20, 1997, the Board issued a written decision granting Employer's motion to dismiss on grounds that the statute of limitations had run on Employee's claim.
Employee appealed the dismissal to this Court and challenged the Board's denial of his request for a continuance and restated his position regarding compensation for his alleged injury. This Court determined the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Employee's request for a continuance, but remanded the cause to the Board to determine the date upon which Employee knew or should have known that he experienced a compensable injury. This Court found that without determining when the statute of limitations was triggered, it was legal error for the Board to conclude that the statutory period had run.
Anderson v. General Motors Corp., C.A. No. 97A-12-008, Gebelein, J. (July 27, 1998).
The Board held a hearing on remand on December 1, 1998. The Board was presented with testimony from Employee and with arguments from Employer's counsel. The Board determined that Employee knew or should have known that he experienced a compensable injury during the six months he was working at General Motors and suffering pain. As a result, the Board determined that the statute of limitations had run and Employee was not entitled to compensation.
Anderson v. General Motors Corp., Decision on Remand from Superior Court, Hrg. No. 1112353 (Dec. 15, 1998).
On December 28, 1997, represented by counsel, Employee filed an application for reargument of the Board's decision on the basis of an updated opinion by Employee's physician and a medical report from 1994 which indicated that Employee had full range of motion in his shoulder at that time. The Board denied Employee's application finding that Employee failed to articulate a basis for reopening the matter.
Employee appealed the Board's decision to this. Court contending that the evidence relied upon by the Board, specifically the medical notes of Employee's doctor in 1997, was incorrect and could be clarified by Employee. Employee argues that a December 1998 statement by Employee's physician, written after the hearing on remand, proves that Employee did not know of a previous injury to his shoulder until he experienced pain in June 1997.
II.
The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960); Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battisa v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986).
Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66.
In terms of an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board, this Court is limited to determining whether there is substantial, competent evidence of record in support of the decision rendered, and whether it is free from legal error. The Court does not sit as the trier of fact, nor should the Court substitute its judgment for that rendered by the Board. It is the exclusive function of the Board to evaluate the credibility of witnesses before it.
General Motors Corp. v. Jarrell, Del. Super., 493 A.2d 978, 980 (1985).
Johnson v. Chrysler, 213 A.2d at 66.
Vasquez v. Abex Corp., Del. Supr., No. 49, Horsey, J. (Nov. 5, 1992) (ORDER).
III.
The Board heard testimony from Employee regarding the trigger date of his alleged injury. Employee testified that he first began experiencing pain in his left shoulder in June of 1997, and sought treatment from Dr. Eric Johnson. Employee testified that it was Dr. Johnson that opined that Employee's injury was caused by his employment at General Motors in 1982. Employee did not provide expert testimony regarding this opinion but offered Dr. Johnson's medical notes as evidence.The medical notes taken by Dr. Johnson upon examination of Employee indicated that Employee had a longstanding history of intermittent left should pain. The notes also indicate that Employee stated to Dr. Johnson that "he had experienced occasional pain on and off at his job at GM." On cross examination Employee said he did not remember saying anything about experiencing occasional pain on and off the job.
The Board found Employee's testimony to be confusing and vague. The Board was specifically concerned that Employee was not certain of exactly when he worked for GM and that he testified that he learned of his injury "later in life." The Board found the medical notes of Dr. Johnson, statements made by Employee to his physician in the course of seeking treatment, to be more credible than Employee's current recollection.
When the Board denied Employee's Motion for Reargument it found that Employee failed to provide any explanation for not submitting the medical evidence at the hearing. The Board concluded that the additional evidence would not change the Board's ultimate conclusion, as it found the physician's report from 1994 to be incomplete and unconvincing, and the Board found "more credence in Dr. Johnson's 1997 medical report, which was written for the purpose of treatment, than the December 1998 note, which was written for purposes of litigation."
IV.
This Court finds that the testimony and medical evidence presented to the Board allowed it to reasonably reach the conclusion that Employee knew or should have known of his compensable injury while experiencing pain on the job in 1982. The Board was free to weigh Employee's medical evidence more heavily than Employee's testimony, and there appears to be no lack of deductive reasoning on the Board's part either in making that choice, or in drawing its conclusions from it. Accordingly, Employee's appeal is denied and the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.